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ABSTRACT
This study examined the racial rhetoric of Wade
Hampton with particular attention to claims that he was a
moderate and sought to solve the racial problems of the
period through rhetorical means.

The study investigated:

(1) the extent to which his speeches addressed the racial
issue, (2) the consistency of his position, and (3) the
nature and appropriateness of his appeals.

State newspapers

were examined to locate his speeches, which were categorized
by period and subject.

Examination of the data revealed

four specific racial exigencies to which Hampton responded:
(1) the loss of black labor(1865-66),
(1867-68),

(2) black suffrage

(3) black political domination (1876), and (4)

proscription of black political participation (1877-78).
His gubernatorial campaign of 1876 and representative
responses to each exigence were critiqued using the
methodology of the rhetorical situation.

The speeches were

analyzed in terms of exigence, audience, constraints, and
appropriateness.
The following conclusions were drawn:

(1) over ninety

percent of Hampton's reported speeches 1865-1878 addressed
the racial exigence.

(2) His speeches were remarkably

consistent with one another and with his private
iv

correspondence.

(3) Hampton envisioned a white controlled

society with blacks performing most of the labor while
enjoying legal equality, educational opportunity, and
possibilities for political office.

To achieve that end he

asked whites to recognize the new political realities, treat
the blacks with kindness and fairness, and grant them legal
and political rights and privileges.

To the blacks, he

appealed to their sense of identification as southern men
and contended that economically they were inextricably
linked to the fate of the native whites.

To audiences black

and white his ethos was his most dominant appeal.
Throughout the period he sought rhetorical rather than
violent means for modifying the exigencies.

His speeches

reveal an approach to the racial issue that was pragmatic
and moderate.

v

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem and Justification
C. Vann Woodward in Origins of the New South: 18771913 labels Wade Hampton as "one of the foremost spokesmen
of the South during the post Civil War period."1

Huber

Ellingsworth in his study of "Southern Reconciliation
Orators in the North, 1868-1899," identifies Wade Hampton
as one of the four most prominent southerners to speak in
the North on the reconciliation theme.2

These observations

logically raised the question of the actual nature and
extent of Hampton's speaking in the South, and most
especially in his native state, South Carolina.

Preliminary

investigations indicated that while historians of the
Reconstruction era in South Carolina concurred in the
significance of his role, referred to his persuasive cam
paigns, and quoted from his speeches, no one had done a
study of Hampton's speaking in South Carolina.

In fact, the

1Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter, eds.,
A History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1951), vol 9, Origins of the New South. by
C. Vann Woodward, 321.
2Huber Ellingsworth, "Southern Reconciliation Orators
in the North, 1868-1899" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State
University, 1955), 103.
1

2

only study of any of Hampton's speaking was Ellingsworth's
which was limited to three speeches delivered in the North.
While the whole of Wade Hampton's speaking career
could profitably be studied, the racial issue was of such
critical importance in the period and so dominant in his
rhetoric that it deserved to be isolated and studied apart
from his other speeches.

Hampton's involvement with the

racial-political conflict in South Carolina is noted by all
who study Reconstruction in South Carolina, but Hampton
Jarrell is the only historian to concentrate exclusively on
that involvement.

In Wade Hampton and the Nearo he identi

fies Hampton with the policies of Lincoln, Johnson, and L.
Q.

c.

Lamar, and argues that Hampton sought a middle road in

race relations between black dominance on the one hand and
proscription on the other.3

This claim toward moderation in

his racial position gains significance in light of Ellings
worth 's claim that Hampton was attempting through his
rhetoric to bring reconciliation between North and South.
Jarrell further observes that he chose to focus his study of
race relations "around the personality of Wade Hampton
because throughout the period he was at the center of the
conflict."4

Thus, it seems profitable to focus this study

of Wade Hampton's speaking on the issue on which he was at
3Hampton M. Jarrell, Wade Hampton and the Negro: The
Road Not Taken (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1949), ix.
4Ibid., xi.

"the center of the conflict," and which he claimed to be
attempting to solve through persuasion rather than coercion.
As early as 1865-67 Wade Hampton spoke to both white
and black audiences in an attempt to influence race rela
tions.

In the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he publicly

disavowed violence and advocated free speech.

Judge T. J.

Mackey, a converted radical, said there were
three methods of dealing with the Negro voters-— three
methods: one is to kill him. . . . The next method is
to defraud the Negro of his vote. . . . The last is the
persuasive method. . . . This is the Hampton method, and
by it thousands of Negroes have been induced to . . .
vote the Democratic ticket.5
Ben Tillman, Hampton's opponent in the 1890's, derided
Hampton for his naive belief in the power of persuasion:
He [Hampton] blundered egregiously in urging the policy
of persuasion; and of convincing the Negroes by argument
to vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen
thousand Negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully
mistaken. . . . Gary preached the only effective
doctrine for the times: that "one ounce of fear was
worth a pound of persuasion," and was prepared and did
ride roughshod over the Negroes.6
Thus, the study of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric clearly
offers the rhetorical critic the opportunity to study the
attempt of a man who by his own testimony as well as that of
his contemporaries sought a rhetorical solution to one of
the most volatile continuing problems in American history.
5Greenville Enterprise and Mountaineer. 21 April 1880.
6Ben jamin R. Tillman, The Struggles of '76: Address
Delivered at the Red Shirt Reunion. Anderson. S.C.. August
25th. 1909 (n.p., n.d.), 27.
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This study will examine the racial rhetoric of Wade
Hampton in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878.

The lower

date was chosen since it represented the beginning of a new
relationship between the races in the South, and the upper
date since it marked Hampton's accession to the United
States Senate and the end of his significant involvement in
the race issue.

The study will attempt to answer the

following questions:

(1) to what extent were Hampton's

speeches in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 concerned
with the race issue; (2) what arguments and strategies did
he employ to deal with the racial situation; (3) did his
position and strategies remain consistent throughout the
period; (4) to what extent did Hampton practice and
encourage rhetorical means for solving the race problem as
opposed to more coercive methods; (5) to what extent did
Hampton's speeches offer a constructive solution to the
problem of race relations in South Carolina; and (6) what
was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial rhetoric.
Material and Methods
The concept of the "rhetorical situation" as devel
oped by Lloyd Bitzer seemed to offer the best methodology
for analyzing Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric.

Bitzer

defines rhetorical situation as a "complex of persons,
events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or
potential exigence which can be completely or partially
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so

constrain human decision or action as to bring about the
significant modification of the exigence."7

In his detailed

explication and extension of the theory, John Patton notes
the importance of the role of perception in the situational
theory and concludes that "the situational theory offers a
way to explain and evaluate perceptions in terms of the
accuracy and clarity with which they reflect observable,
historical features of situations and the constructive
potential of the responses to which they may lead for the
solution of genuine problems."8
Prior to the Civil War Wade Hampton had been only
modestly involved in politics and had acquired no reputation
as a speaker.

After the war, however, Hampton spoke before

audiences black and white in an effort to influence racial
relations in South Carolina.

The application of the

methodology of the rhetorical situation allows the critic to
see Hampton's speeches after the war as a response to an
exigence, and to evaluate his perception of the exigence as
well as the nature and quality of his response.
The first step in executing the study was to acquire
an understanding of the historiographical problems
surrounding the Reconstruction era.

Second was the reading

7Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy
and Rhetoric 1 (Winter 1968): 6.
8John H. Patton, "Causation and Creativity in Rhetori
cal Situations: Distinctions and Implications," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 65 (February 1979): 54-55.

of general sources on the South, from after the Civil War
until the turn of the century, and on Reconstruction in
South Carolina.

In addition to the comprehensive South

Carolina Purina Reconstruction by Francis Simkins and Robert
Woody, the following works were of value to the study:
Hampton Jarrell's Wade Hampton and the Negro; William
Cooper, Jr.'s The Conservative Regime: South Carolina 18771890; George Tindall's South Carolina Negroes. 1877-1900;
Thomas Holt's Black over White:

Negro Political Leadership

in South Carolina During Reconstruction; and Joel William
son' s After Slavery: The Nearo in South Carolina Purina
Reconstruction. 1861-1877.

Most of the Hampton biographies

were eulogistic in nature and of little value.

All

references in the secondary sources to speeches by Hampton
were noted for further research in the newspapers.
From the Charleston News and Courier (1865-1878), the
Columbia Daily Phoenix (1866-1875) and the Columbia Daily
Register (1875-1878) references to speeches and speech
texts were obtained.

Hampton's papers were consulted for

any additional references to speeches, comments about his
speeches, and expressions of his attitude and strategies
toward the racial problem.

The speeches were then classi

fied according to date, location, occasion, racial mix of
the audience, and subj ect.

To develop the nature of the

exigence and the attitudes of the audience, manuscript
collections of key individuals, convention proceedings,

diaries, government investigations into the Ku Klux outrages
and the 1876 election, newspapers, and published accounts of
events by participants were consulted.
Once the nature of the exigence and the attitude of
the audience were established, a decision had to be made
whether to analyze a single representative response to the
exigence or a synthesis of all of his responses to the
situation.
employed.

A combination of the two procedures was
On the economic exigence in 1865 and the suffrage

issue in 1867, single speeches existed that clearly and
fully represented his response to the problem.

In the

defense of his policies in 1878, two speeches were so
frequently cited by the press and historians as key
responses by Hampton that both were deemed necessary to
adequately represent his views, especially since they were
delivered to different audiences in divergent sections of
the state.

For the campaign of 1876 there was no one speech

that stood above the others as the embodiment of all his
appeals; thus, the campaign was analyzed as a whole with an
emphasis on those speeches for which reasonably verbatim
texts were available, and which were given in different
parts of the state.

Once the selection process was com

pleted, the various appeals were analyzed and evaluated in
terms of the appropriateness of Hampton's response to the
exigence.

Responses across the period were then compared

for consistency.

Organization
The reporting of the investigation is organized
around the four exigencies of the racial problem to which
Wade Hampton responded.
Chapter II places the racial speaking of Hampton into
perspective and reveals the extent to which his addresses
were devoted to the racial issue.

It attempts to trace the

movement and speaking of Hampton in general terms throughout
the period 1865-1878.
Chapter III identifies the first racial exigence as
economic and analyzes his response in the Richland Fork
address.
Chapter IV focuses on the issue of unrestricted suf
frage for the blacks and examines his freedmen's address to
an audience of blacks in Columbia, South Carolina in 1867.
Chapter V examines the campaign of
to black domination of the state.

1876 as a response

Hampton's canvass is

evaluated with particular concern for the claims made by
some members of his party that the election had been won,
not through persuasion, but by violence and intimidation.
Chapter VI isolates Hampton's response to the attack
upon his racial policies by some elements of the Democratic
party.

His Blackville and Greenville addresses are analyzed

as two of his most direct and forceful replies.
Chapter VII provides a summary of the chapters and a
general conclusion for the study.

CHAPTER II

THE RHETOR
The purpose of this chapter is not to develop a short
biography of Wade Hampton nor to consider his education in
rhetoric nor the development of his rhetorical skills.

The

chapter seeks rather to answer the question of the extent to
which Hampton incorporated the race issue into his rhetoric
from immediately after the Civil War until his election to
the United States Senate in December of 1878.

Since each of

the analytical chapters focuses rather narrowly on specific
speeches in response to the immediate exigence, this chapter
will attempt to provide a broader perspective on his move
ment and speaking during the period.
1865-1875
Wade Hampton's speaking from after the war until his
nomination for governor in August of 1876 divides nicely
into two distinct phases:

The politically active period

from 1865 to 1869, and the more personal period from 1869 to
1876.
From 1865 until 1869, Hampton took an active, visible
role in South Carolina politics.

He was elected to the

constitutional convention called by Governor Perry in
9

10

September of 1865, though he was notified of his election
too late to attend.1

In the October gubernatorial election,

despite repeated statements that he did not want to be
governor, Hampton came within 743 votes of defeating James
L. Orr.2

Hampton's desire to stay out of office and attend

to personal affairs is indicated by the voting of his home
district of Richland County; not only did they vote Orr for
governor by more than a ten to one margin,3 they also did
not elect Hampton to represent them in the new legislature.4
Though he held no office, he was active in expressing
his views in speeches and published letters.

In July 1866

he was elected as one of four vice presidents at the state
convention of the National Union Convention, but he was not
selected to go to Philadelphia as a delegate to the national
gathering.5
With his address in March of 1867 to the freedmen in
Columbia, Hampton began a period of active influence that
continued through 1868 and was not to be matched until his
campaign for governor in 1876.

From March until August he

^■Columbia Daily Phoenix. 15, 27 September 1865.
2Charleston Daily Courier. 18 October 1865; Columbia
Daily Phoenix. 24 November 1865.
3Columbia Daily Phoenix. 29 November 1865.
4John Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina. 18651877 (Columbia; The State, 1905), 21-22.
5Columbia Daily Phoenix. 1 August 1866.
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actively worked to gain control of the black vote.6

His

efforts were a total failure, and in November he was elected
vice president of a convention of conservatives which met in
Columbia to protest the political power put into the hands
of the blacks by the Reconstruction Acts.7
Unable to control the black vote he turned his efforts
to ousting the radicals and putting a friendly Democratic
administration into power in Washington.

In April of 1868

he was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the
state Democratic party, and in June made a delegate to the
national convention.8

He was a prominent figure at the

convention9 and his role on the platform committee became a
source of continuing controversy when he claimed shortly
after the convention:

"I then added the clause which you

will find embodied in the platform:

'and we declare that

the Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary,
and void.'

That is my plank in the platform."10

Judging from newspaper reports, Hampton's most active
period of speaking during the ten years between the end of
the war and his campaign for governor took place from July
6Jarrell, 17; Francis Butler Simkins and Robert
Hilliard Woody, South Carolina During Reconstruction (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 83-84.
7Columbia Daily Phoenix. 7, 8 November 1868.
8Charleston Daily Courier. 10 June 1868.
9Ibid, 7, 11 July 1868.
10Columbia Daily Phoenix. 26 July 1868.
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through October of 1868.

During these months Hampton spoke

at Democratic rallies throughout the state.

The Columbia

Phoenix mentioned speeches by Wade Hampton in Charleston,
Columbia, Greenville, Anderson, Marion, Sumter, and
Walhalla.11

The fall election and the rout of the Demo

cratic party by the radicals ended the early period of
Hampton's active political involvement.
Hampton Jarrell notes:
After 1868, Wade Hampton retired from active involvement
in South Carolina politics, except some activity in 1870
in a fusion campaign headed by M. C. Butler. Though he
was in and out of the state during the eight years 18681876, most of his time was spent with his plantation in
Mississippi.12
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that, because he was
out of the state much of the time and not openly involved in
political affairs, he was not involved at all.

His letters

to Armistead Burt, John Mullaly and James Conner were filled
with political advice and strategy.13
From 1869 until 1876 his energies were spent in an
effort to restore the health of his wife and his fortune.
Prior to the war he was the head of one of the wealthiest
families in the South and perhaps the nation.

At the "time

13-Ibid, 26 July; 15, 21 August; 9 September; 10, 11
October 1868.
12Jarrell, 34-35.
13Wade Hampton to A.L. Burt, 22 October 1871, A. L.
Burt Papers, Duke University Library, Durham; Wade Hampton
to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade Hampton Papers, South
Caroliniana Library, Columbia; Wade Hampton to John Mullaly,
19 May 1872, Wade Hampton Papers.
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of his death in 1835 Wade Hampton I was reported to be the
wealthiest man in the 22 United States.”14

Under Wade

Hampton II, Millwood, the family home outside of Columbia,
and one of three Hampton plantations, was the "mecca for
South Carolina's aristocracy, as well as for politicians.
. . . The mansion's guest wings always were filled when the
legislature was in session, and it was at Millwood's dinner
table that most of the governors were chosen."15

At the

outbreak of the war Wade Hampton had approximately nine
hundred slaves at his personal plantation in Mississippi and
together the family had at least three thousand.16

After

Sherman's passage through Columbia two lonely corinthian
columns were all that remained of the once magnificent
Millwood.

In May of 1866, Hampton wrote, "My reputation is

the only thing that I have left and I am jealous of its
preservation."17

On December 4, 1868, he filed voluntary

bankruptcy proceedings in Jackson, Mississippi, listing
liabilities of one million dollars and assets of entirely
mortgaged properties.

Ten months later two remaining

Hampton residences in Columbia, Diamond Hill and Southern
14Virginia G. Meynard, The Venturers. The Hampton.
Harrison, and Earle Families of Virginia. South Carolina.
and Texas (Easley, S.C.: Southern Historical Press, 1981),
140.
15Ibid, 174.
16Ibid, 211.
17Wade Hampton to Chancellor Carver, 25 May 1866, Wade
Hampton Papers.
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Cross, were sold at public auction.

Hampton was the sole

bidder for Southern Cross, purchasing it for one hundred
dollars.18

In a letter to James Conner in April of 1869, he

clearly indicated his concern about his financial matters.
"You will be glad to hear," he wrote, "that I have been able
to put matters in such shape as to give me reasonable ground
to hope that I may in time pay off my debts.

The hope of my

life is to do this and I shall devote all my energies to its
accomplishment."19
To increase his chances for paying off his debts, in
the fall of 1871, he accepted a position as vice president
in the insurance company of J. W. Davis.20

Because of his

new position, Hampton indicated in the same letter that he
intended to move his family to Baltimore for the winter.
is difficult to pinpoint Hampton's exact location and
activities over the next few years.

Various pieces of

correspondence show him dwelling at different times in
Baltimore, Wildwoods, and Columbia, with most of his time
apparently divided between Wildwoods and Baltimore.

From

the spring of 1873, until her death in March of 1874, much
of his time was spent caring for his sick wife in
Charlottesville, Virginia.
18Meynard, 255-56.
19Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade
Hampton Papers.
20Wade Hampton to A. L. Burt, 22 October 1871, A. L.
Burt Papers.

It

During this period there is no record of Hampton
delivering a single political address, though he did deliver
a number of ceremonial speeches.

In 1871, he addressed the

Society of Confederate Soldiers and Sailors on the "Life and
Character of General Robert E. Lee.'*21

Notices in 1873 in

the Wilmington (North Carolina) Star and the Augusta
Constitutionalist advertised that General Hampton would be
speaking in each city on General Lee and that proceeds from
the speeches would go into the Lee Memorial Fund.22

Though

the evidence is not conclusive, it seems highly probable
that Hampton delivered this address numerous times through
out the South on behalf of the fund.

The only speech during

this period that has relevance for this study is his 1869
address at the Macon (Georgia) Fair in which he dealt at
length with the new role of black labor.
During the politically active years from 1865 through
1868, it is possible to identify fifteen occasions on which
Hampton was the major speaker.
available for eight.

Of these fifteen, texts are

The seven for which no texts are

available are all campaign speeches given at Democratic
rallies during the late summer and fall of 1868.

About

these campaign speeches, two assumptions seem reasonable:
21Wade Hampton, Address on the Life and Character of
Gen. Robert E. Lee (Baltimore: John Murphy and Co., 1871).
22Wilmington Star in Charleston Daily Courier. 20
February 1873; and Augusta Constitutionalist in Charleston
Daily Courier. 22 January 1873.

(1) he delivered more than the seven reported in the papers;
and (2) they dealt in part at least with the racial
question, since that was the predominant issue at the time.
Of the eight for which texts are available, one was given to
a predominantly black audience (1867 freedmen's address),
one was given to a racially mixed audience (1865 Richland
Fork address), and one to a northern audience (1868 Union
Square address).

The others were delivered to predominantly

southern white audiences.

In five of the eight speeches

Hampton made at least one reference to the race issue.

In

his commencement address at Washington College, his speech
to the citizens of Charleston after his return from the
Democratic convention, and his address to the Richland
County Democratic club, there were no references to race.
Among the five that contained racial references the most
extensive development of the subject occurred in the
freedmen's address and the Richland Fork speech.

While the

other three contained significant references to race, it was
clearly not the dominant theme.
From 1869 until his campaign for governor in 1876,
there was only one reference to a speech by Hampton dealing
with race, the 1869 address to the Georgia State Fair at
Macon.

His other speeches were ceremonial and contained no

mention of race.

1876-1878

In June of 1876 Hampton returned to South Carolina
from Mississippi to attend the Centennial Celebration at
Fort Moultrie.23

Martin Gary had also been in Charleston

that weekend to advocate a straightout Democratic ticket for
the fall election.

By accident Hampton and Gary departed

Charleston on the same train, and while traveling together
discussed the political situation in South Carolina.
Recognizing in Hampton a man who could unite the various
factions of the party, Gary persuaded Wade Hampton to accept
the nomination for governor on a straightout ticket.24
Following the conversation Hampton went to his mountain home
in Cashiers, North Carolina and remained there until the
state convention in August.25
Beginning with the convention and continuing through
the election of 1878, Hampton engaged in the most extensive
speaking on the racial issue of his entire career.

During

the 1876 canvass, which started on September 2 and concluded
November 6, Hampton, by his own testimony, spoke twice in
every county in the state with the exception of Lexington,
for a total of approximately fifty-seven speeches at large
23Congress, House, Select Committee on the Recent
Election in South Carolina, Testimony on the Recent Election
in South Carolina. 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1877, 331.
24William Arthur Sheppard, Red Shirts Remembered;
Southern Brigadiers of the Reconstruction Period (Atlanta:
The Ruralist Press, 1940), 80-89.
25Recent Election in South Carolina. 331.
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meetings.26
racial issue.

The major theme of these addresses was the
In his December inaugural address he devoted

a significant portion to reiterating his racial position and
acknowledging his debt to the blacks for their support.27
Since the first three months of 1877 were occupied
with the political maneuvering between Wade Hampton and
Daniel Chamberlain for recognition as the rightful governor
of the state, it is not surprising that there is no evidence
of any major speeches being delivered by Hampton.

When he

returned in April from his Washington conference with
President Hayes, he delivered a short but important speech,
assuring the people that he would be their governor and
renewing his commitment to an equitable racial policy.
Other major addresses within the state were given later in
April at Charleston and at the Darlington County Fair in
November.28

In all of these speeches his racial policy was

the prominent theme.
During the summer and fall, Hampton traveled exten
sively outside of South Carolina.

From the middle of June

until the middle of July, he traveled to New York state.
From the middle of August until early September, he was in
Virginia and Washington, and for two weeks in the middle of
26Ibid, 305; and Alfred B. Williams, Hampton and His
Red Shirts: South Carolina’s Deliverance in 1876
(Charleston: Walker, Evans and Cogswell Co., 1935), 361.
27Charleston News and Courier, 14 December 1876.
28Ib.id, 19 April; 5 November 1877.

September, he was on an excursion to Illinois.

On the New

York trip, he was the featured speaker for the celebration
in Auburn of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Shields
Guard, a New York National Guard Company.
was his good friend from before the war.

General Shields
In his speech,

Hampton made direct reference to the recent election and his
approach to the blacks.29

The July trip included a major

address at Greenbriar, West Virginia, to a gathering of
troops from both Virginias.

The focus of the speech was

upon national reconciliation, and it included only a passing
reference to the battle in South Carolina for "the equal
rights of all under the constitution.1,30
The September trip to Illinois involved more speeches
than either of the previous two excursions.

The main

occasion was an address to the Winnebago County Fair in
Rockford, Illinois.

He did not develop the racial issue,

but spoke again on the broad themes of national reconcil
iation. 31

On his return trip he joined President Hayes1

traveling party and delivered addresses in Louisville,
Kentucky; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Atlanta, Georgia.

The

ones in Louisville and Chattanooga had no references to race
and were basically praise for Hayes' policies.

The Atlanta

29Ibid, 21, 25 June 1877; for analysis of the speech
see Ellingsworth, 104-29.
30Charleston News and Courier. 20 August 1877.
31Ibid, 17 September 1877; for a detailed analysis of
the speech see Ellingsworth, 104-29.

speech occurred after he had separated from President Hayes,
and was an unscheduled affair.

He had planned only to spend

the night and travel on to Columbia, but Georgia officials
successfully prevailed upon him to stay over and deliver an
address to the people of Atlanta.
related themes:

The speech focused on two

(1) the recent campaign in South Carolina,

with an emphasis on his approach to the blacks, and (2) the
statesmanlike conduct of President Hayes.32

In addition to

these three extended excursions, Hampton also took a short
trip in mid-October to Raleigh, North Carolina, to speak at
the State Fair.

He did not deal with the race issue.33

Of

these seven major addresses delivered outside the state the
race issue was only developed in two of them, probably
because he chose to deal with broad national reconciliation
themes, rather than the narrower issue of the race problem
in South Carolina.
In sharp contrast to 1877, most of Hampton's speaking
in 1878 was within the state and on the racial issue.

Out

of twenty-eight speeches for which at least a summary is
available, the platform of 1876 and his policies toward
blacks were mentioned in all but two.

The two exceptions

were a Washington's birthday address to the Washington Light
Infantry reunion in which he limited himself to war themes,
and a speech in Pickens which dealt with what was a critical
32Ibid, 24 September 1877.
33Ibid, 20 October 1877.
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problem for them at that moment, the revenue issue.

In the

instance of the Washington's birthday speech, Hampton did
address the racial issue later the same day.

At a reception

for the occasion, he strongly appealed for adherence to his
racial policies.34
In the spring of 1878 Hampton reaffirmed to the
Democratic congressional caucus his commitment to the
platform of 1876 and the pledges he had made to the
blacks.35

Shortly thereafter he took that commitment on a

speaking tour through the up-state with speeches in
Anderson, Newberry, Abbeville, and numerous short impromptu
speeches

at locations between.36

In late April and June,

he delivered ceremonial addresses at the Old Fort cele
bration in Ninety-Six, the Aiken Schuetzenfest. and at the
commencement exercises of all black Claflin University.
Though he adapted to the occasion in each instance he still
incorporated his commitment to moderate racial policies into
each one.31
His two strongest racial speeches, in which he clearly
enunciated his views and denounced the racial extremists in
the Democratic party, were given during the summer and early
fall at Blackville in the lower part of South Carolina,
34Ibid, 25 February; 23 September 1878.
35Ibid, 21 March 1878.
36Ibid, 27, 29 March; 1, 11 April 1878.
37Columbia Daily Register. 26 April, 16, 19 June 1878.
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and at Greenville, in the upper portion of the state.

The

election canvass began in Edgefield, shortly after the state
Democratic convention, and then moved to Spartanburg.

At

that point Hampton became ill and had to retire to his
mountain retreat for about a month of recuperation.

In mid-

September, he returned to the canvass with his Greenville
address as well as a few others in the upper and middle
sections of the state.38

He closed the canvass with an

unusually strong effort in the predominantly black counties
in the lower part of the state.39

The year ended with an

overwhelming victory for Wade Hampton and the Democratic
party,40 his election to the United States Senate, and a
tragic hunting accident that cost him a leg and left him
incapacitated for several months.41
When Wade Hampton went to the United States Senate in
1879, he left behind him in South Carolina the racial
conflict in which he had so long been engaged.

His policies

were in place and men of his choosing in power.

In 1880 he

used his power to squelch the gubernatorial bid of his
political nemesis Martin Gary, and thus William Cooper, Jr.,
38Ibid., 13 August, 21, 24, 28 September 1878; and
Charleston News and Courier. 19 August; 20, 23 September; 1
October 1878.
39Columbia Daily Register. 6 October 1878; and Charles
ton News and Courier. 3, 4, 12, 22, 29, 31 October 1878.
40Simkins and Woody, 548.
41Jarrell, 151-52.
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concludes, "with both party and state safe, Hampton no
longer felt called upon to take an active role in state
affairs."42

He remained in the Senate until ousted by Ben

Tillman in 1890.

With the exception of a speech on black

emigration in 1890, he ceased speaking on the racial issue
once he went to the Senate.
Throughout the period of a little more than thirteen
years, three dominant themes emerged in his speaking.

The

Lost Cause theme recurred in his many ceremonial addresses,
particularly those given to various veteran's gatherings.
The theme of national reconciliation and harmony appeared
strongly in speeches outside of the state and to a lesser
degree in those within South Carolina.

Because of the three

political campaigns of 1868, 1876, and 1878, in which he was
totally involved, and in which race was the major issue,
this theme became by far the dominant one in his speaking
from 1865 through 1878.
42William J. Cooper, Jr., The Conservative Regime:
South Carolina. 1877-1890. Johns Hopkins University Studies
in Historical and Political Science, Series 86 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 81.

CHAPTER III

RICHLAND FORK ADDRESS AS RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC EXIGENCE
Exigence
Lloyd F. Bitzer in his article, "Functional Communi
cation: A Situational Perspective," defines exigence as "an
imperfection marked by some degree of urgency; it is a
defect, an obstacle, something to be corrected.

It is

necessarily related to interests and valuations.1,1

The

exigence is rhetorical when it is "capable of positive
modification and where such modification requires or invites
messages that engage audiences who can modify those exi
gencies through their mediating thought, judgment or
action."2

What then was the urgent imperfection that Wade

Hampton sought to modify through rhetoric, and was the
perceived imperfection capable of positive modification
through discourse?
Unquestionably the dominant exigence in the southern
mind during the immediate post Civil War years and perhaps,
1Lloyd Bitzer, "Functional Communication: A Situational
Perspective," in Rhetoric in Transition, ed. Eugene White
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1980), 26.
2Ibid., 27.
24
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arguably, until the present was the new relationship that
existed between whites and blacks.
came the end of a way of life.

With the end of the war

During the spring and summer

of 1865 some 400,000 pieces of property in South Carolina
suddenly became free men and women.3

While the overriding

exigence was the new role of the blacks, urgency was
expressed through a variety of concerns that generally
revolved around economic and political issues.
The first Shockwave from the emancipation of the
slaves was economic.

The slaves had a market value of $200

million4 which was, of course, instantly lost when they were
freed.

While the loss of the slaves without compensation

represented an exigence that, as four years of fighting had
proved, was not rhetorical, the new amorphous condition
between planter and laborer presented a compelling exigence
that threatened the economic survival of the planter and
cried out for messages capable of adjusting and harmonizing
the desires and needs of the blacks with those of the
planters.
The best study of the new economic relationship that
developed between ex-slaves and planters in the early years
after the war is Joel Williamson's After Slavery.5
3Simkins and Woody, 12.
4Ibid.
5Joel Williamson, After Slavery (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965).

His
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analysis will be used extensively in establishing the
conditions of the period.
"Contrary to tradition," writes Williamson,
the typical slave upon hearing of emancipation did not
shout with delight, throw his hat into the air, gather
the few possessions he claimed, and run pellmell for
Charleston. The great majority received the news
quietly and began to make deliberate preparation to
terminate their slavery definitely by some overt act.6
Williamson goes on to point out that "desertion was a common
means by which the ex-slave asserted his freedom."7

Henry

Ravenel, a distinguished scholar and planter in the Edge
field district recorded in his diary for June 14, 1865:
The negroes are very foolishly leaving their former
masters. Nearly every family in Aiken has lost some.
. . . They all want to go to the cities, either Charles
ton or Augusta. The fields have no attraction, mine are
still with me that have been living here.8
A memorial to President Johnson in July sounded a similar
theme:
The able bodied men and women have, in many instances,
abandoned the farms upon which they were employed,
leaving behind them the children and the old to be
supported by the proprietors. . . . Those who remain
upon the farms are generally indisposed to labor as they
had previously done . . . and many are loitering idly
and mischievously through the country.9
While the evidence seems compelling that many slaves
6Ibid., 33.
7Ibid., 34.
8Arney Robinson Childs, ed., The Private Journal of
Henrv William Ravenel. 1859-1887 (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1947), 244.
9,1A memorial to President Johnson for Restoration of
Civil Government," Columbia Daily Phoenix. 7 July 1865.

deserted their former masters shortly after the war,
Williamson convincingly argues that there were important
differences in the nature and timing of the desertions.
Generally, freedmen who as slaves had labored as domes
tics, mechanics, and in the extractive industries
departed at the first reasonable convenient opportunity.
In doing so, they typically exhibited some degree of
malice toward their recent owners. On the other hand,
those who had labored in the fields generally finished
the year in their accustomed places, and when they left
seldom departed with expressions of ill will toward
their late masters.10
The limited early departure of field workers was
brought about primarily through "the insistence of the
occupation forces and the Freedmen's Bureau that plantation
owners and laborers contract to harvest and divide the 1865
crop before parting."11

As early as May, Chief Justice

Salmon Chase was warning the blacks against indolence, and
encouraging them to find steady employment:
They say that you will be disorderly, shiftless, lazy;
that you will starve rather than work; that wages cannot
tempt you to work. . . . show that you will be honest,
temperate, industrious, and faithful in your employ
ments ; that you are ready to do honest work for honest
wages."12
The definition of "honest work and honest wages" was to be
settled upon through the contract system developed earlier
on the Sea Islands by General Saxton.

The contracts

specified in substantial detail the work to be done by the
10Williamson, 34.
i:LIbid., 38.
12Charleston Daily Courier. 13 May 1865.

laborer and the remuneration to be given.

To be reasonably

certain that the contracts were equitable, "Saxton. . . .
ordered his agents to visit each plantation upon which
private parties employed Negroes, to read the contract to
the laborers, to adjust any differences then and there, and
to note carefully on the contract itself the assent of each
worker.1,13

In instances where the workers were dissatisfied

with the contracts, they were encouraged to finish the agri
cultural season, and then seek new employers.

Gen. Charles

Van Wyck, addressing a mass meeting of freedmen on August
11, urged that "those who were dissatisfied with their
present homes and employers, must be patient and enduring
and wait until January and if they could better themselves
to do so, but now to remain close at home and work."14
Apparently as the new year approached many felt they
could improve their contracts or at least felt the need to
assert their freedom by some overt act.

After examining

numerous letters, diaries, and journals of planters through
out the state, Williamson concludes that
Christmas Day, 1865, saw many South Carolina plantations
entirely deserted by their negro populations. . . . In
Spartanburg District, David Golightly Harris recorded in
his journal that all of his "negroes leave today, to
hunt themselves a new home, while we will be left to
wait upon ourselves.1,15
13Williamson, 68.
14Columbia Daily Phoenix. 15 August 1865.
15Williamson,

68.
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Thus, while the immediate exigence of keeping laborers in
the fields for the 1865 agricultural season was satisfied to
some extent, the future of that supply was by no means
certain.
In addition to their concern about the constancy of
the labor supply, many planters were dissatisfied with the
quality and amount of work performed by the blacks under the
new arrangement.

In a letter to a northern journal, a

Camden planter wrote "they are as indolent and regardless of
their contracts as was to be expected."16

He went on to say

that in the past large numbers of blacks were kept on poor
land, but that it was not economical under the new condi
tions.

By the middle of October, a correspondent for the

Chicago Times was describing the contract system as a total
failure:
They have made fair trial of negro labor, and they all
say it is a complete and total failure. It has been
fairly demonstrated that the negro, left to himself and
allowed to work at his own volition, will not work in
such a manner as to make his labor profitable, either to
himself or his employer. The people of the South have
been brought to the verge of starvation this fall,
solely on account of the bad conduct of the negroes
between the months of April and September. There was
abundance of time during that period to have raised
crops that would have far exceeded the wants of the
whole population of the South. But owing to the
desertion of the plantations by the negroes after they
had made engagements to work, and the inability of the
planters to procure other laborers the crops have been
almost entirely lost.17
16Columbia Daily Phoenix. 11 October 1865.
17Ibid., 10 October 1865.
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Concerned about the constancy and the quality of black
labor under the new system, the planters quickly looked for
ways to control, stabilize, and guarantee the labor supply.
In June 1865 the citizens of St. Matthews adopted resolu
tions to control the movement of the blacks on and off the
plantations and to hold back enough food for the coming year
before making any divisions, thus guarding against the
chance that the black would squander his wages without
making provision for the following year, and then expect the
planter to feed him.18

The ultimate, however, in the effort

to control black labor occurred in the late autumn of 1865,
with the passage of the Black Codes.
The Black Codes, drafted by Armistead Burt and David
Wardlaw and passed at the first regular session of the South
Carolina legislature following the war, granted certain
rights to the blacks, but at the same time severely restric
ted their behavior;
Colored persons were to be allowed to acquire property,
sue and be sued, receive the protection of the law in
person and property, testify in cases in which they were
involved, and enter into marriage contracts. . . .
Provision was made for the care of indigent colored
persons. On the other hand, a series of restrictions
attempted to assign colored persons to the position of
an inferior caste. . . . Unless licensed to do so no
colored person was to be allowed to follow any employ
ment— on his own account— except that of farmer or
servant. . . . Colored persons were not to sell farm
produce without a written permit. . . . Judicial
officers were authorized to hire to farmers colored
vagrants or those engaged in a variety of undesirable
employments. On the farms the servants must work from
18Ibi d . , 20 June 1865.
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sun to sun with reasonable intervals for meals, be quiet
at night, and not leave the premises or receive visitors
without express permission. They could be discharged
for cause and have their wages forfeited when departing
from the service of their masters. The masters were
given the right to whip "moderately" servants under
eighteen. Others were to be whipped on authority of
judicial officers. These officers were given authority
to return runaway servants to their masters. The
servants, on the other hand, were given certain rights.
Their wages and periods of service must be specified in
writing, and they were protected against "unreasonable"
tasks, Sunday and night work, unauthorized attacks on
their persons, and inadequate food.19
Some writers see the Black Codes as a misguided effort
on the part of southern whites to satisfy the northern
demand for legislation protecting the blacks, and the
resulting furor as a misperception of the meaning of
"protect."

To the southerner protecting the black was to

protect him against his own vices and handicaps, much as one
might protect a small child, while to the northern mind
protection meant investing the black with all the rights
possessed by other citizens.20

Regardless of whether or not

the codes were designed to palliate the North and gain
readmission to the Union, they were prima facie efforts to
stabilize and control black labor, and thereby satisfy a
pressing economic exigence.
While the planters sought a permanent, controlled
labor supply, the blacks wanted their freedom recognized,
19Simkins and Woody, 48-50.
20John P. Hollis, The Early Period of Reconstruction in
South Carolina (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1905), 47;
Williamson, 72-73.
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equitable remuneration for their labor, and land ownership.
The black reaction to the regulation of their lives by the
Black Codes was swift, vocal, and strong.

In late November

a convention of blacks assembled in Zion Presbyterian Church
of Charleston to protest to the state and the Congress the
passage of the codes.

The delegates asked in a memorial to

Congress that
the strong arm of law and order be placed alike over the
entire people of this State? that life and property be
secured, and the laborer as free to sell his labor as
the merchant his goods. . . . We protest against any
code of black laws the Legislature of this state may
enact, and pray to be governed by the same laws that
control other men.21
On the issue of land ownership Williamson observes:
The strongest and most enduring reason why Negroes
refused to contract during the three year period of
military occupation was their hope for a land division
and the common impression among them that any negotia
tions with their late masters might jeopardize their
chances for success. This obstacle was most formidable
during the fall of 1865 and the following winter.22
Finally, by the fall of 1866 the third concern,
equitable remuneration, was being loudly voiced.

On

November 17 of that year a meeting was held in Sumter to
discuss wage problems.

The freedmen complained that one

21Proceedings of the Colored People1s Convention of the
State of South Carolina, held in Zion Church. Charleston.
November. 1865. Together with the Declaration of rights and
wrongs; an address to the people; a petition to the legisla
ture. and a memorial to Congress (Charleston: n.p., 1865),
30-31.
22Williamson,

89.
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third of the crop was not enough since most of them had
almost nothing.
During the four hours of this great gathering of freed
men, not a word was said about political rights, negro
suffrage, or negro equality. The first and last vote of
the occasion was on the same chord, a fair and
remunerative return of the services of the laborers.23
As blacks deserted the plantations and their former
masters in search of freedom, land, and general economic
improvement, the white planters were faced with the economic
crisis of securing dependable, cheap labor to till their
fields.

The Black Codes speak clearly of the urgency and

seriousness with which the planters perceived the problems
and reflect the dominant belief that only coercive measures
could secure the labor of the blacks.

It is this problem of

how to secure the permanent labor of the black that Hampton
addressed at Richland Fork.
Audience
The second essential element of a rhetorical situation
is an audience capable of modifying the exigence.24

Before

examining the constraints Hampton used in his effort to
alter the conditions, it is necessary to examine (1) the
ability of his audience to modify the exigence and (2) the
attitudes and interests of the audience that might faci
litate or inhibit exigence modification.
23Charleston Daily Courier. 24 November 1866.
24Bitzer, "Functional Communication," 27.
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The audience addressed by Hampton on the morning of
November 22, 1865, was made up of both planters and freedmen
of the Richland District.25

Richland District is located in

the center of the state, and is the district in which the
state capital, Columbia, is located.

It is also the

district Hampton represented in the state legislature prior
to the war.

Speaking to his neighbors, constituents,

comrades in arms, freedmen, and perhaps even some of his
former slaves, he was addressing an audience known well to
him, and he to them.
Was this audience of planters and freedmen capable of
modifying the exigence?

The answer is an unqualified yes.

Certainly the North limited the options available to the
planters.

They could not remand the blacks to slavery, the

coercion of the Black Codes would soon be set aside, and any
contracts with the blacks were subject to approval by the
army.

Within these broad guidelines, however, the whites

and the blacks were left to work out the labor problem.
The crucial fact in the economic history of South
Carolina during Reconstruction is that, ultimately, both
whites and Negroes adjusted their demands to the
requirements imposed by the North and to the needs of
each other. In view of their traditional relations this
was accomplished with a rapidity that was amazing. In
retrospect, it is easy to see that some adjustment was
virtually inevitable. The white man needed the labor of
the Negro to make his capital productive; the Negro
needed the white man's capital to earn a subsistence.
Yet, the prejudices, the bitterness and suspicion that
filled the minds of both whites and Negroes complicated
an already difficult problem. In this context, possibly
25 Columbia Phoenix. 21 January 1866.
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the political dictation of the North was actually
salutary in that it forced each group to cut through the
fantastical problem of race so that all might deal with
the real and pressing problems of economic necessity.
Under these circumstances, the economically dominant
whites were forced to concede much to the Negro worker
which would have come— if at all— only later and with
more difficulty. . . . From the Northern point of view,
probably in no area was Reconstruction more completely
successful.26
Thus, in Williamson's estimation, the only barriers to good
economic relations between planter and laborer were pre
judice, bitterness, and suspicion, barriers which were
certainly within the capacity of Hampton's audience to
remove.
While it is impossible to know the exact mix of
attitudes represented in Hampton's audience, it is possible
to determine attitudes of planters and blacks in general and
reasonable to assume a cross section of these attitudes
present in his audience.

Since the Black Codes were passed

by the South Carolina legislature in the same month that
Hampton gave his speech, they can function as a guide to
white, planter attitudes.

The codes with their restrictions

on the work and behavior of the blacks expressed the senti
ments of the vast majority of planters.
The debate on the Black Codes revealed three distinct
groups of whites:
severe,

(1) those who opposed the measure as too

(2) those who thought they were too lenient, and (3)

the supporters.
26Williamson,

121.
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Those who opposed the codes as being too severe did
so, not primarily out of concern for the blacks, but a
realistic assessment of the political reaction in the Nort’.i.
" 'Unless you want to bring the North down on u s , ' James
Chestnut had warned the state senator from Kershaw District
as he departed for Columbia,
Negroes

'repeal all laws enacted for

and leave the emancipated Negro and the white man on

the same footing before the law.9"27

James

Hemphill, an

influential member of the state senate, wrote his brother:
My impression is that our Northern brethren. [emphasis
in original] who hold our fate in their hands, and who
are
par excellence the Negro9s friends, will consider it
too
much a white m a n 9s law, and that it does not
sufficiently protect the freedmen against their former
masters. It is a most difficult problem to solve, and I
do not believe that the great body of our people do yet
appreciate the great change that has taken place in the
relations between the races.28
A month later, Hemphill restated his concern about northern
reaction to the codes.
The U.S. Congress will take the whole affair of the
freedmen under their special charge, and make laws which
shall give them protection which their Northern friends
may deem necessary. The Code will be regarded by them
as too much of a white man9s law. Many of its provi
sions are scarcely compatible with a state of freedom,
and it will be hard to persuade the freedom shriekers
that the American citizens of African descent are
obtaining their rights.29
Other prominent whites who shared the sentiments of
27Mary Boykin Chestnut MS Diary, notes written in 1879,
in Williamson, 76.
28James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865,
Hemphill Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.
29Ibid., 1 December 1865.
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Chestnut and Hemphill were Gov. James L. Orr and Francis W.
Pickens.

Governor Orr supported the action of Maj. Gen.

Daniel E. Sickles when by proclamation of January 1, 1866,
the general declared the codes null and void.30

In

September of 1866 Orr called a special session of the
legislature to modify the codes.31

In addition to his

official acts, his public statements and private corres
pondence manifested a liberal spirit toward the blacks.
In a Christmas Day proclamation in 1865, Governor Orr
urged "kindness, humanity and justice" upon the whites
in their relations with the freedmen. . . . Several
weeks later, in a letter to Francis W. Pickens, he gave
a practical suggestion for the application of his advice
when he recommended that planters, themselves, should
voluntarily divide their lands into forty and fifty acre
plots upon which individual negro families would live
and work. Pickens, a planter with large land holdings,
approved, but added the more generous thought that onehundred-acre plots might be necessary to provide each
with the water, wood, and other resources required to
operate a farm efficiently.32
Those who supported the codes were not necessarily
anti-black.

Many were simply seeking to show the North that

they were providing for the protection and welfare of the
former slaves.
terms.

The problem was in the interpretation of

In the northern view protecting the rights of the

blacks meant securing equal treatment before the law for
both white and black.

To the southerner, however, it meant

30Simkins and Woody, 57.
31Reynolds, 31.
32Williamson, 122.
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protecting him from himself, as one might protect a child.33
A description of the Negro by John Deforest, a Union officer
with the Freedman's Bureau in Greenville, indicates that
this perception of the ex-slave was not held exclusively by
southerners:
On the other hand, the black was not the vicious and
totally irrational creature described in reactionary
journals. He was very ignorant, somewhat improvident,
not yet aware of the necessity of persistent industry,
and in short, a grown up child.34
John Hollis saw the codes as the result not of vengeance,
but benign paternalism:
The sentiment displayed toward the emancipated slaves
does not seem from the published account to have been
prompted by any spirit of revenge on the part of the
whites. Indeed it may be said that to some extent the
white population felt a responsibility for the
protection of the freedmen in their ignorance and
destitution.35
To substantiate his point Hollis cites a portion of Governor
B. F. Perry's first message to the legislature:
The negro has lost the protection of his master and he
must now be protected by the law. This is expected of
you by the President and Federal Congress and will
remove all pretense for military rule in the State, as
well as facilitate your speedy restoration to the Union
and self government.36
H. R. Ravenel, a planter and scholar, is an excellent
33Ibid., 73.
34James H. Croushore and David M. Potter, eds., John
William DeForest. A Union Officer in the Reconstruction (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 74.
35Hollis, 47.
36Ibid.
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example of one who felt the need for a system of compulsory
labor while at the same time evincing sympathy and concern
over the treatment of the blacks.

In June of 1865 he wrote

to A. L. Taveau, "we are in a transition to something better
or worse, and I fear the latter very much, unless some
system of labor is organized by which the negroes are
compelled to work.1,37

Two days later he recorded in his

diary:
I find some difficulty in "arranging terms" with my
negroes, but strange to say, the difficulty lies in the
opposite direction from what they most usually do. . . .
The condition is so new to both of us, that we find it
awkward to arrange. I have told them to consider it
over and let me know what they will be willing to take.
[He saw the solution in] some discreet and wise agent
who could aid and advise both Negroes and employers.38
A little less than a year later, he commended the steady
work of the Negroes on his farm and bemoaned the poor return
they would get for their labor because of the condition of
the soil, as well as their treatment by poor whites:
That the low and ignorant classes of our white popu
lation should feel vindictively inclined toward them,
may be expected. They will taunt and maltreat the negro
simply because he belongs to the proscribed race and was
once a slave. Even if we felt inclined to indulge a
revengeful feeling at the loss of property in their
emancipation, we should recollect that it was through no
act of theirs, that emancipation was effected. . . . Let
us have the magnanimity to be just, if we have not the
Christian principles of forgiveness.39
37H. W. Ravenel to A. L. Taveau, 2 7 June 1865, A. L.
Taveau Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.
38Ravenel, 247-48.
39Ibid., 278.
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The third group of whites was composed of "those who
did not think the Code was severe enough.

This element

represented planters and leaders of the heavily Negro
populated districts and the persisting proslavery party.1,40
Prior to the convening of the constitutional convention, F.
W. Pickens expressed his concern to Governor Perry over the
strength of the proslavery sentiment in the Edgefield
District.

When the vote was taken, however, only eight

voted against abolishing slavery.41

Edmund Rhett realized

that slavery in its past form was dead, but nevertheless in
a letter to A. L. Burt, a co-author of the codes, urged
"that he [the Negro] should be kept as near to the condition
of slavery as is practicable."42

Immediately prior to the

vote on the codes James Hemphill observed that "every
individual member almost can find some ground of objection,"
and that, "many think it too indulgent of the negro."43
As indicated in the earlier analysis of the exigence,
the blacks wanted their freedom recognized, a fair remun
eration for their work, and land.

Though many of the field

hands pressured by the North continued on the farms through
the summer, their condition was still too similar to slavery
40Williamson, 74.
41Ibid., 71-72.
42Edmund Rhett to A. L. Burt, 14 October 1865, A. L.
Burt Papers.
43James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865,
Hemphill Papers.

to fulfill their need to experience freedom.

There was a

general feeling of distrust, but not vengeance, toward the
planter, an anxiety reinforced by the Black Codes, which the
blacks interpreted to mean that the whites wanted to strip
them of freedom and return them as much as possible to a
position of servitude.44
This distrust of the whites manifested itself in a
concern for fair wages:
Even when the terms of labor were fairly and carefully
determined by a conscientious employer, Negro workers
remained suspicious of the white man. In Spartanburg
District, David Golightly Harris. . . . noted "they are
no judges, and fear to trade for fear they will [be]
cheated and have no confidence in themselves or in the
white man."45
The black frequently could not understand how his portion of
the crop had disappeared in the advances made to him earlier
in the season.

He simply concluded that the planter was

cheating him.46
Finally, the belief that the federal government was
going to give them land significantly influenced black
attitudes toward making contracts with the planters.

"There

44Alrutheus A. Taylor, The Negro in South Carolina
During The Reconstruction (n.p.: Association for the Study
of Negro Life and History, 1924; repr., New York: Russell
and Russell, 1969), 36-37; Sidney Andrews, The South Since
the War: As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Observa
tion in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston: Ticknor and
Fields, 1866; repr., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971),
96-97.
45Williamson, 100.
46Croushore and Potter, 73.
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is among the plantation negroes a widely spread idea that
land is to be given them by the government and this idea is
at the bottom of much idleness and discontent.1,47
Williamson concurs that the expectation of a division of the
land was a major reason why blacks refused to contract at
the end of 1865.48

Of course, considering the confiscated

plantations and Sherman8s order setting aside land for the
blacks, their expectation was not without some foundation.
Thus, at Richland Fork that morning, there were
perhaps a few who shared the perspective of James Hemphill
and James Orr, that the Black Codes were politically
inexpedient, and that a greater recognition of black rights
was needed.

The great majority, however, saw the codes as

necessary to stabilize labor and protect the indolent black
from himself.

While the extremely harsh views toward blacks

were centered more in the lower portion of the state, it is
more than probable that some of these attitudes were
represented as well.

The blacks standing on the periphery

of the crowd were apprehensive, generally fearful that the
whites would take advantage of them and eventually return
them to a status only slightly above slavery.
Constraints
"Every rhetorical situation,88 according to Lloyd
47Andrews, 98.
48Williamson, 89.
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Bitzer, "contains a set of constraints made up of persons,
events, objects, and relations which . . . have the power to
constrain decision and action needed to modify the
exigence."49

Bitzer divides constraints into the attitudes,

motives, and beliefs of the audience which the speaker must
harness, and the personal and logical proofs brought to the
occasion by the speaker.50

This section will examine the

personal and logical proofs brought to the situation by Wade
Hampton, and his attempt to harness the motives of his
audience.
Personal Appeals
Unquestionably his personal ethos was a powerful
persuasive appeal for Wade Hampton.

As developed earlier,

his reputation as wealthy planter and Civil War hero was
well established not only in South Carolina but throughout
the South.

The extent of his popularity was amply

illustrated by his near victory in the 1865 gubernatorial
election despite his attempt to dissuade people from voting
for him.
At Richland Fork Hampton was speaking to neighbors who
had elected him in earlier days to represent them in the
South Carolina legislature, had fought under him in the war,
and now had invited him to address them on how to respond to
49Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," 8.
50Ibid.
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the new situation facing them.
Hampton was not content, however, to rest his ethos
strictly upon prior reputation but explicitly reminded his
audience of their relationship.

Early in the address he

reminded them that "years ago, without any agency on my
part, you called me from my private life to represent you in
the Legislature, and at each succeeding election I had but
renewed evidence of your regard and confidence."51

In

addition to the mutual regard for each other as representa
tive and constituent, there was the far deeper bond as
warriors for the Lost Cause.

"It was my good fortune to

lead many of the sons of Richland forth to battle. . . .

I

have seen them, on many a bloody battlefield, bearing aloft
the banner of our state as far into the fight and as nobly
as did any others."
Did Hampton need these explicit reminders to solidify
his ethos with this audience?

In one sense, no; his reputa

tion was well established among these men of Richland
County.

But in another sense a failure to acknowledge their

past relationship would have been a severe violation of the
amenities of the occasion resulting perhaps in some loss of
ethos.

So in one sense the reminders were necessary to

preserve the esteem in which he was held.

What also made

these opening remarks significant was the stress placed upon
51Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21 January 1866. All further
references to the text of the address are from this source.
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their respective roles in the past.

In both the political

and the military, he had been the leader, they the
followers.

The implication was clear, as they had followed

his advice and commands in the past, so they should accede
to his advice in the present.

In a later address on much

the same theme in Macon, Georgia, Hampton made the link
between past and present authority more direct:
I beg to offer a few words of counsel, for I feel that I
can speak to you with authority; not that authority with
which accident once invested me, but that given by
affection.
In by-gone years you never refused to hear
me; I never called on you in vain, I never appealed to
you that you did not respond, and I would fain hope that
my words will not now fall unheeded on your ears.^2
In addition to his audience of white planters and
former soldiers, Hampton was also facing a large contingent
of blacks, who of course had quite different conceptions of
his ethos.

To them Hampton portrayed himself as a man of

truth and good will:
If they [blacks] will ask my people who have lived with
me for years, not one man, woman or child on my place
will say that I ever deceived them, or told them what
was not true. In what I shall say to you, then today, I
shall speak only what I believe to be true, and I shall
advise you honestly.
Later, he sought to establish good will when he told them,
"I have always tried to treat my negroes well, and I intend
to do all in my power for them now.

I have offered them

good wages, and I tell them if they can do better elsewhere
to go there."

The proof that he had treated the blacks

52Ibid., 23 November 1869.
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fairly was offered in his next statement.

"Most of them are

going to remain with me."
Though there is little direct evidence on the
question, Hampton apparently did have a reasonably good
reputation among the blacks.

As will be discussed in later

chapters, he was one of the few whites to whom the blacks
would give an audience even when they disagreed with his
position.
From his white audience Hampton commanded a deep
respect born out of a commonality of interests and his
record of leadership in small measure in pre-war politics
and in large measure on the battlefield.

Thus, there was no

need to build ethos, only to make acknowledgements and
reminders necessary to fulfill the amenities of the
occasion.

With the blacks, however, he made a definite

attempt to establish credibility and good will by citing his
past dealings with his slaves.
Logical Appeals
The structure of Hampton's argument was a straight
forward problem-solution development.
to get the fields cultivated.

The problem was how

The solution, according to

Hampton, was to induce by fair treatment the Negroes back to
the fields.

The argument was expressed in a series of

enthymemes and a final cause-effect analysis.
Hampton began by establishing a premise that didn't
fit into the logical structure of the speech until later,

but because of its overriding importance in the mind of his
audience had to be established at the outset.

The premise

was that "the freedom of the Negroes is a fixed and
irrevocable fact, and the sooner we recognize and act upon
this fact, the better it will be for all parties."
put, slavery was dead.

Simply

He established the premise with

three supporting arguments.

(1) The South had accepted the

terms of surrender and thus was "bound by . . . self respect
. . . honor . . . [and] true manhood" to keep the terms of
the agreement.

The terms included the abolition of slavery,

thus the code of a gentleman demanded the acceptance of the
end of slavery.

While making this argument he adroitly

dissociated himself from the correctness of accepting the
terms in the first place, and argued it as a fait accompli.
"I do not propose to discuss these terms; nor will I say
that it was the true policy of the South to accept them.
only state the fact that our people accepted them."

I

For

those not willing to be bound by honor he argued (2) that
the South Carolina convention had recognized that slavery
was dead, and (3) the South Carolina legislature had "rati
fied the amendment of the Constitution of the United States
abolishing slavery."

Thus, they were bound both by honor

and law, approved and accepted by their peers to accept the
freedom of the Negro.
With the question of slavery settled, Hampton began a
chain of reasoning with the first of several enthymemes:
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"our fields must be tilled."

The major premise of this

hypothetical syllogism was in the next statement:

"Unless

this is done and done speedily famine will destroy what
little has escaped fire and sword."

The complete syllogism

would then be:
Major premise:

If we wish to eat, the fields must be
tilled

Minor premise (understood):
Therefore:

We do wish to eat

The fields must be tilled

He did not seek to establish the relationship between the
likelihood of famine and the tilling of the fields.

He left

the proof to the experience of his audience.
Hampton then moved to the second link in his argument,
the question of who would cultivate the fields.

His answer

was
the same labor that reclaimed them from the savage
wilderness and made them rich with the food of man.
. . . The same trained laborers who produced these
golden harvests are amongst us, and I believe that their
services can still be made available.
The argument was a simple categorical syllogism:
Major Premise:

Those who worked the fields in the past
are the best for the present and future

Minor Premise:

The Negro worked them in the past

Therefore:

The Negro is best for the present and future

In his Macon speech, four years later, Hampton
advanced much the same argument, but added further support
to his contention that the Negro was the best labor for the
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fields:
The Negro is undoubtedly better fitted, from his long
training, his physical configuration and his adapt
ability to all the diversities of our climate, to make a
more efficient laborer than any other. Especially is
this true when the labor is to be performed in the more
malarial portions of our country.5-3
Thus, while at Macon he asserted specifics as to why the
Negro was the best laborer for the fields, at Richland Fork
the argument was purely circumstantial and drew upon the
experience of the audience for its support:
the past would work in the present.

what worked in

In one sense, even

though he provided more specifics at Macon, the argument
still rested upon the past observations of his audience,
since he never developed what there was about the black's
configuration that made him better suited for the fields or
about his make-up that made him more adaptable to the
climate.
If the fields had to be tilled, and the black was the
best one to do it, and slavery was dead, how then could his
services best be procured?

This question constituted the

final link in Hampton's chain of argument.
provided through causal analysis.

The answer was

The goal would be

achieved "but in one way, and that will be by dealing with
the negro fairly, frankly and equitably.

Let him see that

we not only recognize his newly acquired rights, but that we
will protect him in the enjoyment of these rights."
53Ibid., 21 November 1869.
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Necessity would force the black to seek work and when he
did, the planters should
meet him kindly; encourage him when he is disposed to do
well; offer fair terms to him, and whilst you demand
from him a strict observance of his obligation, carry
out honestly and fairly your agreement with him. Show
him that the white man of the South is his best friend.
The crux of Hampton's argument lay in the dilemma that was
put to the planter.

He needed to have his fields tilled and

the Negro was best suited for doing it, but the black's
services could only be obtained through slavery or fair
treatment that induced voluntary labor.

Slavery, as he

established in his first argument, was dead; the only
alternative available was to adopt a program of kind treat
ment.

As the problem with most disjunctive syllogisms lies

in the failure to consider the ground between the two
extremes, so it did here.

Nowhere did he address the use of

threats, intimidation, and especially legal coercion as in
the Black Codes as means of securing the black's labor.
The omission of any direct reference to the Black
Codes is particularly significant, since they were a prime
topic of conversation when the speech was given.
perhaps two oblique references to the codes.

There were

One was his

reference to protecting the Negro in his enj oyment of his
rights.

An argument used to gain passage of the codes was

that they were protecting the Negro both from those who
would seek to take advantage of him and from himself.

The

other reference was in a remark made directly to the blacks
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in the audience that "laws will be made by which every man,
white and black, in the country will have to show that he is
making an honest support for himself or he will be taken up
and put at hard work."

The only possible laws that Hampton

could have had in mind were the Black Codes.

To the extent

that the Black Codes could compel the blacks to make
contracts with the planters, the need to use fair, kind
treatment as the only way to obtain their services was
certainly reduced.
Perhaps because he realized the vulnerability of his
own argument, he added two additional advantages that could
be accrued only through the application of fair treatment:
(1)

the frustration of the Yankees and (2) the maintenance

of the class structure by keeping the peasants happy.

"You

will speedily eradicate the foul, the false, the pernicious
doctrine instilled in his [the Negro] heart by the aboli
tionists of the North . . . and again have in the South a
happy, contented and laborious peasantry."

Though it was

inadequately developed, this argument was the key to his
approach.

While other means could be utilized for obtaining

black labor, at least temporarily, only kind, fair treatment
could neutralize the attempts of the abolitionists to gain
control of the blacks and with it radically alter the social
structure.
A year later, speaking to the Soldiers Association at
Walhalla, South Carolina, Hampton briefly suggested the same
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approach toward the Negroes.

Dealing with him "frankly,

justly, kindly," would cause him to cling
to his old home, his own country, and his former
masters. If you wish to see him contented, indus
trious, useful, aid him in his effort to elevate
himself in the scale of civilization, and thus fit him
not only to enjoy the blessings of freedom, but to
appreciate its duties.54
Thus he again argued that the best way to achieve a continu
ing labor class was by kind treatment of the Negro.
In his Macon address in 1869 he again made the same
argument but in more detail than Richland Fork or Walhalla.
Our object, then should be to develop to the utmost his
capacity as a laborer. To do this time is required, and
we shall have to exercise great forbearance, constant
prudence, and steady kindness. We must make him feel
that his interests are indissolubly bound up with ours;
that high prices for our products insure high wages for
him. . . . Let us be scrupulously just in our dealings
with him. Let us assist him in his aspirations for
knowledge and aid him in its acquisition. . . . In a
word, convince him that we are his best, if not his
only, friends, and when we shall have done this, we
shall not only have placed our labor on a sound footing,
but we shall have gained in the laborer a strong and
zealous ally.55
While at Richland Fork and Walhalla he simply asserted the
causal connection between kind treatment and a contented
labor supply, at Macon he supported it with his own
experience:
I speak not from theory but experience— an experience
which has taught me that the kindest relations can exist
between the planter and his former slaves, resulting in
mutual advantage to both parties. My old slaves are
cultivating the land on which they have lived for years,
54Charleston Daily Courier. 10 October 1866.
55Columbia Daily Phoe n i x . 21 November 1869.
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and there has been a constant and marked improvement in
their industry in each year since their emancipation.
. . . I have promised to put up for them a schoolhouse
and church, and to pay a portion of the salaries of
their teachers. . . . That kind treatment, just dealing
and sincere efforts to improve their conditions are not
without effect upon them, is proved by the fact, grati
fying to myself, that I am now on my way to Mississippi,
by the request of hundreds of Negroes, besides my own
laborers, to advise them what course to pursue in the
approaching election there.56
Consistently, then, Hampton advanced the same causal
argument introduced at Richland Fork for solving the labor
problems.

The best way to secure the labor and the control

of the black was through kind, just treatment.

At Richland

Fork his auditors had to accept the statement simply on the
authority of the speaker, for no evidence was offered to
support the truth of the assertion.

By 1869 he was able to

offer the limited proof of his own experience to support the
causal relation.
In addition to his arguments to the whites in his
audience, Hampton also addressed arguments specifically to
the blacks at Richland Fork.
major contentions.

His arguments consisted of two

The first, which received the more

extensive development, was that the blacks would have to
work.

The second was that the best place to get work was

from the white planter.
The first contention that they would have to work he
supported with three reasons:

(1) duty demanded it, (2)

laws would enforce it, and (3) survival required it.
56Ibid.
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"Freedom," Hampton argued, "has its duties as well as
pleasures.

And the first duty of every free man is to

support himself and his family. . . . and to do this you
will have to work."

For those blacks who might not be

impressed with the call to duty, he moved briefly to the
level of coercion:

"Laws will be made by which every man,

white and black, in the country will have to show that he is
making an honest support for himself, or he will be taken up
and put at hard work."

Here, as mentioned earlier, he must

have had the Black Codes in mind.

While the only backing

for the first two reasons was his word, the third reason was
supported with evidence.

"But if you do not work," he told

them, "you will surely starve."

This truth was illustrated

by the example of the Indian.
They would not work, and though they were a larger and a
stronger race than yours, they were driven off by the
white man, as the wind drives the chaff before it. This
will be your fate, if you will not work, but choose to
live like the Indians, in idleness and drunkenness.
Anticipating that some in his audience might rej ect his
argument on the belief that the Yankees would take care of
them and keep them from starving, he engaged in refutation.
"The Yankees don't care for you, and they would be perfectly
willing to see you all die off, so that room would be made
here for their poor people."

He had no evidence to support

such an extreme statement, but he made an attempt by quoting
at length from a speech made to the blacks in Florida by the
presidentially appointed governor of that state.

The
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governor noted that he was a Yankee by birth and education
but a southerner by residence for some thirty years.

He

then concluded that he knew well both the Yankee and the
southerner and " 'I tell you today as your friend, that the
Southern white man with whom you were raised, and who is
acquainted with your habits and customs, is the best friend
you have got.'"

The governor concluded by telling them

"'the President will not give you one foot of land, nor a
mule, nor hog, nor cow, nor even a knife and fork or spoon.
He has given you your freedom and that is everything he
intends to give you."'

While the testimony of the governor

did not support Hampton's extreme statement, it did give
credence to the general notion that the North would not
support black indolence.
What is perplexing about Hampton's choice of reasons
used to support the contention that the blacks must work is
the relationship between his second reason and the other
two.

Reasons one and three presupposed choice, while two

was clearly coercive.

If laws were going to compel everyone

to have a job, it was rather meaningless to argue that
blacks ought to choose to work to fulfill the duties of
freedom or to keep from starving.
whether to work, but where to work.

The choice was not
Hampton either did not

see the Black Codes as an enduring solution and therefore
stressed the voluntary aspects of work, or he did not
perceive the contradiction in his arguments.
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Hampton's second contention was that the best place
for the black to get work was from the planter.

"Now, how

can you support yourselves and your families best?
hiring your labor to the white people.

I say by

We want labor to

cultivate our fields, and we would rather hire you than
strangers, who know nothing about planting."
support for his claims.

He offered no

As in so many of his arguments, the

proof rested either in his authority or the audience1s
knowledge.
To his white audience Hampton argued that they needed
labor, that the blacks offered the best way to fulfill that
need, and that kind treatment provided the best avenue for
securing their labor.

To the blacks he argued their need to

find employment and that the best place to do so was with
the white planters.
Motive Appeals
Hampton, in calling upon the whites to extend fair and
just treatment to the blacks, was not doing so out of any
noble, altruistic concern for the welfare of the blacks or
moral obligation of the whites.

The appeal was strictly to

the self interest of the white planters.

Their economic and

social world had been turned upside down by recent events,
and, while the world of the 1850's could not be restored, it
was not necessary to plow under all vestiges of it.
Hampton's rhetorical vision was of contented blacks
laboring on large farms and plantations for prosperous,
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benevolent white masters.
remain intact.

The economic arrangements would

The acquisition of a "happy, contented, and

laborious peasantry" would be to Hampton and his white
audience "happy results."

To achieve this pre-war vision in

a post-war environment required only a change of means.
Whereas slavery had achieved the desired goal in the past, a
kind, just, benevolent paternalism would be needed to
achieve it in the present.
end justified the means:

His appeal was strictly that the

"the ends you seek not only

justify, but demand the exercise of these virtues to their
greatest extent."
Lest their self interests were not sufficient to
justify the necessary exercise of "forbearance" and
"patience" Hampton appealed to them in the name of
patriotism:
You seek to restore the prosperity of your country— to
rebuild her cities— to reclaim her desolated fields— to
reanimate her with new hope. These are the objects
nearest to a patriotic heart and to obtain them no
sacrifice would be too great, no labor too arduous.
Thus, using kindness and fairness as a means of securing the
labor of the black was characterized as a patriot's
sacrifice for his country.
While Hampton's interests and those of his white
audience were at one and he could appeal to them on the
basis of a common self interest with a touch of patriotism
tossed in, he was certainly not at one with the interests of
the black members of his audience.

His vision of a black
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peasant laborer had little appeal for those who had only
recently left the bonds of slavery and were now enamored
with thoughts of freedom and land.

Consequently, his appeal

to them was at a more basic level— fear.

If they would not

work, they would be taken up and put at hard labor, or they
would starve, or like the Indians they would be driven off.
He made no effort to show the blacks how hiring their labor
to the white planters would improve their position in life
or bring to fruition any of their new aspirations.

The best

that he offered was the freedom to make the best contract
they could.

Their field labor was not a first affirmative

step on the road of freedom and opportunity, but an
avoidance mechanism to escape the bad things that would
happen if they didn't work.
Fitness of Response
The immediate exigence was the economic problem caused
by the emancipation of the blacks.

Hampton accurately

perceived the threat to the survival of the planter and the
state's agricultural economy in general, and in his first
major speech after the war sought to modify the exigence
through the application of rhetoric.
His approach at Richland Fork was the first indication
of what became a grand, overall, pragmatic, consistent
strategy for dealing with the larger exigence of black-white
relations, of which the economic difficulties were only one
dimension.

Hampton advocated new means to achieve old ends.

He accepted the end of slavery but not of a way of life.

To

the white planter he presented the appealing vision of a
social and economic order as much like the pre-war structure
as possible.

While most of the white South Carolina leader

ship shared that idealistic vision, Hampton was one of the
few who possessed enough realism to recognize that it would
not be attained through force, coercion and intimidation.
The advocacy of fair and just treatment toward the black had
little to do with moral or legal obligations and everything
to do with the realistic need to counter the "pernicious
doctrines" of the abolitionists and gain control over the
blacks.
In an 1867 letter to James Conner, Hampton revealed
the extent of his commitment to realistic pragmatism:
Every good man who can go to the Convention, even if
sent by negroes and with negroes, should go. We can
control and direct the negroes if we act discreetly, and
in my judgment the highest duty of every Southern man is
to secure the good will and confidence of the negro.
. . . Like you, I am only solicitous about our State
government, and if we can protect that from destruction,
I am willing to send negroes co Congress57
Hampton's writings do not reveal whether or not by November
of 1865 he had foreseen the issues that would be created by
black emancipation and had created a grand strategy for
dealing with them.

It is significant, however, that his

strategy for coping with the economic problems by kind
treatment that would secure the confidence of the blacks
57Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
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remained essentially unchanged.

This strategy was probably

the only one that could have come close to achieving the
southern vision.
While in some ways Hampton was offering a realistic
strategy, his realism did not go far enough.
failed on two counts:

The speech

(1) he did not accurately assess the

need of the blacks to assert their freedom, and (2) he
offered the planters no reason why kind treatment was the
best means for securing black labor.

As indicated in the

earlier analysis of the audience, one of the strong desires
among the blacks was the desire for some land of their own
as a means of asserting their freedom.
ignored this concern.

Hampton totally

Considering that his strategy relied

upon the voluntary actions of both blacks and whites, there
was remarkably little incentive for the blacks.

The choices

were to make contracts with the planters, starve, or be put
at forced labor.

There were no positive advantages from

working for the planters— no prospect of future land
acquisition, no hope of significant financial gain, no
avenues for practical expression of their new freedom.
Hampton's vision of a white planter class with a black
peasant labor class was too much deja vu and nightmare to
hold any appeal for the blacks.

While Hampton ignored the

black's desire for land, E. B. Heyward, who spoke to the
same audience at the conclusion of Hampton's speech, fully
recognized the desire, gave a rather extensive treatment to
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it, and advocated the planters leave to the black laborers a
portion of ground for raising their own crops, but which
would be forfeited if the worker violated his contract.58
Heyward's analysis is clear evidence of the subject's
relevance and importance to that audience, and Hampton's
total ignoring of this interest is inexplicable.
Not only did Hampton inadequately respond to the
interests of the blacks, he provided no reasons, other than
his opinion, why the whites should take a conciliatory
attitude toward the blacks.

He offered no evidence that

such an approach would produce the desired result or that
such an approach was even necessary.

In fact the events of

recent days and his own remarks to the blacks contradicted
the need to adopt his position.

The recently passed Black

Codes were an attempt to deal with the very problem he was
addressing.

To the extent the Black Codes were enforceable,

his approach was unnecessary.

Nowhere did he attempt to

show that the Black Codes were unworkable, undesirable, or
that they would not endure.

In fact, to the contrary, he

argued in his remarks to the blacks that laws would force
them to work, thereby contradicting his earlier appeal to
the whites.
At Richland Fork Hampton correctly dealt with the
exigence of the economic crisis presented by the new
relationship between blacks and whites.

He developed a

58Columbia Daily P h o e n i x . 21 January 1866.
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strategy for solving the problem, but failed to provide
adequate constraints for the whites to adopt his position,
and failed to analyze his black audience's perception of the
exigence as a need for land as an expression of freedom, and
not simply survival.

CHAPTER IV

FREEDMEN'S ADDRESS AS RESPONSE
TO THE BLACK SUFFRAGE EXIGENCE
Exigence
The second major exigence to emerge with emancipation
concerned the political relationship between black and
white.

It is certainly not surprising that difficulties

arose as former masters and ex-slaves, rebels and Yankee
conquerors, Democrats and Republicans, native sons and
carpetbaggers all sought to define the new relationship.
While there were many dimensions to the problem, they all
ultimately were reduced to one overriding consideration,
suffrage for the blacks.

Because of the scope and signi

ficance of this issue the analysis will focus only on this
one area.
On May 12, 1865, while many up-state blacks were still
unaware of their emancipation, a meeting of freedmen was
taking place at Zion church in Charleston.

Chief Justice

Salmon Chase, Maj. Gen. Rufus Saxton, Maj. Martin R. Delany
and Reuben Tomlinson, Superintendent of Education for the
Freedmen's Bureau, addressed the meeting and urged the
blacks to petition President Johnson and Congress for the
right to vote.

"I wish to leave nothing undone to secure
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you that right— the right to vote/' said General Saxton,
"the right to hold the elective franchise.

It is the

inalienable right of all men, the right of the colored as
well as the white man."1

Thus the call for black suffrage

in South Carolina began almost simultaneously with the end
of slavery.
Under President Johnson's plan of reconstruction only
those qualified to vote in 1860 were eligible to vote for
delegates to South Carolina's constitutional convention in
September, 1865.

Blacks, therefore, were ineligible to vote

for those who would set future qualifications for voters.
As white voters went to the polls, blacks assembled in
Charleston and St. Helena to petition the convention to
grant them suffrage on the same basis as the white popula
tion.

Significantly, they were perfectly willing to accept

a suffrage with educational or property restrictions, as
long as the restrictions were applied equally to both blacks
and whites.2

Such, however, was not to be.

Governor Perry presaged the action of the convention
by stating in his opening address that "this is a white
man's government and intended for white men only."

In his

view, "to extend this universal suffrage to the freedmen in
their present ignorant and degraded condition would be
Charleston Daily Courier. 13 May 1865.
2Thomas Holt, Black Over White: Negro Political Leader
ship in South Carolina During Reconstruction (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1977), 21-22.
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little less than folly and madness."3

Perry later

questioned the wisdom of his approach:
I thought as a matter of policy and justice, that the
intelligent property holders amongst the freedmen should
be allowed to vote, and so stated in the original draft
of my first message to the convention. But my friends
advised me to leave out this recommendation as it would
only produce a division in the convention, and there was
no probability of its being adopted. I did so, and ever
since regretted it, for if a qualified suffrage had been
extended to the colored people we might have avoided the
second reconstruction and the Constitutional Amendment
imposed by Congress.4
Dr. Alexander Wylie, a delegate to the convention, testified
during the Ku Klux hearings that many delegates favored a
qualified suffrage but like Perry were hesitant to speak for
it:
I . . . favored giving the negroes all civil rights. I
voted with only three men . . . to give all civil rights
to negroes, not mentioning color, and proposed that we
should present some qualifications in regard to educa
tion and property. I am satisfied that a large propor
tion of the older men were in favor of that proposition,
but they looked to their constituents and hesitated.
They expressed themselves so . . . they had not dis
cussed the matter with the people and were afraid.5
Sidney Andrews, a northern reporter, found no sympathy
for black suffrage:
I did hope . . . that I should find half a dozen men at
least in favor of giving suffrage to some negroes, as
many more in favor of abolishing the barbaric color
3Charleston Daily Courier. 16 September 1865.
4Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men, with
Speeches and Addresses. 2d Series (Greenville: Shannon &
Co., 1889), 275.
5Congress, Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the
Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, The
Ku—Klux Conspiracy. 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1872, 560-61.
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qualification, and still as many more ready to admit
that suffrage would be the right of the negro as soon as
he is able to use it understandingly. Vain hope! If
there are six men who so much as admit that it will
probably be right or politic to give suffrage to any
negro of their State within ten years, four of them must
be among the thirty or thirty-five whose views I have
not personally learned.6
The talk, according to Andrews, was all of a "white-man1s
government.1,7
While some members of the convention might have had
reservations about the tactical wisdom of totally excluding
the black from the state's political structure, the fact is
that no other policy was seriously considered.

The conven

tion ignored the petition from the blacks and granted
suffrage only to white males.

In fact the convention

refused even to count the blacks in establishing a basis for
representation in the lower house.8
On November 25, 1865, forty-six black delegates from
nine districts throughout the state met in Charleston to
protest the treatment of the blacks by the constitutional
convention and the recent session of the legislature.

The

protests were primarily directed at the economic restric
tions of the Black Codes and the failure of the consti
tutional convention to grant equal suffrage.

The delegates

adopted appeals to the people of South Carolina, the state
6Andrews, 89.
7Ibid., 88.
8Simkins and Woody, 40-41.
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legislature, and the Congress.

In all of these appeals they

asked that suffrage be granted them on an equal basis with
the whites.9
Not surprisingly the appeals were ignored by the white
power structure of the state, a structure that through its
own intransigence was about to lose its power to shape the
destiny of the state, for while they were deaf to the
appeals of the blacks, such was not the case with the
Republican controlled Congress.

In December the Congress

turned away the state's elected representatives; in January
Gen. Daniel Sickles declared the Black Codes null and void.
A month later the Congress guaranteed basic equality of
rights to the blacks with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.

Shortly thereafter Congress sent to the states

for ratification the Fourteenth Amendment.10
The political relationship between blacks and whites
in South Carolina remained unchanged until March 1867 when
Congress repudiated the president's plan of reconstruction
and substituted its own.

Under the congressional plan South

Carolina was placed under the control of the United States
military.

Congress further specified a new constitutional

convention with delegates elected by all citizens except
those disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The new

constitution would have to grant suffrage to all male
9Proceedings of the Colored People1s Convention. 23-31.
10Holt, 23.
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citizens, be ratified by the voters, and approved by Cong
ress.

The new legislature elected under this constitution

would have to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Suddenly, as Thomas Holt puts it, "a revolutionary
change in black-white relations,
making."12

'a new order,' was in the

For the first time the black majority in South

Carolina would have a direct say in the shaping of the state
government.

The revolutionary nature of the change was

underscored by the almost two to one majority of potential
black voters over whites.

The new registration of voters

completed in October of 1867 showed 46,346 whites and 78,982
blacks.13
The exigence was clear and urgent.

If the native

whites did not in some way gain control of these new black
voters, the white power structure would be swept away and
control of the state pass to blacks, scalawags, and carpet
baggers .

For many their worst fear was on the verge of

reality.

The strategy for coping with the crisis had been

suggested in an unsigned editorial in the Charleston Daily
Courier in the fall of 1866.

Observing the growing power of

the radicals in Congress, the writer advocated the calling
of a constitutional convention which would grant suffrage to
anyone who " [is] twenty-one years of age, has resided ___
11Simkins and Woody, 64.
12Holt, 28.
13Reynolds, 73,
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months in the state, can read and write, and is possessed of
hundred dollars worth of real or personal property."

The

action was needed, in the writer's view, to preempt more
drastic action by the Congress:
The present Congress will not adjourn and leave the
South a free agent in this matter; now is the time for
her to anticipate the Radical party. . . . Such an
amendment would give us greater strength in Congress,
and instead of running to universal suffrage would
produce exactly the opposite result.14
Audience
As the political context changed so did the nature of
Hampton's audience.

Hampton Jarrell observes:

During 1866 Hampton had appealed primarily to the white
men of the state for kind treatment of the Negro; but
. . . by March of 1867 the General realized that the
power of decision in the state as to harmony or strife
between the races had passed to the Negro. . . . [and]
he sought with all his influence to persuade the blacks
to join the white men of the state in shaping its
political structure.15
Immediately following Hampton1s address to the freedmen in Columbia, Beverly Nash, a black organizer of the
meeting, spoke to the crowd.

Nash endorsed the sentiments

of Hampton and stressed the bond of friendship that had
existed between the southern whites and blacks:

"We

recognize the Southern white man as the true friend of the
black man."
tion:

He acknowledged the economic need for coopera

"The white man has land, the black man has labor, and
14Charleston Daily Courier. 29 November 1866.
15Jarrell, 16.
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labor is worth nothing without capital.

We must help to

create that capital by restoring confidence, and we can only
restore confidence by electing proper men to fill our public
offices."

While Nash reinforced cooperation between the two

groups he completely rejected the idea of a limited suf
frage:

"My doctrine is, that every man, whether ignorant or

not, who is compelled to pay taxes, is entitled to vote."16
While Nash was in Columbia urging cooperation with the
white southern leadership, another meeting of blacks with an
entirely different perspective was taking place in Charles
ton.

The meeting was called to ratify a platform for the

formation of a Union Republican party in South Carolina.

In

addressing the group, F. L. Cardozo and B. F. Randolf, both
blacks, warned the audience to beware of false claims of
friendship and kindness by the southern whites who were
seeking only to beguile them and take away their rights.
Their true friends were not the former slave owners but the
men of the Republican party who had "shown their friendship
by the sacrifice of their lives and their treasure."

Wade

Hampton was specifically mentioned as one who was trying to
swallow them through flattery, and Nash was denounced as a
traitor.

While the reporter indicated that these impres

sions were enthusiastically supported by the audience,
Cardozo prefaced his remarks as if he anticipated some
16Charleston Daily C o u r i e r . 23 March 1867.
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contrary views in the audience:
What then, may be asked is the danger? I answer, it
lies in the intention of the Southern whites to cheat
us, if possible, out of these great advantages, by the
false pretension of would-be friends. And here I know I
begin to tread on delicate ground; I shall, however,
endeavor to go on fearlessly and without any vindictive
feeling to any individual. Personally I have been
treated with the greatest personal kindness by many
Southern gentlemen.
I have received from them indivi
dual favors and acts of kindness. But this is no
question of individual or personal consideration.17
While Nash differed with Cardozo and Randolf on the
question of cooperation with southern whites, there was no
difference on the issue of suffrage.

The sentiment of the

Charleston meeting was best expressed by E.J. Adams:
A perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, the
common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings
of liberty cannot be secured without universal suffrage.
It is the only means of defense for the illiterate and
the poor.18
Six weeks later at a party organizational meeting in
Columbia a resolution calling for universal suffrage was
adopted.19

And yet, there were some slight reservations.

B. F. Randolf was so concerned about providing motivation
for education that at the constitutional convention he had
inserted in committee a provision that those not able to
read and write after 1875 would not have the right to vote.
The convention strongly opposed the restriction and voted
it down 107 to 2, with even Mr. Randolf voting with the
17Ibid., 27 March 1867.
18Ibid.
19Columbia Daily P h o e n i x . 2 May 1867.
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majority.20

Thus, the black leadership and a substantial

number of followers had a commitment to universal suffrage
that would be difficult, if not impossible, for any of the
southern whites to overcome.
The blacks, though, were still not a united group.

A

correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune reported in
late May his concern over the poor political organization
among the blacks:
There is absolutely none [political organization]
deserving the name, outside of Charleston and the
islands and adjacent coast towns. The Union League. . .
has made little headway here.
The only open Republican
movement is that represented by the convention which has
just adjourned, and that had representation from only
nine out of thirty districts.21
He concluded that the blacks

feelings were with the Repub

licans, but the ignorance, poverty, and habit of submission
prevalent among them threatened the success of the radical
movement.22
In addition to the lack of organization there were
social differences among the blacks which threatened their
unity.

F. L. Cardozo alluded to these differences in his

speech at the organizational meeting in Charleston:
I would . . . warn you of another danger . . . that is
peculiar to ourselves. From the unhappy state of things
20Proceedinqs of the Constitutional Convention of South
Carolina held at Charleston. South Carolina, beginning
January 14th and ending March 17th. 1868 (Charleston: Denny
& Perry, 1868), 824, 830-35.
21New York Daily Tribune. 23 May 1867.
22Ibid.
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which has existed here in the enjoyment of this new
privilege the colored people find themselves divided and
disunited by a variety of sentiments and feelings.
Whatever may be a man's social status, whatever may be
his religious views, whatever may be the state of his
knowledge, if he will come with you and vote for the
platform, unite with him, if it be Satan himself. Let
no cause of dissension, no feeling of animosity, no
objection to social condition, prevent you from securing
to yourselves and your children the liberty that has
been committed to you.23
Thomas Holt provides considerable insight into the possible
nature of their division.
blacks:

He delineates three groups of

the freeborn mulattoes, the urban slaves, and the

field slaves, with the greatest distinction existing between
the mulattoes and the others.

While he concurs with other

scholars that the problem was not as great as the white
press made it out to be and that the major issues "were
those dividing black and white, not those between black and
mulatto," Holt still contends "divisions and conflicts did
exist, and they did have political consequences."24

After

noting the religious, social, and economic differences of
the two groups he concludes that
a politically mobilized black constituency was essential
to the advancement of the brown bourgeoisie. Thus one
might speculate that the political conservatism of this
element of the South Carolina group was restrained by
their dependence on a mainly black, slave-born constit
uency. Consequently, the freeborn mulatto, bourgeois
legislators by and large, reached across the "chasm" to
embrace— sometimes belatedly and haltingly, often with
vacillation and quibbling at crucial moments— the
23Charleston Daily Courier. 22 March 1867.
24Holt, 59.
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political and economic agenda of the black peasantry.25
The blacks, then, that Hampton was seeking to influ
ence were as yet politically unorganized but with sympathies
strongly inclined toward the radical movement.

They were

largely ignorant and concerned with securing land and food.
It was an audience with an undercurrent of social and
economic factions and some difference of opinion on the
appropriate relationship with southern whites, but rather
solidly behind the issue that was of utmost importance to
Hampton— universal suffrage.
Constraints
Personal Appeals
As in the speech at Richland Fork, Wade Hampton was a
well known figure to his audience of freedmen.

His identity

and his relationship with blacks both past and present were
clear, and needed no amplification.

What he spent almost

one-third of the speech developing was the trustworthiness
dimension of ethos.

This dimension was critical to his

success for two reasons:

(1) any appeal from the old white

power structure to the newly enfranchised black maj ority
would have to be viewed with a great deal of skepticism, and
(2) his ultimate appeal would call for the blacks to trust
the whites.

He sought to establish this trustworthiness by

showing his friendship with the blacks, a friendship which
25Ibid., 68.
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he argued was both sincere and deep.
He sought to establish the sincerity of his friendship
by arguing the consistency of his messages and the absence
of any personal motives.

In the opening of the address

Hampton noted that he was speaking to "the colored people of
this district, amongst whom my life has been passed."26

In

the past the blacks had treated him with kindness and
respect and there had been no change in this attitude since
the end of the war.

From these two pieces of data he moved

to the conclusion that "I am, therefore, justified in
calling you my friends."

He then expressed the hope that

"as my conduct to you has made you look upon me as your
friend [as evidenced by the invitation to speak to them] so
my advice and actions in the future will but confirm you in
that belief."

Once he had established the basis of friend

ship he moved to defend the sincerity of it:

"I mention

these things to you . . . to give you the assurance, if you
need any, of my sincerity in all the advice I shall offer to
you today."

The "things mentioned" were (1) that he "was

the first Southern man who addressed a colored audience
after the close of the war," and that the advice given in
that speech at Richland Fork was the same he would be giving
in this one; and (2) that the advice given to whites in his
Pickens address in the fall of 1866 was consistent with what
26Charleston Daily Courier. 23 March 1867. All other
references to this speech in this section are from this
source.
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he would be giving to them.

To substantiate his point he

quoted from what he had told his audience in Pickens
regarding their treatment of the blacks.

From this evidence

he concluded "I have held one language in reference to your
people since your freedom.”
The evidence seems to justify his conclusion.

There

are no inconsistencies between statements made to whites as
opposed to black audiences or between those made in this
address with those spoken one and two years earlier.

In all

of these instances he was advocating fair, kind, treatment
and good will between the races, with the whites, of course,
always occupying the superior position.
In addition to proving his sincerity by the consis
tency of his messages, he also argued the absence of any
personal motives:
No personal motives can possibly sway me for I am no
longer a citizen of the United States or of the Confed
erate States. The Bill which gives the right of
suffrage to you, disenfranchises me. I have not even a
home here, for my home, and the homes of all who love my
name, have been laid in ashes. I have no political
rights. I have nothing to bind me to the ruined land,
but the memories of the past, the appreciation I cherish
for its people, and the graves of my kindred. These
ties, however, are strong enough to keep alive in my
heart, a warm interest in my state, and they are
sufficient to make one strive always to promote her
welfare. This motive, alone, brought me here today, for
it was not until the chairman of your committee urged me
to come, upon the ground, that I could thus "do good to
my own people, and to them," that I consented to address
you.
While there is no reason to doubt Hampton's dedication to
the welfare of his state, and in fact many reasons for
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accepting it, the reasons presented here border on mis
representation.

While Millwood, the magnificent plantation

of the Hampton family going back to his grandfather, had
indeed been converted to cinders by Sherman, Diamond Hill
and Southern Cross, both of which were in Columbia and
belonged to the Hampton family, were in fine condition.
Political control of the state would have a dramatic impact
upon the economy, and Hampton, tottering on the brink of
bankruptcy, certainly had a vital interest in the economy.
While in truth he had been disfranchised and was without
political rights, he was not without political influence,
and certainly fully expected within a short period of time
to regain his rights.

Even granting minimum personal moti

vation, he was still motivated by his vision of a society
controlled by white aristocrats.

The impression which he

sought to create that he was speaking to them purely from an
altruistic concern for their welfare was definitely not an
accurate one.
Secondly, Hampton argued that he was trustworthy
because of his deep affection for the blacks.

This

affection was based on their past attitudes and actions
toward him:
Looking at your action [inviting him to speak] in an
aspect purely personal, I cannot but be greatly grati
fied at the confidence you have reposed in me. It is
but another evidence of that life-long kindliness shown
by your people to myself; a kindliness which I gladly
reciprocate. From many of you I have met not only
kindness, but affection. I cannot forget how faithfully
some of your people clung to me through all the perils
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and privations of the war. I cannot forget that it was
one of you, who was always amongst the first at my side
when I was wounded, and the last to leave me. Such
affection is not often met with, nor is it easily
forgotten, and while I have a crust of bread it shall be
shared with this well-tried, this true, this trusty
friend.
There is little reason to doubt the genuineness and
depth of his feeling toward the blacks.

What is important

is that this feeling had been expressed within very clear
societal boundaries.

The relationship was not between

equals but rather between master and slave.

"The freedmen

of Columbia," wrote Harper1s Weekly, "probably understand
Mr. Wade Hampton quite as well as he understands them.

They

certainly did not believe him to be their chief friend when
he was in arms for the glorious right of enslaving them
hopelessly forever."27
Motive Appeals
In a New York Daily Tribune editorial a few days
before Hampton's address, Horace Greeley wrote:
The Union having triumphed by Emancipation, it was the
manifest policy, the clear interest, of the Southerners,
to turn at once to the Blacks and say, "we upheld
Slavery so long as we could, because we believed it best
for us and for you. But slavery is dead and you are
free: now we will show you that we were honest in our
devotion to slavery by treating you justly and kindly as
freemen. Choose your wisest and best men for consulta
tion with us; let them tell us what guarantees you
require for your rights, and they shall be freely
accorded. We are of different races and must remain so;
but we are all Americans and Southerners; and, if we do
27H a r p e r 1s Weekly,

16 April 1867.
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not henceforth live in harmony, it shall not be our
fault."28
White southerners in 1865 had not followed the steps
outlined by Greeley, though Hampton had consistently
advocated kind treatment.

By 1867 Hampton's thinking was

much more along the line of Greeley’s .

The key was to

establish a sense of unity and identity.

Greeley1s line,

"we are all Americans and Southerners" was mirrored by
Hampton's "are you not Southern men, as we are."

The

strategy of appealing to identification was clear to minds
both North and South.
As indicated earlier, Hampton's whole strategy for
dealing with the exigence was to gain control over the black
vote, and the means for doing that was identification.

Not

only in this speech but throughout the spring and summer of
1867 and the summer and early fall of 1868, Hampton sought
by verbal and nonverbal means to achieve with the blacks
what Kenneth Burke labels as consubstantiation.
Nonverbally, Hampton sought consubstantiation by
participating in meetings with the blacks.

In his address

at Columbia he was a guest speaker, sharing the platform on
an equal basis with black orators.

Simkins and Woody

describe the overall strategy and the manner in which it was
executed during the spring and summer of 1867:
To promote this sort of cooperation, public meetings
were held at which Negroes were invited to listen to
28New York Daily T r i b u n e . 14 March 1867.
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speakers of both races. To make the gatherings attrac
tive to the Negroes, they were allowed to march in
procession to the place of assemblage, members of their
race were appointed as a special police force to supple
ment the regular white force, and a free barbecue was
provided. . . . When these gatherings broke, after
sturdy repasts of barbecued lamb and kid had been
enj oyed everyone was in the best of spirits and it
seemed as if kindly cooperation were going to heal scars
left by the war.29
While Hampton and others of the white power structure
sought with banquets and processions to identify themselves
with the blacks, they were unable to go far enough to make
it work:
Why should they follow leaders who demanded that they
speak first and eat their barbecue at a separate table?
Better far the Negroes agreed, to follow leaders who
would give the race some of the offices and banquet
cheek by jowl with them.30
Verbally, Hampton sought identification through his
language, arguments, and illustrations.

Thirteen times in

the address he used "friends" and eight times "kindness."
The invitation to address them indicated they looked upon
the whites as friends, "friends with whom you wish to act
and from whom you are willing to seek counsel."

The blacks

were to test the proffered friendship of northerners and
southerners and discover their true friends.

Finally, he

identified as a "well-tried," "true," and "trusty friend"
the servant who was first to aid him when he was wounded in
battle.

The blacks, Hampton observed, had always treated

29Simkins and Woody, 85.
30Ibid.
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him with "kindness."

The black orator of the day had

"spoken wisely and kindly."
the blacks "kindly."

He urged the whites to treat

On the one hand Hampton had promised

the whites that the blacks would reciprocate any kindness
shown to them, and on the other hand he was gladly recip
rocating the kindness the blacks had shown to him.

In other

words, Hampton tried to create the oneness of long-time
friends bound with ties of mutual expressions of kindness.
Hampton's arguments are analyzed later in this chapter
and will not be duplicated here.

Simply put, he argued

blacks and whites were linked as one.

They shared the same

sun, the same soil and they would share the same suffering
or the same success.

Thus, they were one in environment and

circumstance.
Two illustrations from his past experience were used
to exemplify the mutual bonds of kindness and respect
between black and white.

In the one he described an

incident that had occurred several years earlier in the
North when a ticket agent told him his two servants could
not ride with him in the same car.

"I told him that I had

paid their fare; that I thought them good enough to ride
with me, and therefore quite good enough to ride with his
fellow-citizens, and that they should go into my car.
brought them in and kept them there."

So I

In a second example

Hampton remembered "how faithfully some of your people clung
to me through all the perils and privations of the war.

I
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cannot forget that it was one of you, who was always amongst
the first at my side when I was wounded, and the last to
leave me.”

The two examples established an almost familial

relationship between Hampton and the blacks with Hampton
being the instigator in one instance and the beneficiary in
the other.
Through nonverbal means of picnics, barbecues, and
joint speaking engagements, Hampton tried to appeal to the
black sense of oneness and identification with the state and
its white leaders.

Verbally the same appeal was made by

employing terms that characterize a good and close rela
tionship, and by pointing to past examples of good feeling.
Unfortunately for Hampton, the chasm was too wide for his
appeals to span.
Logical Appeals
Hampton's argumentative structure rested on one
independent, overriding contention and two conditional
arguments.

His first and most crucial argument was that the

fate and prosperity of the blacks was inevitably linked to
the welfare of the southern whites.

After establishing this

point, he considered two possibilities and the ensuing
consequences:

(1) that the military bill would be declared

constitutional by the United States Supreme Court and the
blacks would have the vote; and (2) that the bill would be
declared unconstitutional and the whites would remain in
power.

This section will analyze each of these arguments.
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His argument linking the welfare of southern whites
and blacks was critical not only to the success of this
speech but to his overall strategy of dealing with the black
question.

In a letter written two weeks after his speech to

John Mullaly, a northern newspaper editor, Hampton clearly
enunciated his strategy:
it will overwhelm us.

"If we cannot direct these votes,

Now how shall we do this?

Simply by

making the negro a Southern man, and if you will a democrat,
anything but a radical."31

Six days after the speech he

wrote to James Conner, "the highest duty of every Southern
man is to receive the good will and confidence of the
negro."32

While he had earlier urged fair treatment toward

the blacks and argued that it was in the whites best
interest to treat them kindly, he had told the blacks in his
Richland Fork address that "we can get along without you
better than you can without us."33
In making his argument, Hampton first established the
obvious, that by geography and environment the blacks were
southern men:
Are you not Southern men, as we are? Is this not your
home as well as ours? Does not that glorious Southern
sun above us shine alike for both of us? Did not this
soil give birth to all of us? And will we not all
alike, . . . sleep in that selfsame soil?
31Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
32Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James
Conner Papers.
33Columbia P h oeni x . 21 January 1866.
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Undoubtedly, very few South Carolina blacks thought of
themselves as southern men.

While they had been born and

were living within the geographic region, it was through no
choice of their own.

They were in the South because they

had been unable to go anywhere else.

Further, to suggest

that one is a southern man or a northern man carries the
connotation that he is in sympathy with the social and
political views of that region.

It is inconceivable that

these blacks, two years out of slavery, were then or had
ever been in harmony with a system that had kept them bound
in chains.

To argue that they should identify with the

white power structure because they too were southern men by
birth was a hollow appeal.
His second argument linking them to the interests of
the South was at least more substantive if not more per
suasive:
Your welfare is inseparably linked with that of the
whites of the South. If we are unjustly taxed, you will
have to pay your share; if we are oppressed, you will
suffer; if we are ruined, you will be destroyed. Your
prosperity depends entirely on that of your country, and
whatever fate awaits the white people of the South will
be yours.
He made no attempt to prove the truth of his assertion that
the fate of white and black was linked together, rather, he
argued the consequences of the condition.

Hampton was

utilizing Aristotle's topic of the greater and lesser.

If

the "greater," the white land owners, were adversely
affected by taxes or other economic measures, the "lesser,"
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the poor blacks, would feel the impact as well.

Normally,

the argument would carry, but in this instance the blacks
had almost nothing to lose.

The disparity of their relative

economic conditions was forcefully set forth by A. L. Burt
in a protest to the Congress over the new state consti
tution.

" 'At this moment the taxable property is held by

one race, and under that Constitution the political power is
vested exclusively in the other.9”34

In a speech to the

1868 constitutional convention R. H. Cain in arguing for an
appeal for federal money further described the plight of the
blacks:
This is a measure of relief to those thousands of freed
people who now have no lands of their own. . . . I
believe it is a fact . . . that over three hundred
thousand men, women and children are homeless, landless.
The abolition of slavery has thrown these people upon
their own resources.35
Thus, Hampton9s argument was valid only for the small
percentage of blacks who had an economic investment in the
state.

Significantly, Cain in his address to the convention

argued the same point that Hampton was trying to make, but
correctly noted that for the blacks to have any interest in
the economy of the state, they had to be landowners:

,9If

they possess lands they have an interest in the soil, in the
State, in its commerce, its agriculture and in everything
34Resoectful Remonstrance on behalf of the White People
of South Carolina against the Constitution of the late
Convention of that State, now submitted to Congress for
Ratification (Columbia: n.p., 1868).
3Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. 379.
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pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the State."36
To substantiate his view that blacks and whites were
linked in economic interest, Hampton developed an example of
unjust taxation:
I have said that if an unjust tax is laid upon the
South, you will have to pay your share of it. Let me
prove this to you. Many of you are laborers on plan
tations, working for a portion of the crop. Well,
suppose you get one, or two, or three bales of cotton,
as your year's wages. Now, before you can sell this
cotton, for which you have worked hard, a whole year,
you have to pay a tax of twelve dollars a bale, for
every bale you have made. There is a case, in which
unjust taxation falls as hard, or harder on you, than it
does on us.
The example did indeed support his generalization, but
certainly did not prove it.

Any tax upon goods and services

would affect, as Hampton claimed, both white and black.

The

fallacy, of course, is that he was trying to prove a
generalization with only one example.

Significantly he

avoided mentioning the tax that was uppermost in the minds
of the planters— the property tax— because it blatantly
contradicted his assertion.

The impact of the property tax

would fall almost exclusively upon the white landowners.
The vast maj ority of blacks would not only escape the burden
of the tax, but would stand to gain as planters were forced
to sell some of their land.

A. L. Burt in his protest to

Congress saw the consequences of heavy property taxes:
Now what must be the consequences? Property under forms
of law, in the guise of taxation will be transferred
from the hands of those who now possess it to others.
36Ibi d . , 380.
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It is inevitable. The holders of taxable property in
South Carolina cannot today, and will not hereafter, be
able to pay the taxes imposed upon them.37
By 1874 the taxpayer's convention was petitioning Congress
and citing unjust taxes that confiscated their property:
It has been openly avowed by prominent members of the
Legislature that the taxes should be increased to a
point which will compel the sale of the great body of
the land, and take it away from the former owners. The
fruit of this policy is shown in the fact stated by the
Comptroller-General in his official report, that for
default in the payment of taxes for the year 1872 alone,
268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the State.38
Not only would the blacks not be hurt along with the whites
by taxes, as Hampton stated, they would be significantly
helped.
Following his attempt to establish a general link
between the economic well being of the two classes, Hampton
moved to specific arguments dealing with their new right to
vote.

He observed at the outset that the bill giving blacks

the franchise was being challenged before the Supreme Court
and that "a great many persons, amongst whom is the Presi
dent of the United States, think that this Bill is unconsti
tutional ."

With that observation he then considered two

contingencies:

(1) the bill was constitutional and the

blacks would have the right to vote, and (2) the bill was
37Resoectful Remonstrance. 16.
38Proceedings of the Taxpayer1s Convention of South
Carolina, held at Columbia. beginning February 17, and
ending February 20. 1874 (Charleston, n.p., 1874), 51.
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unconstitutional and the present government would remain in
power.
The possibility that the first contingency might be
true forced Hampton to make a crucial direct appeal for the
black vote.

Hampton provided three groups of men from whom

the voters would select those who would "make your laws,"
and "frame your government."

They could choose (1) "men who

are ignorant of all law— all science of Government," or (2)
"strangers who have flocked here to plunder what little is
left to u s ," or (3) "the men among whom you have lived
heretofore— amongst whom you must always live," and whose
interest it was "to make the blacks enlightened, prosperous
and contented."

From the available choices, Hampton con

cluded, "it seems to me this latter course would be the
wisest."

Essentially, he was employing the method of

residues:

three choices were available and two were prima

facie bad, thus the only viable choice was the remaining
alternative.

The fallacy in his analysis was the

unsupported generalization that he asked his audience to
accept.

As with much of his speaking, he offered no

specific evidence to support his claims.

Nowhere did he

attempt to prove that all the native blacks were "ignorant
of all law."

He totally ignored the substantial number of

well educated free blacks who had been free for years and
were well established in business and the professions.

He

had to ignore men such as W. B. Nash, the moderator of the
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meeting to which he was speaking and whose sound judgment
and advice he had earlier praised.

Nowhere did he attempt

to prove that all the strangers were there "to plunder"
them; nor did he attempt to show that the whites had a
genuine interest in the welfare of the blacks.
The proof for his claims was to be found in actions
not words and significantly, future actions, not those of
the past:
I do not tell you to trust to professions of friendship
alone, whether they come from the Southern man or the
Northern. But what I ask you to do, what I have the
right to ask of you is, that as we profess to be your
friends, you will give us the opportunity of showing by
our actions whether we are sincere or not. If we
deceive you, then turn to the North, and see if you can
find better friends there.
The attractiveness of the argument was that it was a no risk
proposition, since the new constitution would have to be
submitted to the people for approval:
Should the new Constitution, then, not give equal
protection and rights to all, it can be rejected.
Another convention can be called, and another consti
tution submitted to the people. You have it, therefore,
in your power to test the good will and honesty of
purpose of the whites without any danger of inquiry
[sic] to yourselves.
Hampton's argument was correct; the blacks could allow the
whites to write the new constitution and then reject it if
it were not satisfactory.

The problem with the argument lay

in his having to appeal to what the whites would do in the
future rather than pointing to what they had done in the
past.

The whites had been in control of the government

since the end of the war.

They had revised the constitution

and passed new legislation to meet the changed conditions.
The constitutional convention had not given the blacks the
right to vote, they had not even allowed them to be counted
as a basis for representation in the legislature, but
instead had echoed and re-echoed the sentiments of Governor
Perry in his opening address that "this is a white man's
government."

The legislature had shown its concern for the

welfare of the blacks by passing the severely restrictive
Black Codes.

Instead of trying to explain or in any way

justify these past acts, Hampton simply ignored them and
argued that "not only does humanity dictate kind treatment,
honest dealing, just laws for the colored population, but
self-interest demands from us the same course."

While the

humanitarian appeal was new, the self-interest argument was
the same cause-effect analysis that he had employed at
Richland Fork.

The problem was that while Hampton might

have believed that humanity and self-interest demanded fair
treatment, the evidence from the past two years indicated
that at best the whites had varying definitions for "fair"
treatment and at worst no concern about it.

The evidence

indicated that the actions of the whites were determined
more by the radical controlled Congress than by
humanitarianism.
The argument that the blacks could test the sincerity
of the whites without risk was equally applicable to the
other alternatives.

In fact it is logically more persuasive
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when applied to them.

The whites had for two years had the

opportunity to produce laws favorable to the blacks and had
not done so.

Since the native blacks and "strangers" had

professed at least an equal interest in the welfare of the
blacks and had not had an opportunity to prove it through
legislation, reason would favor giving them the opportunity,
especially since the product of their labor would still have
to be approved at the polls.
In his first contingency Hampton dealt with the
possibility of the bill being declared constitutional and
the blacks retaining the right to vote.

The second possi

bility he considered was that the bill would be declared
unconstitutional and the present government continue.

This

state of affairs would then provide an opportunity for the
whites "to prove that our professions of friendship were not
idle."

He then set forth the case for a restricted suf

frage.

Significantly, in contrast to his earlier tendency

toward sweeping generalizations, he carefully noted that he
was not speaking for anyone but himself, a qualification
which certainly robbed the proposal of much of its force:
While I cannot speak for others, I tell you what I am
willing to see done. I am willing to give the right of
suffrage to all who can read and who pay a certain
amount of taxes, and I agree that all, white as well as
black, who do not possess these qualifications shall be
excluded. I would not take this right from any who have
heretofore exercised it, but I wish to see an educa
tional and property qualification for voters adopted in
the future.
To support his contention he argued that (1) advantages
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would come from his proposal, and (2) universal suffrage did
not exist.
The advantages of qualified suffrage, in Hampton's
estimation were two:
It will be a strong inducement to all to seek education
and to obtain for themselves a real and tangible
interest in the State. It will . . . contribute not
only to the material prosperity of the State, but to the
increase of virtue and education among her people.
These advantages were presented as self evident truths and
no support was offered.

It is possible to accept as

reasonable his conclusion that a qualified suffrage would
serve as some inducement toward education and property
acquisition, though it is not clear to what extent a person
not motivated by personal gain to acquire property and
education would be motivated by the prospect of voting.
Despite the lack of verification this motivation was
generally accepted by both black and white.

The same

position was argued at length in the 1868 constitutional
convention where qualified suffrage was rejected not because
it wouldn't motivate but because it would place the state
back in the control of the white southerners.

While reason

able to infer that some, regardless of how few, would be
motivated to acquire property and education, one cannot make
the leap from the desire to the realization as Hampton did
in the second half of his statement.

Not only must there be

a desire, but also the means of attainment.

Horace Greeley,

editor of the New York Daily Tribune, generally favored a
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qualified suffrage, but opposed it in the South because the
means of attainment were not readily available.39

In the

constitutional convention, F. L. Cardozo argued that
Charleston was the only place in the state with a system of
common schools and that it would take ten years to establish
an adequate system.40
In fairness to Hampton, he did advocate aiding the
blacks in their quest for knowledge.

Speaking to white

Georgia planters in 1869 he urged;
Let us assist him in his aspirations for knowledge and
aid him in its acquisition. . . . I do believe that in
proportion as you make all labor, other than compulsory,
intelligent, you render it profitable.
If this is true,
we should educate the mind, the heart and the soul of
the Negro, looking at the question only in its material
aspect and leaving out of consideration altogether those
higher and nobler motives which should prompt us to do
so.41
The system for accomplishing the goal called for the
planters to put up a school house on their land and help pay
the cost of the teacher.42

It was a system unlikely to

lift, in the near future, the bulk of illiterate blacks to a
level acceptable for voting.

In this address to the

freedmen, however, Hampton gave no suggestion as to how
blacks would acquire either education or property.
39New York Daily Tribune. 6 February 1867 in Charleston
Daily Courier, 13 February 1867.
4°Proceedinqs of the Constitutiona1 Convention. 825.
41Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21, 23 November 1869.
42Ibid.
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While evidence showing that qualified suffrage would
indeed provide greater material prosperity and an increased
level of education in the state was absent from the speech
and under the existing system logically unsupportable, a
third unmentioned advantage was absolutely clear.

With

black illiteracy estimated at eight-five percent of the
population,43 the unquestionable consequence of qualified
suffrage would have been the virtual elimination of the
blacks from the ballot box.
Hampton's second main argument for qualified suffrage
was that universal suffrage did not exist:
No one under twenty-one years of age is allowed to vote,
nor can foreigners do so until they have been in this
country some years. . . . Thus, you see that there is no
such thing as universal suffrage, nor do I think it
desirable, that there should be.
Essentially, he was arguing a straw man.

For the most part,

those supporting black suffrage were not contending that the
state did not have the right to set requirements for voting,
only that the requirements should not exclude the black from
casting a ballot.

Since there was no such thing as univer

sal suffrage, Hampton concluded, "you would have no right to
complain of a law which would put within your reach and that
of your children, any privilege, enjoyed by any class of
citizens."

Thus, any limitation upon the right to vote

should be acceptable as long as it was applied equally to
all involved.

Obviously, saying that some qualifications

43Williamson,

236.

for suffrage are justified is not the same as saying all
qualifications are justified.

The issue was not the general

one of whether there should be universal suffrage, but the
specific one of whether blacks should vote.
Hampton's logical appeals simply cannot sustain
careful analysis.

Throughout the speech he employed

sweeping unsupported generalizations linking the fate of
white and black and asserting the benefits of a qualified
suffrage.

He engaged in no refutation or counter

argumentation.

It was as if no arguments existed that were

counter to his own.

Not only did he ignore possible counter

arguments, but, in what was probably his greatest logical
failure, he ignored the record of the past.

To argue the

good faith of the whites toward the blacks and omit all
reference to the past represented massive misjudgment.

The

record was not good, but somehow he had to deal with it.
With every avowal by Hampton of what the whites would do in
the future, his audience had to be asking why the whites had
not done it in the past.

The issue was too large to ignore

as Hampton chose to do.
Fitness of Response
The best assessment of Hampton's address is that it
was an appropriate but inadequate response to the exigence.
It was appropriate in that he both recognized the critical
issues and dealt with them in a positive manner.

It was

inadequate in that while he sought accommodation with the
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blacks, what he was offering was too little, too late.
Unquestionably the most pressing issue in South
Carolina from the spring of 1867 through the national
elections in the fall of 1868 was the political power of the
blacks, and specifically their right to vote.

Immediately

after passage of the Reconstruction Acts, which granted
suffrage to the blacks, Hampton spoke to the issue.

Whereas

in 1865 the thrust of his Richland Fork address was on the
need for black labor and economic cooperation, in the
freedmen's address the ground had shifted to suffrage and
political cooperation.
Hampton's response was also appropriate in that he
approached the exigence in a positive manner.

Earlier at

Richland Fork and at Walhalla he had been positive in urging
the whites to deal kindly with the blacks because it was in
their best interest to do so.

His approach to the blacks,

however, had been more negative in tone, warning them of
dire consequences if they did not return to the fields.

In

the freedmen's address, however, there were no threats or
warnings, but rather a recognition of their political
equality with the whites and a high level appeal for them to
put the interest of South Carolina above other motivations.
An editorial in Harper's Weekly commended Hampton's approach
to the situation:
The meetings of the Freedmen in South Carolina, and
especially that at Columbia which was addressed by Mr.
Wade Hampton . . . are significant. They show the
utmost good sense upon the part of the orators. They
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are, of course, attempts to gain the control of the
colored vote; but that is a legitimate purpose and they
are exactly the results which we have always anticipated
from the wise Radical policy of Congress. . . . It is
the most healthy sign we have seen in the Southern
States. . . . It is a practical acceptance of the
situation.44
While doubting his ability to persuade the blacks, the
editorial specifically congratulated
Mr. Hampton upon his conduct. It is that of a citizen
who thoroughly comprehends the situation, and of a
soldier who concedes that his cause is lost. Such a man
will either leave the country, or if he remains, will
adapt himself to its changed conditions when he per
ceives that they are changed.45
The Richmond Times saw Hampton's response as indica
tive of "a sagacious, practical statesman and one that
should be 'universally imitated.'"46

The New York Times

praised Hampton's position and expressed the view that if
the South would adopt such a view it would "contribute very
largely to the harmony of sentiment between the two
sections."47

W. B. Nash, the black leader who spoke on the

same occasion with Hampton, later wrote in a letter to the
Columbia Daily Phoenix that "when I heard the noble senti
ments expressed there by him . . .

I threw down the hatchet

and called on my people to do the same, and to meet our
44Harper's Weekly. 6 April 1867.
45Ibid.
46Richmond Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix, 26 March
1867.
47New York Times in Columbia Daily P h o e n i x . 22 October
1867.
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white citizens half way in a Christian-like spirit."48

As

Harper1s Weekly had observed, it was no mystery to anyone
that Hampton was trying to gain control of the black vote,
but he was trying to do it by recognizing a changed poli
tical condition and responding to it in a realistic,
pragmatic fashion.
While Hampton's response was appropriate, it was
inadequate.

Horace Greeley in the New York Daily Tribune

saw the position of Hampton and the blacks as being irrecon
cilable through compromise:
We take Wade Hampton of the well-disposed ex-rebels who
are sincerely desirous of the welfare of the freedmen,
but wish to control their action; we take the Charleston
meeting as the representative of the freedmen throughout
the South. . . . There is a radical difference in the
conviction of these two, to be adjusted by no compro
mise. . . . Practically, it is a question of voting.
It
is whether the negroes shall go over to Wade Hampton, or
whether he shall go to the negroes. March 19, he gave
them the ultimatum of the Southern whites— "thus far we
can go to please you; come over the rest of the way to
us." March 22, the negroes gave their answer— "malice
toward none, charity to all, but— we vote with the
Republican party.1,49
Hampton was genuinely willing to compromise, as he had
indicated in his correspondence with James Conner; not only
was he willing to grant a qualified suffrage but also to
allow the blacks to take the congressional seats as long as
the whites kept control of the state.

The problem was that

Hampton could not go far enough in his compromise, and there
48Columbia Daily Phoenix,

3 April 1867.

49New York Daily Tribune, 29 March 1867.
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was no need for the blacks to compromise.

Hampton offered a

qualified suffrage which was unacceptable even to Beverly
Nash, the black organizer of the joint meeting who was
urging the blacks to support the state's established
leaders.50

In fact Hampton had to carefully qualify his

offer of limited suffrage to show that he was only speaking
for himself and not the white leadership in general.

Thus,

the blacks faced a choice between an uncertain, qualified
suffrage at the hands of those who had only recently given
them the Black Codes, and a reasonably certain unqualified
suffrage from those who had been working for their right to
vote.

It was not a difficult choice.
50Charleston Daily Courier. 23 March 1867.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1876 AS RESPONSE
TO THE BLACK DOMINATION EXIGENCE
Exigence
The exigencies of 1867-68 and 1876 were essentially
the same in that both concerned which race would control the
government of South Carolina.

In 1867, however, black

dominance was only a threat, whereas by 1876 the black
majority had been in power for eight years with all its real
and imagined abuses of government.

Part of the frustration

of the whites came from being one of only three states still
under reconstruction government, and knowing that Missis
sippi in 1875 had overthrown its black majority and returned
the state to the control of the native whites.

The con

sensus of white opinion toward black supremacy was expressed
in an 1888 article by Wade Hampton, in which he concluded
that "it would involve total and absolute ruin to the south
and infinite and irreparable loss to the whole country."1
The exigence of black control remained constant, but
the urgency to modify it increased as the years passed, and
various efforts by the whites to bring about change failed.
^-Wade Hampton, "What Negro Supremacy Means," Forum 5
(June 1888), 2.
100

101

Unjust taxation and corrupt administration were the two
strongest perceptions lending urgency to the need to modify
the situation.
In 1871 and 1874 members of the white establishment
called taxpayer conventions to publicize the policies of the
government and to petition Congress for relief.

The 1871

convention was called "to investigate the accounts of the
comptroller and the financial agent and to determine the
amount of the public debt with a view to seek further action
as might be necessary for the protection of public creditors
and taxpayers."2

According to Simkins and Woody the machi

nations of Gov. Robert Scott, Att. Gen. Daniel Chamberlain,
and financial agent H. H. Kempton successfully prevented the
convention from uncovering the truth.3
The 1874 convention was not as much an investigation
of a specific issue as a proclamation of the various fiscal
ills of the radical government.

In a memorial to Congress

drafted by Armistead Burt, he argued that it was the policy
of the administration to tax land "to a point which will
compel the sale of the great body of the land and take it
away from the former owners."

He showed that "for the year

1872 alone 268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the
State."4

Additionally Burt cited the extravagance of the

2Simkins and Woody, 156.
3Ibid., 158-59.
4Proceedings of the Taxpayers1 Convention. 156.
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Republican governments by comparing expenses of leading
items for 1865-66 with those for 1873.
$260,000 to almost $2 million.

The contrast was

He attacked particularly the

printing expenses, showing that the $331,945 spent for
printing in 1873 was $60,765 more than the total spent on
printing from 1800-1859.5
By way of rebuttal the Republican administration sent
a response to the United States Congress.

The incumbents

correctly showed that 1865-66 was atypical and then tried to
justify the increased cost over more typical years.
Significantly, the Republicans did not refute the charge
that their tax policies were leading to the confiscation of
land, but claimed that the goal was socially desirable in
order to achieve a more egalitarian society.6
While the Taxpayer's Convention identified and publi
cized the increased cost of government, the confiscatory tax
policy, and the strong possibility of corruption in the
government printing operation, it brought no change in
conditions.

President Grant received the committee bearing

the appeal and responded that it was not a matter for the
federal government but for South Carolina, and laid the
blame for the problem on the views of the white
5Ibid., 52.
6Reply of the Central Committee of the Republican Party
of South Carolina to the Memorial of the Taxpayer1s Conven
tion in Reynolds, 253-61.
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establishment.

Congress likewise claimed the issues were

beyond their power and refused to get involved.7
Along with the exigence of heavy taxation was that of
corruption of Republican politicians.

It is not the point

of this study to argue the degree of corruption or the
culpability of individuals, since that ground is adequately
discussed by numerous historians.

The two facts of impor

tance for this study are (1) corruption did exist to a
significant degree, and (2) the conservatives perceived the
corruption as massive and destructive.
Historians of the period, redeemer and revisionist
alike, recognize that corruption was prevalent in the
radical regimes.

Reynolds along with Simkins and Woody

paint the fraud and corruption in vivid colors with a broad
brush, while more contemporary historians such as Holt,
Williamson, and Bleser use delicate bristles and subtle
hues.

Holt accepts the fact that bribery was widespread,

but argues that it usually dealt only with financial matters
and concludes that it did not significantly alter the voting
patterns of individual legislators.

"Clearly, corrupt

inducements were simply one of several factors that must be
weighed by a lawmaker in arriving at a political decision."8
Carol Bleser in his excellent study of the land commission
7Charleston News and Courier. 30 March; 3, 18 April
1874.
8H o l t , 148.
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observes, "although the land experiment was humanitarian in
concept, in practice it was sabotaged by internal dissen
sion, riddled with corruption, and harassed by the criticism
from the Conservatives."9

Bleser documents several frauds

by the land commission and then cites Gov. Robert K. Scott
as "one of the worst corrupters of the Land Commission
Act."10

Williamson specifically details the corruption

prevalent in the "Bond Ring" and the "Railroad Ring" and
estimates that during the period some twelve to fifteen key
figures managed to steal "from scores of thousands to
several hundred thousand dollars each."11
The significance of the corruption issue is that both
Republicans and Democrats recognized and publicly denounced
the corruption.

Attorney General Daniel Chamberlain wrote

in a published letter to W. T. Trenholm that "incompetency,
dishonesty, corruption in all its forms, have 'advanced
their miscreated fronts,' have put to flight the small
remnant that opposed them, and now rules the party which
rules the state.1,12

Robert Elliott, a black member of the

South Carolina legislature and speaker of the house during
the Chamberlain administration, attracted great attention
9Carol Bleser, The Promised Land: The History of the
South Carolina Land Commission. 1869-1890 (Columbia: Univer
sity of South Carolina Press, 1969), 47.
10Ibid., 54.
11Williamson, 390.
12Ku Klux Conspiracy. 1251.
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during 1874 with his bold calls for reform.13

The central

issue in the gubernatorial campaigns of 1870, 1872, and 1874
was corruption in government.

The issue, though, is greatly

complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing the corrup
tionists from the reformers.

According to Lamson:

There was of course nothing exceptional in the 1870's,
about public servants who advocated reform on the one
hand while systematically defrauding the public on the
other. Men like Moses, Naegle, Patterson, Tomlinson,
Cardozo, Whipper, Smalls, and even on occasion Robert
Brown Elliott, to mention only a few, . . . all talked a
noble game while often playing an ignoble one.14
Daniel Chamberlain is an excellent example of the problem.
Lamson clearly sees him as a hypocrite:

"Although he set

himself apart as an honest man and a reformer, there is
ample evidence that he was a member of the infamous Bond and
Railroad rings."15

In confidential letters to F. W.

Dawson, however, Chamberlain confessed poor judgment but
denied culpability for any wrong.

"That I hoped to make

money— dreamed of thousands— there is no doubt, but I never
knew of or consented to any transaction even in this
connection, which involved any injury to the State as I then
understood it."16

Whatever his past experience had been

13Peggy Lamson, The Glorious Failure; Black
Congressman Robert Brown Elliott and the Reconstruction of
South Carolina (New York; W. W. Norton, 1973) 184-88.
14Ibid., 155.
15Ibid.
16Daniel H. Chamberlain to F. W. Dawson, 9 June 1875,
F. W. Dawson Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.
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there is no question but that he was sincere and effective
in his reform efforts after 1874.

In his biography of F. W.

Dawson, E. Culpepper Clark writes;
It has been as difficult for historians as for contem
poraries, to resolve the enigma of Chamberlain1s close
contact with the corruptionists and his apparent good
character. The best explanation is found in Robert
Means Davis's notebook, "Campaign of 1876," . . . Davis
a contemporary observed that as attorney general
Chamberlain knew about some of the frauds but refused to
reveal them, even though he did not profit personally.17
In spite of the difficulties in discerning between corrup
ters and reformers the point seems clear that corruption was
widespread and available as an issue for both Republicans
and Democrats.
From after the 1868 election until 1876 the conser
vatives felt it was pointless to offer Democratic candidates
in state elections.

Realizing the futility of direct

confrontation, the native whites sought at least to get
their foot in the statehouse door through a program of
fusion with more conservative Republicans of both races.
True fusion campaigns were run in 1870 and 1874 while in
1872 some of the whites supported bolters in the Republican
party.18

The strategy called for a nonpartisan campaign

based upon honest reform without regard to party or race.19
17E. Culpepper Clark, Francis Warrington Dawson and the
Politics of Restoration: South Carolina. 1874-1899 (Univer
sity, Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 47.
18Simkins and Woody, 444-73.
19Charleston Daily Cour i e r . 4 May 1870.
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In 1870 the Union Reform party was created and nominated
white Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor and white
Democrat M. C. Butler for lieutenant-governor.

Despite an

active campaign and endorsements by several leading northern
Republican newspapers, the Union Reform party failed by more
than thirty thousand votes.20
The 1874 fusionist effort was by far the most encour
aging of all efforts of the conservative whites:
The Independents . . . came within 12,000 votes of
defeating the regulars in the gubernatorial contest, and
they won Charleston county with its bulging twenty
legislative seats. Independent Republicans and Demo
crats held a total of fifty-four seats in the House,
while in the Senate there were eight Independents and
seven Democrats for a combined strength of fifteen.21
Had the promise of exerting a conservative control over the
legislature been realized the events of 1876 would no doubt
have taken a different course.
To understand the situation in 1876 it is necessary to
look at the political alignments that developed between 1874
and 1876.
The 1874 campaign was one for reform.

Not only was

this the battle cry of the bolters but of the regular
Republicans as well.

"In the spring of 1874, virtually

every Republican leader in the state was talking reform, and
20Ibid., 20 February, 16 May 1870? and Simkins and
Woody, 449-53.
21H o l t , 178.
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a strong minority was moving energetically to achieve it."22
Republican newspapers North and South as well as the Grant
administration demanded reform.

In fact there are indi

cations that the Grant administration toyed with the idea of
supporting a conservative candidate for governor, but in the
end stayed with the regular Republicans.2 3

Whatever the

intentions of the other party leaders, Governor Chamber
lain's calls for reform were apparently sincere.

Williamson

lists the reforms initiated by Chamberlain and indicates
that by mid-1875 he was drawing support and praise from
conservatives who had denounced him in 1874.

Strangely

enough a strong alliance developed between Chamberlain and
F. W. Dawson, editor and part owner of the Charleston Daily
Courier and one of Chamberlain1s harshest critics in 1874.24
At the same time the governor was developing support among
the white conservatives, he was creating division within his
own party.

"Relations between the governor and the Negro

Republican leadership had deteriorated considerably,
especially those between Chamberlain and House Speaker
Robert B. Elliott.1,25

Elliott saw Chamberlain's actions as

a threat to the dominant political power of the blacks.

If,

22Williamson, 399.
23Holt, 177; and Williamson, 400.
24Holt, 183; and Williamson, 401-02.
25Holt, 185; for detailed analysis of the relationship
between Chamberlain and Elliott see Lamson, 195-234.
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from Elliott's perspective, Chamberlain succeeded in holding
together a coalition of white conservatives, reform-minded
white Republicans, and upper class blacks who were being
hurt by corruption, then the poor blacks would be the
losers; thus Elliott worked strenuously to unite the black
legislative vote to oppose many of the initiatives of
Chamberlain.26
The most significant confrontation between Chamberlain
and the black leadership occurred over the election to
judgeships of W. J. Whipper and Franklin J. Moses , Jr.
Whipper, a northern black, was nominated to a judgeship in
the First Circuit, which included Charleston, and former
Governor Moses for a judgeship in the Third Circuit.

Both

Chamberlain and the conservatives denounced the men as
corrupt and unfit to serve as judges.

The corruption of

Moses is generally accepted while the case of Whipper is not
quite as clear.

Holt observes that the nominee had been

twice court-martialed while in the army, but Lamson notes
that he
was certainly not a stupid man, nor was he essentially a
bad man . . . . he was not one of the "friends" referred
to in the Woodruff diary; and except for his admittedly
dubious dealings with the sinking fund commission, he
was not cited in any other connection in the Report on
Public Lands.27
Whether the opposition to him was to his color or his
26Holt, 186-96.
27Holt,

185; and Lamson, 209.

110

character is not particularly germane.

The important issue

is that Chamberlain and the conservatives portrayed Whipper
and Moses as the personifications of corruption, and a vote
for their election was a vote for corrupt government.
Elliott, on the other hand, saw their election as a party
power move against Chamberlain.

"Practically every speaker

supporting these nominations invoked the necessity for
strict party unity.

At the caucus Speaker Elliott had

declared that he would measure each member's Republicanism
by his vote on this issue."28

In a strategic ploy the vote

was taken while Chamberlain was out of town and the men
elected.

While Chamberlain with a legally questionable

tactic prevented the men from taking their seats by refusing
to sign their commissions, his victory was pyrrhic.
damage had been done.

The

For the white conservatives the

evidence was obvious, the commitment to corruption by the
Republican party was so deep that no one could control or
reform it.29

Immediately after he learned of their election

Chamberlain responded, "'One immediate effect will
obviously be the reorganization of the Democratic party
within the state as the only means left for opposing . . .
the terrible crevasse of misgovernment and public
debauchery.8"30

One day after Chamberlain’s statement the

28Holt, 186.
29Lamson, 225; Simkins and Woody, 479; and Holt, 187.
30Charleston News and Courier. 20 December 1875.
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News and Courier in an editorial called for the reorgani
zation of the Democratic party and on January 1 the Columbia
Daily Register published a call for a meeting of the state
Democratic Executive Committee, and the Democratic party was
reborn in South Carolina.31
Through eight years and three elections the native
whites had failed in their efforts to undermine the power of
the Republican party and its black majority.

The exigence

of black domination had not changed throughout the period,
but two factors provided a sense of urgency at the beginning
of 1876:

(1) the election of Whipper and Moses seemed to

indicate conclusively the futility, even with a reformer
governor, of looking to the Republicans for relief; and (2)
the recent overthrow of radicals with their black majority
in Mississippi gave hope that it could be done in South
Carolina, even as it increased the frustration of being one
of the last southern states still under radical control.
Audience
While numerous factions and groups made up the South
Carolina political scene in 1876, Hampton primarily directed
his attention to two broad categories that were necessary to
modify the exigence:

apathetic and disillusioned conser

vative whites, and blacks.
3Charleston News and Courier, 21 December 1875; and
Columbia Daily Register. 1 January 1876.
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Blacks
The black audience was the key to any hope of success
for the Democratic party.

The 1875 census of voting age

males showed 110,744 blacks to 74,199 whites.32

With a

35,000 vote majority, the blacks had the power to control
any election.
The black vote, however, was not a single, unified,
monolithic political force.

Holt's analysis of black

political leadership documents that in the Republican party
divisions existed both between blacks and whites and among
the blacks themselves:
Prominent mulattoes from the freeborn class sometimes
allied themselves with the conservatives in local and
state elections. . . . Furthermore the statistical
correlation of voting behavior with socio-economic
background evident in earlier legislatures suggests an
underlying class schism among negro legislators.33
The lack of adequate data prevented Holt from applying a
statistical measure to the 1874-75 legislature, but he was
able to detect an apparent tendency on the part of upper
class blacks to break with the party stance and vote with
the conservative whites on several key issues.34
In addition to the splits along class lines in voting
behavior, there were also divisions over the reform
32Congress, Senate, South Carolina in 1876. Testimony
as to the Denial of the Elective Franchise in South Carolina
at the Election of 1875 and 1876. 44th Cong., 2d sess.,
1877, 568.
33Holt, 188-89.
34Ibid., 189-94.
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movements of 1870, 1872, and 1874.

In each instance the

majority of blacks voted with the party and defeated the
reformers.

Regardless of the outcome, the evidence demon

strates among the black leadership and the rank and file a
willingness to break with the regular party leaders in an
effort to obtain better government.
The Union Reform party of 1870 was a movement outside
the Republican party that represented a coalition of Demo
crats and both white and black Republicans.

M. C. Butler, a

Democrat and one of the advocates of the straightout
campaign of 1876, was the nominee for 1ieutenant-governor
with Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor.

Approxi

mately one-fifth of the convention delegates were black, and
many of them were nominated for county offices.

While the

effort failed massively, it did mark the first coming
together of white Democrats and black Republicans as
political equals in a reform movement.35
The 1872 and 1874 splits occurred within the Repub
lican party, and though both were unsuccessful, the 1874
campaign significantly narrowed the margin of defeat from
thirty thousand in the earlier campaign to only twelve
thousand.

The voting results indicate that large numbers of

black Republicans and white Democrats supported the reform
ticket which had as its candidate for 1ieutenant-governor
35Simkins and Woody,

447-56; and Taylor,

194-98.
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Martin R. Delany, a black.36
The division among black Republicans reached its
zenith toward the end of the Chamberlain administration.
From the perspective of Robert B. Elliott, black speaker of
the house, Chamberlain was on a course that was diametri
cally opposed to the interests of blacks.37

Holt observes

that "the governor's program did spark divisions within the
party and among negro legislators in particular."38

The

extent and intensity of the division are exemplified by the
Republican conventions in April and September of 1876.

At

the April convention the floor became a battleground where
Elliott sought to discredit Chamberlain by denying him a
place as a delegate to the Republican National Convention.
The charges and countercharges of corruption became so
acrimonious that at one point guns were drawn, tables
overturned, and the convention turned into an uproar.
Chamberlain won the skirmish and gained a seat on the
delegation but only after he delivered, at four in the
morning, a powerful defense of his Republicanism and his
reform policies.39

Though the skirmish and the control of

36Simkins and Woody, 472-73.
37Charleston News and Courier. 15 September 1976.
38Holt, 182.
39Charleston News and Courier. 11, 12, 14 April 1876;
see also Holt, 198-99; and Walter Allen, Governor Chamber
lain's Administration in South Carolina; A Chapter of
Reconstruction in the Southern States (New York; Putnam,
1888), 258-70.
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the party were Chamberlain's, the victory was by no means
decisive.
Chamberlain's opposition showed its strength at the
state nominating convention five months later.

Though

Chamberlain was able to retain the nomination for governor
he was forced to run on a ticket with two of his bitterest
enemies.

In a letter to William Lloyd Garrison written two

months after he relinquished his claim upon the office of
governor and left the state, he described how close he came
to forcing the convention into a showdown vote between
himself and R. B. Elliott:
I made a grave mistake in that I did not refuse to run
on a ticket with R. B. Elliott. . . . Elliott's base
presence on the ticket justly gave offence to some
honest men of both races. . . . I took the resolution
unknown to any friends, to walk into the convention and
throw up my nomination and avow that I did it because I
would not run on a ticket with Elliott. I knew it would
result in putting him off the ticket. I had actually
risen in my office . . . for this purpose, when I was
met at the door by a dozen or more of my most devoted
colored supporters who came to congratulate me on the
surrender of Elliott in seeking to stand on a ticket
with m e ! [emphasis in original] I was disarmed of my
purpose and relinquished it. It was a mistake.40
While social class and the need for reform were
working to split the blacks, white violence and protection
of their rights were concerns that pushed them together in
the Republican party.

Taylor notes the effect of the Ku

Klux outrage of the early 1870's:
The failure of the liberal Democrats to rebuke the
40Daniel Chamberlain to William Lloyd Garrison, 11 June
1877 in Allen, 505.
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lawlessness of their party associates and the refusal of
Democratic officials to convict partisans of crime
committed against Negroes and radical whites prevented
any considerable cleavage between the mass of Negroes
and the Republican party. Indeed, so far from accomp
lishing their purpose, the action of the Democrats
compelled the continued allegiance of the Negroes to the
Republican party. This was the logical course for the
Negroes since the Republicans had afforded them such
protection as they had received.41
It is not germane to this analysis to explore the nature and
causes of the Ku Klux violence.

Specific cases are amply

documented in the testimony before a joint committee of
Congress.42

What is important here is that it was violence

by conservative whites against black Republicans and white
radicals for political reasons, and that blacks throughout
the state knew of it.
For the blacks that Hampton sought to reach in the
autumn of 1876, violence was not only a memory, it was a
present reality.

The most significant and widely publicized

of all the violent racial encounters of 1875-76 was the
Hamburg riot in July of 1876.

In the conflict between a

band of white men and the black militia, one white man and
six blacks were killed and numbers wounded.
blacks were killed in cold blood.43

Five of the

The response by the

blacks came at political gatherings in Charleston and
Columbia.

In Charleston on July 17 they met to denounce

41Taylor, 203.
42Ku Klux Conspiracy.
43Holt, 199-200; see also extensive testimony in Recent
Election in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
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the violence:
We enter our outrages. We protest against these men and
their aides and abettors, and . . . we demand that
Governor Chamberlain shall . . . invoke all the powers
of the state to bring M. C. Butler and his clan to
justice.
They furthermore issued a resolution "that the massacre of
colored citizens at Hamburg, S. C. is unworthy of any
civilized community and deserves the censure and condem
nation of the civilized world."44

Similar sentiments were

expressed three days later at a Columbia meeting called by
R. B. Elliott.

At this meeting the blacks published their

grievances in an "Address to the People of the United
States."45
A final important perception of the blacks was that
their political freedom and social advancement were directly
linked to the Republican party.

The right to an unqualified

suffrage had come not from the Democrats but the Repub
licans.

Under the Republican banner over 250 of their race

had been members of the legislature between 1868 and 1876,
and numerous others held local and county offices.46

Not

only were they serving as local officers of the law and
members of the state militia, but they were sitting with
44Charleston News and Courier. 18 July 1876.
45An Address to the People of the United States,
Adopted at a Conference of Colored Citizens. Held at
Columbia. S.C.. July 20. and 21. 1876 (Columbia: Republican
Printing Company, 1876).
46H o l t , 228-40.
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whites as jurors and taking instructions from black judges.
Black controlled legislatures had provided free common
schools, admission to the state university on a non racial
basis, and a land commission to help the poor obtain
property.

While fraud and mismanagement had prevented the

realization of much of the new legislation, it nevertheless
had been undertaken under the aegis of the Republican
party.47
The black voters that Hampton sought to reach in the
fall of 1876 were far from a simple undifferentiated mass.
They were separated by class, education, and morality, and
concepts toward the nature and function of government, but
they were pulled together by heritage, and fear for the
preservation of their personal safety and political rights.
Whites
Hampton's white audience, while far more sympathetic
to his views, was also not without its differences.

On the

one hand there were large numbers who were politically
discouraged, disillusioned, and generally apathetic toward
efforts to overturn the black maj ority; on the other hand
among the politically active there were strong differences
regarding the approach to be taken by the campaign.
According to Williamson,
after the fiasco of 1868 and until 1876, most native
whites virtually surrendered the state to
47Holt,

152-70; and Taylor,

153-88.
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Republicanism. . . . Most whites simply withdrew from
active politics, concentrated upon improving their
economic situation, and gave up hope of regaining
political power.48
Hampton himself is a good example of this attitude.

After

the 1868 campaign he withdrew from active politics in the
state and devoted his efforts to ameliorating his economic
distress.

It was not until 1876 that he actively took part

again in South Carolina politics.

James L. Orr, one time

Democratic stalwart, saw the twenty-five thousand vote
Republican majority as insurmountable, and joined the
Republican party as the only practical way to effect good
government.49

Others looked at the numbers and quit.

"In

every election in which the fusionists participated,
possibly more eligible white voters stayed home than went to
the polls."50

From the fall of 1868 until December 1875 the

Democratic party was essentially non-existent in South
Carolina.

In Taylor's words, "the machine all but went to

pieces between 1868 and 1876."51
Among the politically active there were several topics
of division.

There was early division over whether the

Democratic ticket should be straightout, or a compromise
48Williamson, 353.
49James L. Orr, "Ex-Governor Orr's Reasons for Joining
the Republican Party in South Carolina," Southern Politics.
August 1870.
50Williamson, 354.
51Taylor,

188; see also Simkins and Woody,

180.
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with better elements of the Republican party,

within the

straightout group were significant differences over the
strategy and tactics to be used during a campaign.
The division between the compromise and straightout
factions was prominent between January and August 1876.

The

straightout faction, led by Martin Gary of Edgefield County,
demanded that only Democrats be nominated for state and
federal offices.52

In his testimony before the Senate

investigating committee, A. C. Haskell, Democratic campaign
chairman, explained why the party rejected cooperation for a
straightout approach:
A large portion of the people of the state were willing
to put Mr. Chamberlain on our ticket, notwithstanding
past prejudices . . . on the ground that he had shown
indications of a desire to reform. . . . But the public
opinion overcame that upon the ground, both that the
record of the past was very strongly against him, and
that the experiment had been tried but had repeatedly
failed . . . it was thought to be a hopeless effort.
If
we took Mr. Chamberlain, he would at once lose all
control over his own party.53
Though sentiment for the straightout campaign was
probably strongest in Edgefield County, there was support
from throughout the state.

As early as August 1875 The

Columbia Daily Register issued a clear call for a
straightout campaign.54

A year later the Pickens Sentinel,

Camden Journal. Abbeville Medium. Charleston Journal of
52,lPlan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers, South
Caroliniana Library, Columbia.
53South Carolina in 1876. 791-92.
54Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 11 August 1875.
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Commerce. Keowee Courier. and the Abbeville Press and Banner
were all calling for the party to go straightout.55

In

Richland County, nominees for delegates to the August state
convention were asked to state their position on a straightout campaign.

All of the elected delegates including Wade

Hampton supported the straightout position.56
At the May convention of the party, the delegates went
into secret session to discuss strategy for winning with a
straightout ticket.

The reporter for the Columbia Daily

Register noted the absence of strong fusion sentiments at
the convention.

The fusionists, however, were strong enough

to defeat a resolution by Martin Gary calling for a
straightout campaign, and delay any commitment to a campaign
strategy until the convention reconvened in August.57
In contrast to the straightouts, F. W. Dawson, editor
of the most influential newspaper in the state, the
Charleston News and Courier, felt the only way to overcome
the black maj ority was not to nominate a candidate for
governor and allow Daniel Chamberlain to be reelected.
Chamberlain's reform measures had won him a substantial
amount of acceptance and praise among Democrats.

In a

series of articles in July 1876 the Charleston News and
Courier set forth in detail the praiseworthy reform record
55Ibid., 3 June 1876.
56Ibid., 8 August 1876.
57Ibid., 6, 7 May 1876.
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of the governor.58

For whatever motives, Chamberlain

shortly after his election in 1874 "consciously sought to
destroy the existing Republican alliances and to create a
new coalition with elements of the former Democratic
regime."59

Frequently, upon the advice of his good friend

F. W. Dawson, he appointed Democrats rather than Republicans
to state and local offices.60

It is thus Chamberlain who

best summarizes the rationale for the cooperationists:
They knew and recognized the fact that the republican
party embraced a maj ority of at least twenty-five
thousand of the voters of the state. They knew and
recognized the fact that the colored race, who consti
tute the larger part of the republican voters were
attached to that party by . . . the profound conviction,
whether mistaken or not, that the great boons so
recently conferred on them— freedom and suffrage— were
safe only . . . under the protection of the party which
had conferred them. They believed upon evidence too
clear to leave room for doubt that for this cause no
number of these voters, sufficient to change the
relations of our parties, could be detached from the
republican party by argument or legitimate persuasion or
other lawful methods of influencing their political
action.6 1
Much the same idea was expressed by F. W. Dawson in a July
13 editorial when he argued that the only way a straightout
ticket could win would be by "fraud and force."62

Rather

significantly, A. C. Haskell in a letter to the editor in
58Charleston News and Courier. 5-18 July 1876.
59Holt, 179.
60Ibid., 183.
61Recent Election in South Carolina. 356-57.
62Charleston News and Courier. 13 July 1876.
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the Charleston Daily Register attacked Dawson for malicious
reporting but did not respond to the substance of Dawson's
argument.63
The division between the two factions of Democrats
remained sharp until one event in the middle of the summer
obliterated the dividing line.

Chamberlain's handling of

the Hamburg riot not only alienated him from many of his
Democratic supporters but also drove a wedge between him and
his most powerful ally, the Charleston News and Courier.
After having published only two weeks earlier an endorsement
of Chamberlain, the paper broke with him on July 20:

"We

have supported Governor Chamberlain's reform measures, and
we have frankly expressed our opinion of the Hamburg riot,
but we must protest against any move that wears the appear
ance of taking advantage of a local disturbance to prop up
the waning fortunes of South Carolina Republicanism."64
James B. Kershaw, a cooperationist, noted:
I think the unhappy affair at Hamburg will be made such
use of in the canvass that no alternative would probably
have been left us than to take it straight. At all
events it is a luxury once more to be able to put
forward the men we like best."65
Ben Tillman, looking back at the events, put the matter
rather succinctly, "If there had been no Hamburg riot, it is
extremely doubtful whether there would have been any
63Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 15 July 1876.
64Charleston News and C o u r i e r . 20 July 1876.
65Ibid., 28 July 1876.
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straightout campaign in 1876.1,66

At the August convention,

the straightout supporters were in control.

After a lengthy

secret session, Wade Hampton emerged as the unanimous choice
to head the ticket, with a full slate of Democratic candi
dates for state offices joining him.

"With a Straightout

Democrat heading the ticket, the white population for the
first time in eight years united in a definite, fixed
purpose.1,67
The party was united in the fixed purpose of over
throwing the radical regime and replacing it with white
native Democrats, but below the surface there were still
differences as to how that should be done.

While for many

the concept of a straightout campaign was synonymous with
fraud and violence, there was definitely a continuum that
ranged from murder at one end to non violent demonstrations
of strength and authority at the other.

At the one end,

argument and persuasion as a means for reaching the blacks
was discountenanced and ridiculed, while at the other they
were embraced as viable tools.

Martin Gary and Wade

Hampton, respectively, represented the two ends of the
continuum.68
The audience that Hampton faced as he began the
campaign was composed of blacks, large numbers of whom, as
66Tillman, 29.
67Simkins and Woody, 495-96.
68Tillman, 28-29; and Williams, 82-83.
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Chamberlain had observed, were convinced they owed their
freedom and suffrage to the continuance of Republican
administration, but who also were divided over class,
philosophy, and personalities.

The politically active

Democrats were aroused and outwardly united behind a man and
a cause, while below the surface strong differences in
philosophy, manner, and method seethed.

The politically

inactive and discouraged were there to be informed and
rallied.
Constraints
Rather than analyze a single campaign speech, this
section will look at Hampton's campaign speeches as a whole
and place them within the total campaign strategy.

The

analysis will cover speeches given from the time of his
nomination on August 16 to his final campaign address on
November 4 in Columbia.

During this period he spoke at

fifty-seven large meetings, and in all but one county.69
Campaign Strategy
One of the major factors influencing the direction of
South Carolina Democrats in 1876 was the overthrow of the
radical government with its large black majority in
Mississippi.

In November of 1875 the Columbia Daily

Register quoted an article from the Augusta Chronicle and
69Recent Election in South Carolina. 305? and Williams,
161, 357.
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Sentinel calling for the people of South Carolina to learn
from Mississippi:
The Democratic victory in Mississippi was the most
sweeping political revolution since the war. . . . It
only now remains to rout the Radicals from South
Carolina and Louisiana. . . . Let the white people of
those states learn a lesson of wisdom from
M i s s i s s i p p i „ 7n

A few months earlier the Register had quoted the New York
World praising the work of Mississippi Democrats and setting
them forth as an example for other states with black
majorities.71

Martin Gary took the advice and turned to

Mississippi for guidance in overthrowing South Carolina's
black majority.

In a letter to Major T. L. Barker of

Charleston, General S. W. Ferguson of Greenville, Missis
sippi described how the whites of Washington County overcame
a black maj ority of five thousand.

According to Ferguson,

the keys to success were letting the white radical leaders
know their lives were forfeit if there were any disturb
ances , showing up at all radical meetings to contradict the
speakers to their faces, and monitoring the polling places.
All of the above with considerable elaboration appeared in a
thirty-three plank plan for the campaign of 1876 drafted by
Martin Gary.
batim:

Gary even included one recommendation ver

"never threaten a man individually, if he deserves

to be threatened, the necessities of the times require that
70Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 11 November 1875.
71I b i d . , 22 July 1875.
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he should die."72

Gary's plan was specifically for Edge

field County, but certainly clearly revealed a plan that
could be used in any county with a black majority.
The heart of the plan was theDemocratic rifle clubs
that were to be established in each township.

They were to

be uniformed with red shirts, armed with pistols and rifles,
arrayed under military command, and ready to ride to any
place in the county at a moment's notice.

They were to be

present in force at all radical meetings to verbally assault
the speakers and confront them with their "lies."

In

general they were to intimidate the Republican white leaders
and impress the blacks with the Democrats' power and
determination.

Additionally, each man was responsible to

use any means necessary to insure that one black man did not
vote the radical ticket.73

In a revision of the original

plan, Gary gave more specific instructions on intimidating
the blacks at the polling places on election day and
stuffing the ballot boxes.

In no case would there be any

rational appeals made to the blacks; they were to be told
that the Democrats were going to win with or without them,
and they could join the winning side if they wanted.

They

were to be told that many blacks had already joined the
Democrats, but names could not be released because of fear
72S. W. Ferguson to T. L. Barker, 7 January 1876,
Martin Gary Papers; and "Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary
Papers.
73"Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers.
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of Republican reprisals.74

To tighten the link to the

Mississippi plan, General S. W. Ferguson was present at the
August Democratic convention and following its close, spoke
at a rousing celebration of the work of the convention.75
The practical outworking of the plan was described by
Ben Tillman and Governor Chamberlain.

According to Tillman,

"Gary's doctrine of voting early and often changed the
republican majority of 2,300 in Edgefield to a democratic
majority of 3,900 thus giving Hampton a claim to the office
of governor.1,76

Tillman further claimed that the Hamburg

Riot exemplified the policy of intimidation:
Butler, Gary, and George Tillman had to my personal
knowledge agreed on the policy of terrorizing the
negroes at the first opportunity, by letting them
provoke trouble and then having the whites demonstrate
their superiority by killing as many of them as was
justifiable.77
In his Senate testimony Governor Chamberlain described
his experience with Democrats showing up at Republican
meetings and demanding a division of time.

In early August

he went to speak at a Republican meeting in Edgefield:
The public meeting was practically broken up and
prevented. There was nothing like free speech allowed
by the democrats who were assembled there. The
demonstration was so overawing and threatening in size
74"Plan of the Campaign." There are several versions
of this document in the Gary Papers.
75Charleston News and Courier, 17 August 1876.
76Tillman, 29.
77I b id., 28.
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and so brutal and determined in its character as to make
it a practical denial of free speech; and although . . .
the meeting was called by republicans and no invitations
extended to any other party to take any part in it, yet
the white people, led by General Gary and General
Butler, did take possession of it and did practically
deny free speech. . . . They came upon the platform, and
they practically enforced their demand of equal rights
with us . . . and General Butler and General Gary both
addressed the audience before the republicans, who had
called the meeting, were at all recognized; and General
Gary announced that they had come there to be heard, and
they were going to be heard; if there was any trouble in
consequence of the enforcement of the demand to be
heard, that he wanted it to be understood that the
responsibility would be with the republicans and the
republican leaders, intimating that if there should be
trouble and bloodshed, the leaders would be killed or
injured first. . . . I yielded to them simply because I
was not willing to take the responsibility of a
massacre.78
The governor went on to describe similar episodes within a
few days of each other at Newberry, Abbeville, Midway, and
Lancaster.
A. C. Haskell, Chairman of the Democratic Executive
Committee, repeatedly denied that the campaign strategy
involved violence, intimidation, or fraud.

Haskell in his

testimony before both the House and Senate investigating
committees outlined the instructions given to the county
chairmen at the beginning of the campaign:
The general plan of the campaign was impressed upon
them, at the base of which was, that there was to be no
force, no demonstrat ion of military force or physical
force, other than consisted in mere assemblages of
numbers, and that there was to be no actual violence
whatsoever in the state; that the campaign was to be
conducted on the clearest and broadest principles of
equal rights to all men, and full consideration to the
colored race, and that we were to win them by argument
78South Carolina in 1876. 7-9.
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and persuasion.79
Ten days before the election he again called together the
county chairmen and impressed
upon every chairman that he was to go back to his county
with this understanding, that not only should they not
use force at the election, but there must be no
demonstration of force; there must be nothing to intimi
date, awe, frighten or otherwise deter the colored
people from going to the polls.80
Regarding the practice of dividing time, Haskell testified:
My instructions always were to go to the meetings and to
remain perfectly quiet, but ask for a division of the
time and if it was rejected to remain perfectly quiet;
to keep order, listen to the speakers, and use any means
at their command, by the ordinary rules of mass
meetings, to indicate their pleasure or displeasure— to
hiss or applaud as they pleased— but by no means to make
any demonstration or threaten force or use it.81
Wade Hampton avowed that
the principles upon which I conducted the canvass were
the same as those I had announced in my acceptance of
the nomination. I not only declared my disapprobation
of any intimidation, but I said there should be none;
that if there were any attempts made looking in that
direction anywhere in the state, I should withdraw from
the canvass.82
Throughout the campaign he contended there was no violence
or intimidation at any of his meetings except Beaufort,
where a black audience refused to hear some of the speakers
who were traveling with him.

At all of his meetings he

offered any Republican the opportunity of dividing time, and
79Recent Election in South Carolina. 341.
80Ibid., 342.
81South Carolina in 1876. 831.
82Ibid., 984.

131

specifically instructed the executive committee that Demo
crats were to request and not demand a division of time at
Republican meetings.

In his view, the plan of the campaign

was to "endeavor to call out the colored people to listen to
us, to show them that their interests were our interests
...

to appeal to them by argument, and to reach their

heads through their hearts."83

Later in the same testimony

Hampton revealed his confidence in appealing to the blacks:
I believed that it could be carried by an appeal to the
best element of the colored people; that they were
suffering, as we were, by the stagnation of trade and
the ruin of the industrial interests of the state, and I
felt satisfied that an appeal to them would enlist
enough of them to carry the election.84
What then was the plan for the campaign, violence or
persuasion, Hampton or Gary?
be that both were employed.

The best conclusion seems to
In essence as the Senate

maj ority report concluded, there was both a high road and a
low road:

"Legitimate methods of political conversion

constituted the canvass.

Illegitimate methods constituted

the campaign," and
General Hampton . . . took no open part in the campaign.
. . . General Hampton was not permitted to hear anyone
urge violence, nor did he ever see any armed men, nor
did he personally [emphasis in original] know of any
physical violence or unlawful intimidation."85
In light of his emphasis upon persuasion in 1865 and 1868,
83Recent Election in South Carolina. 306.
84Ibid., 311.
85South Carolina in 1 8 7 6 . 157-58.
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his control over the Red Shirts during the dual governorship
and his eventual total break with Martin Gary it is not hard
to accept as genuine his belief that he could persuade
enough blacks to join him to give the Democrats the elec
tion.

He was also practical enough to know that violence

would bring federal troops and that was the last thing the
Democrats wanted.
While he may not have condoned the tactics of intimi
dation, he at least had to know what was taking place.

He

had been in Mississippi during that election, he was at the
August convention during the five hour secret session, he
heard the address of General Ferguson, and he surely had to
know of the campaign documents of Gary.

Hampton may have

believed that Gary's tactics were a necessary end to be
tolerated for the greater good of ridding the state of the
radicals.

In any case it is doubtful that he had the

political clout to control certain elements of the party.
The zealots had been laying the groundwork for the campaign
for almost a year prior to Hampton's involvement.

Hampton

was not the master strategist behind the campaign, but
rather was selected by the Butler-Gary faction because of
his ability to unify the party and inspire the Democrats
with zeal, confidence, and determination.
The testimony of A. C. Haskell was considerably less
sincere than that of Hampton.

While he professed that the

party policy regarding dividing time was to be done in a
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quiet, peaceful manner, and only upon the voluntary consent
of the Republican leaders, his own testimony of his experi
ences in going to Republican meetings contradicted his
claim.

In all of the occasions he cited as peaceful there

were disturbances, threats, and guns, and in one instance
the overt promise to kill the leaders if violence broke out
over their putting forward a black Democratic speaker.

In

every instance the meeting ceased to be under the control of
those who had convened it.

While disavowing knowledge of

the Mississippi plan he executed it to perfection.
James Conner, a Charleston lawyer, former chairman of
the Democratic Executive Committee, former cooperationist,
and candidate for attorney general, was a good friend of
Hampton and traveled with him through a substantial part of
the canvass.

In a letter to his wife at the end of October,

Conner observed, "our chance to carry the negro was not by
argument or reason but by letting him see that we were the
stronger, to impress him with a sense of our power and
determination— hence the demonstrations we made.1,86

In

another letter shortly after the election he described the
inability of the whites to buy the votes of blacks on
election day, even though ample money was available.87
In summary, while there were two overall strategies at
86James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James
Conner Papers.
87Ibid., 11 November 1876.
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work in the campaign, by far the most pervasive appears to
be the Mississippi plan with its fraud and intimidation,
rather than the persuasive approach of Hampton.

The

Mississippi plan with variations in intensity was applied
from the mountains to the coast.

While Hampton may have

believed in his ability to persuade the blacks, there is
little evidence to support a widespread belief in the
ability to win the blacks through rational argument.
Hampton's Speeches
Personal Appeals
Wade Hampton was one of a very few men in the state
who had the respect of both black and white.

"There was no

other person in South Carolina better fitted than this
nominee for the role of arousing white sentiment and of
convincing Northern opinion of the liberal intentions of his
party."88

In a letter to the editor in which he recommended

Wade Hampton as the party's nominee, M. C. Butler called him
"one of our most prominent, patriotic and popular country
men" and saw him as the best man to "reconcile whatever
discordant elements there may be in the Democratic party of
S.C."89

In addition to being seen as a man who could arouse

the whites, appease the North, and reconcile the party, he
was, perhaps most importantly, perceived as the best man to
88Francis Simkins, "The Election of 1876 in South
Carolina," South Atlantic Quarterly 21 (July 1922): 239.
89Colurobia Daily Register. 8 July 1876.
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bridge the racial gap.

A. C. Haskell testified:

He was nominated as a representative of the interests of
both races. He has always been recognized in this
state as a conservative man. . . . After the war he was
the first man who was looked to by the colored people
here in Columbia as their friend and representative and
so he acted. We did not nominate him as an extreme
democrat, but as a reform man, who was eminently
conservative, and who would be able to unite the two
races better than anyone else we could select in the
state.90
For the native whites, Hampton was more than a
pragmatic choice.

As the highest ranking South Carolina

officer in the Confederacy he was the embodiment of the Lost
Cause.

Many of the men in the state had fought under his

command.

In the interim since the war he had addressed

numerous reunions of confederate veterans.

Williamson

expresses well this relationship between Hampton and the
state:
When South Carolina found Hampton in 1876, it was if she
had re-found herself.
Indeed, she had. Hampton was,
above all, the creature of the society that had reared
him. He was the personification of its ideal, carrying
in his human form the inflexible rectitude, the sober
courage which all South Carolinians idealized but few
possessed. . . . In turning to Hampton in 1876, white
Carolinians were listening again to their consciences.91
For the whites Hampton's reputation was so well established
that it was unnecessary for him to attempt to build ethos
through his speeches.

While there were a few references to

his devotion to duty and the Lost Cause, they were minimal
90South Carolina in 1876. 792.
91Williamson, 407.
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and relatively insignificant.

He was telling his white

audiences what they wanted to hear and he didn't need to
build his ethos to do that.

Even in Edgefield where his

instructions were direct, forceful, and counter to what Gary
was advocating, he included no reminder of his past military
authority.92
The stress on building ethos had to be directed toward
the black voters.
trustworthiness.

The critical element of ethos was
He was asking the blacks to set aside

their history of slavery and black codes and trust him with
their newly gained civil and political rights.

It was

critical to his argument that he establish himself as a
trustworthy individual.
Hampton employed three techniques to establish his
trustworthiness:

(1) To establish the intensity of his

commitment he promised drastic future action if there were
any attempt to violate his promises, and he gave both past
and present examples of his standing up to whites on behalf
of blacks; (2) to demonstrate his consistency on the issue
of suffrage he pointed to his past position; and (3) through
testimony and example he tried to portray the mutual respect
and confidence existing between him and the blacks.

All of

these appeals did not appear in any one speech, but one or
more of them appeared in most of the speeches, and some of
92Charleston News and C o u r i e r . 21 October 1876.
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them were published in a campaign booklet.93
In establishing the intensity of his commitment, he
repeatedly promised to resign his office if the legislature
tried to tamper with the rights of the blacks:
I declare to Heaven that if there should be elected a
Legislature that attempted to do away with one single
right or privilege now enjoyed by the colored people,
that, so help me God, I would resign if I could not
defeat them.94
He gave impact to this commitment by citing two examples of
his standing up to whites to guarantee rights to a black
person.

Both were reprinted in the pamphlet distributed

throughout the state.

In one instance in Mississippi a

slave who did not belong to Hampton was about to be lynched
for murder.

Hampton heard of it, went to the owner and told

him:
"If you will get two more men, and give us all doublebarreled guns, I will take him out of the hands of those
men, put him back in jail, and give my life before he
shall be subjected to lynch-law." They told me if I
opposed the intention of those men they would lynch me.
I said let them do it, but I would go and tell them if
that man is lynched at their hands, they would be guilty
of murder. I did so, and I would risk my life to
sustain the laws of South Carolina, and to protect the
lives of her citizens.95
The other example occurred in Walhalla at the beginning of
the campaign.

At the Democratic meeting Hampton asked if

93Wade Hampton, The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton.
Democratic Candidate for Governor. to the Colored People of
South Carolina. 1865-1876 (n.p.: n.p.).
94Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
95The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton. 6-7.
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there were any Republicans present who wanted to speak.
When a black man stood and declared he was a Republican, the
crowd became boisterous and unruly.

Hampton quieted the

crowd and allowed the man to speak in peace.96
The second proof of his trustworthiness and the one
most frequently used was the claim that he was the first man
in the South to advocate suffrage for the blacks, usually
pointing out that it was before Congress had acted and while
Gov. Oliver Morton of Indiana and Gov. John Andrew of
Massachusetts were still opposing suffrage for the blacks.97
There is inconsistency among the various texts as to exactly
what Hampton claimed.

In some speeches he was reported to

have taken his position in 1865, while in others it was
1867.

In some instances he was the "first man" and in

others the "first man in the South" to advocate black
suffrage.98

In fact he was referring to the position he

adopted in 1867.99

Whether he was the first man in the

South to take that position is unclear, but he was one of
the earliest southern advocates.

In testifying before the

Senate investigating committee he observed that he was well
in advance of the rest of the South Carolina whites at that
96Ibid., 7.
97Charleston News and Courier. 10 October 1876.
98See addresses delivered at Sumter and Yorkville in
Charleston News and Courier. 10, 16 October 1876.
" South Carolina in 1876. 991.
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time.100

In some of his speeches he tried to use this

earlier division as further proof of his own sincerity in
advocating voting rights for blacks, and the fact of his
nomination as an indication that South Carolina whites had
adopted his position.101
His final appeal for trustworthiness was established
by examples of his past dealings with blacks, particularly
those who had once served him as slaves.

At Abbeville he

quoted a letter from a former slave who said, "You were
always good and kind to me when your slave, and knowing that
you are a good and kind man— a man who will do what he
promises— I write to say that I will vote for you, and get
all the black men I can to do the same."102

In the same

speech he went on to describe his good relations with his
former slaves at his Mississippi plantation:
These colored people, hundreds of them, with their
ancestors, have lived on my estate in Mississippi for
over two hundred years, and they are living there still.
They have never left me; they live all around me, and
since the war, such confidence have I in them that I
have not even a lock on my house. There is no protec
tion except those colored people who have grown up from
childhood with me. . . . These colored people, when they
want help, come to me for it.103
He then told of one of his former slaves, who, as he lay
100Ibid.
101Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
102Ibid., 20 September 1876.
103Ibid.
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dying, called for Hampton and
turned over all his property into my hands, asking me to
sell his cotton and take care of the money for his wife
and children, and to protect them. . . . I tell you
this, my colored friends, to show you that those colored
men who know me trust me.104
There is no evidence to suggest that any of these
appeals were illegitimate or inappropriate.

To the con

trary, the evidence indicates that he was consistent in his
advocacy of fair and kind treatment of the blacks and
recognition of their political rights.

Generally blacks

indicated a respect for him by attending his meetings and
listening to him when they would not hear other white
men.105

As indicated at the beginning of this discussion,

the whites also perceived him as a man who was respected and
trusted by the blacks.

The only flaw in his appeal was in

his discussion of his early position favoring black
suffrage.

His black audience knew that he advocated their

suffrage only after it was apparent they were going to get
it anyway, and that while the North was offering full voting
rights, Hampton offered a suffrage with educational and
property restrictions.

Overall, though, his claim for

trustworthiness was reasonable and supportable.
Motive Appeals
Hampton employed four basic motive appeals during his
104Ibid.
105South Carolina in 1876. 986, 994.
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canvass:

(1) the use of spectacle to inspire whites with

elan and confidence, and to awe the blacks with the whites'
power and authority; (2) the appeal to economic survival by
showing the threat from radical corruption; (3) the call to
patriotism to join as one in saving the state; and (4) the
creation both verbally and nonverbally of a bandwagon
effect.
A. B. Williams, a young reporter for the Charleston
Journal of Commerce. traveled with the canvass and provided
a description of the speaking occasions.

Williams was

heavily biased for Hampton and thus one must allow for some
exaggeration, but even with allowances, the demonstrations
and processions still appear impressive.

At the opening of

the canvass in Anderson "the crowd was estimated at 6,000
and 1,600 mounted men, organized in rifle and other clubs,
rode in the procession, while a long line of Democratic
clubs on foot marched and yelled— the 'Rebel yell."'106

At

Greenville he was met with a crowd of 5,000 to 6,000 and
1,500 mounted men, while in Spartanburg there was an equal
number of mounted men and the firing of artillery.

By the

time the entourage reached Newberry, the procession included
4,000 mounted men, "and the first appearance of the
regularly uniformed mounted Red Shirts."107

At every

campaign rally there was much firing of cannon, marching,
106Williams, 161.
107Ibi d . , 167,

181, 200.
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riding of men uniformed in red shirts, and moving in
military order.
While making no direct link to the mounted Red Shirts
and the firing of artillery, Hampton in his testimony before
the House investigating committee agreed that blacks were
easily influenced by "a display of force."108

James Conner,

writing to his wife, gave a clear statement of purpose for
all the display.

"Our chance to carry the negro was . . .

to impress him with a sense of our power and determination—
hence the demonstrations we made; for the darkey is impres
sible [sic! and the spectacular takes him." The only problem
with this approach was as Conner continued, "Chamberlain
brought in the troops and showed to the negro that there was
a power stronger than ours and the negro ceased to come to
us.

The same influence or motive that brought him in the

one case kept him away in the other."109
The economic appeal was essentially the same one he
had been making since the war;

the blacks and whites were

1inked together economically, and if the whites failed the
blacks would be on the bottom of the destruction:
If you allow the white people of South Carolina to go
down this time, you will go down so deep that no plummet
can ever reach you. If we, the white people of South
Carolina were to leave you the State, and give you
everything,— land, houses, churches, banks— you could
not live without them. The only way to bring about
108Recent Election in South Carolina. 330.
109James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James
Conner Papers.
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prosperity in this state is to bring the two races in
friendly relation together.110
Later in the speech he linked the prosperity to good govern
ment and then cited Georgia as an example of prosperity for
the blacks under a white Democratic government.

While

Hampton did not go into any specifics regarding corruption
and its economic impact, Gen. Robert Toombs of Georgia who
spoke immediately after Hampton, gave details on the fraud
and stealing of the radicals and how it directly affected
the economic well being of the blacks.111

At Edgefield he

used a comparison he had employed years earlier and
threatened the blacks with the fate of the Indians unless
they helped restore economic prosperity to the state.

Along

with the negative, however, he did again cite the economic
advantages that had come to the blacks in Georgia since the
radicals had been thrown out.112

In Charleston, the appeal

had a slightly different tone when he contended:
I tell the colored man he will never have any protection
for his life or property under this corrupt carpetbag
government. Why? Because they have not the power to
protect you. And they never will have the power until
they are supported by the capital and intelligence of
the Democratic party.113
He did not clarify what he meant by protection, but it
certainly could have been interpreted by his hearers as an
110Charleston News and Courier. 20 September 1876.

^Ibid.
112Ibid., 21 October 1876.
113I b id., 31 October 1876.
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oblique reference to proscription.
Earlier that month there had appeared in the News and
Courier a series of one-liners, interspersed among news
items, encouraging Democrats to do business with other
Democrats:

"If you want a porter, employ a democrat; If you

want a driver, employ a democrat."114

More than twenty such

appeals appeared with each giving a different service or
occupation.

The News and Courier also carried a series of

resolutions adopted by the Sixth Ward Democratic Club of
Charleston.

Proscription was one of the subjects addressed:

In our opinion the interest of the democratic party will
be promoted if, in purchasing supplies, employing
laborers, and so forth, those cooperating with that
party will give the preference to persons who intend to
join us in this struggle for an honest government.115
Hampton denied before the House investigating committee that
he had said anything in his speeches specifically about pro
scription, but had argued only that the economic interests
of the two races were linked.

Furthermore, after the

election he had sent out a directive specifically forbidding
proscription.116

The closest he came to the subject was in

his September speech at Marion:
I have told the colored people that the men who own the
land, the men who pay the taxes, the men who have the
title-deeds from the Almighty, will take you by the hand
as their friends if you come with them and help them to
redeem the State. But they say, on the other hand, if
114Ibid., 2 October 1876.
115Ibid., 21 September 1876.
116Recent Election in South Caro l i n a . 330-31.
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you do not come with them, and rather go with the
corrupt crew who have, for eight years, ruled and ruined
the State, then you will have to look to them for your
living and protection. We offer to the colored people
the right hand of fellowship; we hold out to them the
olive-branch of peace, but you cannot expect us, when
you allow your state to be dragged down to infamous ruin
by alien adventurers, to help you who have been the
cause of all the suffering which will assuredly follow.
We give you your choice now, either to come with your
white friends, who never have deceived you, or to go
with the carpet-baggers, who have deceived and plundered
you for eight years. If you think your carpet-bag
friends are right, then, when your trouble comes, go to
them for the help and protection you will assuredly
need.117
He illustrated the interpretation that should be given
his remarks by citing what a Greenville man had told his
workers.

If the Republicans returned to power he would not

be able to afford hiring any of them for the next year, but
if the Democrats took control he was confident the economy
would improve so that he could give them a $3.00 raise.

"He

didn't say that if they voted the democratic ticket he would
pay them higher wages, but simply if that party got into
power he would do so, showing how certain he was that under
home rule the prosperity of the state would be insured."118
As in past instances, the appeal to the economic
motives of the blacks was more negative than positive.
There was some positive ground, as in his promise that money
designated for schools would be spent for education and not
siphoned off by fraud, and in the citing of the improved
117Charleston News and Courier. 2 October 1876.
118Ibid., 20 September 1876.

146

condition of blacks in Georgia.
predominated.

Fear, however, certainly

Return of Republican rule would mean economic

collapse for the whites and, employing Aristotle's topic of
the greater and lesser, far beneath the rubble would be the
blacks, or like the Indian, they would be scattered to
oblivion.

Even if he did not directly endorse proscription

there was no mistaking the message that their jobs were
threatened if they helped the Republicans to victory.
The appeal to patriotism called from Hampton his most
emotional language.

He called for black and white to

forsake party and to stand together to rescue the state from
destruction by the radicals:
I can only implore our people, white and black, to come
together and sustain this cause. It is not the cause of
a party. It is not the cause of a clique. It is not a
struggle for party supremacy. It is a struggle for this
grand old home of ours. It is a struggle to save South
Carolina from foreign adventurers and thieves. It is a
struggle that white and black can struggle shoulder to
shoulder, to sustain. This dear old land belongs to us,
and, if we are true to ourselves, if we are true to our
fathers, if we are true to our children and to our God,
we cannot fail to transmit it free and prosperous to our
children. . . . Nothing on the face of this great earth
would have induced me to enter this contest, but the
sole hope that I might save South Carolina. And I tell
you that there is not a man in this State who is making
a greater sacrifice than I am. And now I ask you all,
white and black, in the name of Carolina, in the name of
our children, and in the name of your God to stand by
and sustain this great cause to the last.119
In Charleston black and white lost their separate
identities and became one as patriotic Carolinians:
I came then to speak to you, my friends, not as a party
119Ibid.
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man. I do not come to speak to my white friends or my
colored friends, but I speak to Carolinians, and I speak
as one pleading for a cause as noble as ever stirred the
heart of a patriot; for it is the cause of our native
land. . . . It is not a party fight. . . . But it is
simply an issue of patriotism.
It is an issue of life
and death to the State of South Carolina.120
Hampton called upon the men of Aiken to sacrifice
their lives for the dear old state.

Chamberlain had

received federal troops to maintain order in the state.
Hampton was afraid there would be some provocation that
would set off a collision between the whites and the troops.
Such an event could place the state under martial law and
obviate the ballot.

To forestall such a scenario, he

pleaded with the men of Aiken to remain passive, seek
redress of their rights in the courts, and die rather than
offer resistance:
If, by the inexorable law of military authority, they
are even ordered to fire upon you, say to them, "we have
no war against the United States government; we
recognize the flag which waves from the Golden Gate of
California to the Granite Hills of New Hampshire. It is
ours. If you fire on us, we know that in our deaths
American liberty will live." I see beside me today men
who offered their lives on many a battlefield.
I say to
them, offer them again; you could not die in a nobler
cause.121
In the name of patriotism, then, blacks and whites
were consubstantiated into Carolinians, and the cause
ennobled by being lifted above a mere political campaign and
placed on the level of protection of family, heritage, and
120Ibid., 31 October 1876.
121Ibid., 23 October 1876.
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soil that had been given them as a birthright from God.
This appeal would seem particularly appropriate for the
whites, many of whom had gone off to war to defend their
homeland and their way of life.

The merits of the appeal

for the blacks is not as apparent, and certainly not as
strong as for whites.

Many of them did see themselves as

native Carolinians and loved the soil of their birth, but
for the majority who under the Democrats had never had a
chance to own so much as a shovel full of that red clay and
sand the appeal to patriotism seems particularly weak.
The bandwagon appeal was both verbal and nonverbal.
The nonverbal aspect was in the design of the canvass
itself.

It started at Anderson in the extreme northwest

corner of the state, where white Democrats were in the
maj ority and progressed slowly and systematically through
the middle counties to the coast, where the blacks were in
control.

This progression from the mountains to the coast,

from Democratic to Republican, and white to black control,
allowed time for the up-state enthusiasm to spread to the
low-country.

Anderson had been one of the first counties to

enthusiastically call for a straightout campaign.

Many of

the down-state counties who had been inactive and
discouraged because of large Republican majorities suddenly
caught fire when they heard what was happening in the upper
counties. After seeing the initial outpouring of enthusiasm
and determination demonstrated by the whites at these early
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meetings, H. V. Redfield, a Republican correspondent, wrote
that the Democrats were going to carry the state.122
Verbally, the bandwagon effect was created as time and
again in the low-country Hampton announced the election won
or almost won and invited his audience to join with the
victors.

In Marion, he declared, "I have seen brave men

enough on my march to assure you that victory is secure.*'123
In Edgefield he announced:
We have already won the battle. I have already seen
enough people enrolled in our Democratic clubs to ensure
our election, and not only that, but by a much larger
majority than we could have hoped. The only thing to be
done now is to secure the fruits of victory.124
At Aiken, a few days later, it was much the same thing:
"I bring you the news of the great battle waging throughout
the State, of a battle already won. . . .

we already have

colored men in our Democratic clubs sufficient to carry the
election alone."125

And in Charleston at the end of October

he proclaimed, "I can tell you here that there are already
enough colored men enrolled to bear it to victory.

We have

won the fight."126
Again and again he announced that they had the
election won and the only danger was in being cheated out of
122Williams, 161, 162, 167, 168, 179.
123Charleston News and Courier. 2 October 1876.
124Ibid., 21 October 1876.
125Ibid., 23 October 1876.
126Ibi d . , 31 October 1876.
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the fruits of victory.

Of course there was no way he could

make such a statement with any degree of accuracy.

It was

simply designed to impress the blacks with the size and
strength of the Democratic movement and to encourage whites,
particularly those in heavily black counties.
Finally, Hampton employed ridicule to make Chamberlain
and the Republican ticket appear weak and incompetent.
Throughout his canvass, Hampton repeatedly chided Chamberlain for not dealing with whatever unrest existed in the
state rather than turning to Washington, and for not
dividing time with him at the Democratic rallies.

At

Yorkville he charged: "He who should perform the functions
of Governor for the whole people; he who, when there comes a
riot . . . instead of being there to see that the laws are
enforced and that life, liberty and property are protected
flies to the United States government for troops."127

In

Marion he made direct reference to the Combahee riots:
These outraged colored men . . . had written again and
again to Governor Chamberlain to protect them and he
turns to them a deaf ear. He does not go there and runs
to Washington.
I say here that if governor Chamberlain
will call on me and give me the authority for three
days, I pledge myself to go among those Combahee rioters
not armed with even a pen knife, and I further pledge
myself that they will listen to me and order will be
restored in twenty-four hours.128
His most forceful ridicule occurred at Abbeville:
Now fellowcitizens is not this a nice condition of
127Ibid., 16 October 1876.
128Ibid., 2 October 1876.
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affairs when the Governor of a state, the so-called
Governor of a state, cannot protect himself or protect
his people. Look at the riots that have recently
occurred in South Carolina. What does the Governor do?
He packs up his carpet-bag, puts off for Washington and
cries for United States troops. . . . Think of the time
when George McDuffie was your governor, and try and
imagine him in the event of a riot calling on United
States troops instead of appealing to the hearts of his
people . . . if you place me in the chair once honored
by him, if I cannot suppress a riot, if I can not go to
the people of Carolina white and black, and say to them
these are the laws and you must uphold and enforce
them— if I cannot appeal to Carolina's sons to support
me in the laws that I am sworn to maintain, then cast me
out with scorn from the office that I dishonor.129
Not only was Chamberlain inept and cowardly in his
handling of the riots, he was also afraid to meet Hampton
on the stump.

At Yorkville, Hampton indicated that the

governor had agreed to meet him there in a joint discussion,
but had apparently backed out:
After declining first, he, when pressed, accepts, and
the first place appointed for the meeting was here. But
where is he to-day? Where is your Governor, who ought
to be present to represent you? I can tell you why he
is absent. He has libelled the fair name of the people
of South Carolina, and he does not meet men who will
prove to his face that he is a liar.130
Two weeks later at Charleston, Hampton again mentioned his
invitation to Chamberlain to meet him face to face:
But, he will not come out and meet the people of South
Carolina, because he knows that if he does he will see
flashing from indignant eyes reprobation of his conduct.
He will see, in the stern faces of white men and black
men, contempt of the man who has been a traitor to the
129Ibid., 20 October 1876.
130Ibid., 16 October 1876.
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white and black man alike, a traitor to his position and
to his trust.131
In the middle of September at Abbeville he told the crowd he
had sent a telegram to the governor offering joint meetings
and promising that the white men of the state would protect
him.132
The problem with Hampton reproaching Chamberlain for
not appearing at the meetings is that no agreement was ever
concluded between the two parties for joint sessions.
Hampton did telegraph an invitation to Chamberlain for joint
discussion.

The governor responded that it was a matter

that needed to be handled by the executive committees of the
respective parties and referred the request to Robert
Elliott, the chairman of the Republican committee.
Correspondence between A . C. Haskell, the Democratic chair
man, and R. B. Elliott indicates a reasonable readiness by
the Republicans for joint discussions but a total lack of
flexibility by the Democrats.

The Republicans were willing

to accommodate the Democratic schedule for six of a proposed
eight engagements, but the insistence by the Democrats that
all of the sessions had to meet their schedule forced
negotiations to be broken off on October 18.133
The evidence indicates that Hampton had no reason to
131Ibid., 31 October 1876.
132Ibid., 20 September 1876.
133Copies of correspondence of both parties appear in
Allen, 392-97.
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expect Chamberlain to appear at Yorkville or at any of the
other Democratic meetings.

Haskell proposed that joint

meetings begin at Yorkville but that proposal was never
adopted by both sides.

Thus, Hampton1s ridicule of Cham

berlain for not meeting him face to face seems totally
unfounded and inappropriate.
Democrats is also puzzling.

The inflexibility of the
It was part of their campaign

design to confront the radicals face to face wherever
possible and to attract as large an audience of blacks as
possible; joint discussions would have achieved both objec
tives.

Yet, their total intransigence in the negotiations

precluded the realization of those goals.
While Hampton was wrong in reproaching Chamberlain for
not fulfilling an agreement he never made, he was correct
that Chamberlain feared to openly campaign throughout the
state.

His experiences with the Red Shirts at Newberry,

Edgefield, and Midway during the summer and prior to the
nominating convention were so devastating and intimidating
that the Republicans did not attempt any type of canvass at
all until the middle of October, and Chamberlain did not
give any speeches from the time of his nomination to the
election:
The exceedingly violent tone of the men who were chiefly
responsible for inaugurating the straight-out policy was
one cause of fear . . . and the result was that from
the time of my nomination until the 14th of October, no
general canvass of the state was made. Between the 14th
of October and the day of election we managed to hold
one general political meeting in each county. But the
local leaders in the counties, in some instances, in the
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upper part of the state were afraid to go out in the
country to attend the local meetings, for fear of their
lives. . . . I did not speak at all to the people from
the time I was nominated until the election, simply
because it was not considered safe; it was regarded by
my friends as an unnecessary exposure of my life. . . .
I was very anxious to do it for some personal reasons,
but I finally consented not to do so, because it was not
considered personally safe.134
He also indicated in his testimony the desire for an agree
ment with the Democrats for joint discussions since he felt
they would have been protected under such an agreement, but
the rigid demands of the Democrats cancelled that possi
bility. 135
In the perception of whites, the blacks were easily
impressed and intimidated by a show of force and strength.
They were for the most part vulnerable economically and
j

largely dependent upon white planters and merchants for
economic survival, and most though reared in slavery were
natives of the state.

Hampton sought in his appeals, both

verbal and nonverbal, to address all of these motives.

In

the spectacle of mounted, organized, uniformed whites there
was strength and power that contrasted sharply with a
governor who would not respond to the taunts of the oppo
sition and personally go forth to quell the riots and
confront his accusers.

Repeatedly blacks were made to fear

the disastrous economic consequences if the Republicans
stayed in power.

Along with the heavy dose of fear was the

134South Carolina in 1876. 24.
135Ibid.
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uplifting appeal to do one's duty for God, family, and
country, and redeem the state from the corrupters.

For the

whites the need was to inspire confidence and create zeal;
and this he did through the spectacular parades and demon
strations, the perpetual proclamations of success, and the
call to give all for the grand old state.
Logical Appeals
A large part of Hampton's arguments consisted of
refuting the belief held by many blacks that the Democrats
would take away their rights if they regained power.

To

refute this major concern, he used three basic arguments:
(1) the interest of the whites,

(2) the integrity of his

word, and (3) the numerical superiority of the blacks.
constructive arguments were also three:

His

(1) the Republican

candidates were corrupt and therefore unfit; (2) the whites
needed to maintain discipline; and (3) the rights of the
blacks were secure.
His first argument to refute the belief that blacks
might lose their right to vote under the Democrats was an
enthymeme built upon another enthymeme.

The underlying

enthymeme was a maxim that people will do what is in their
self interest.

Hampton argued that black suffrage gave

South Carolina a greater voice in Congress because it
enlarged the base for determining the number of represen
tatives, thus it was in the self interest of the whites to
leave black voting rights alone.

His understood major
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premise was that having a greater voice in Congress was in
the self interest of the whites:
By the votes of the colored man the South has more votes
in Congress, the South has more votes in the Electoral
College, the South has more influence in the Union, and,
therefore, we of the South would be fools, politically,
if we tried to cut away the 800.000 colored votes that
give that power and influence.136
On the surface the analysis appears valid.

The black

vote did in fact give a greater voice to the South, and it
was in the South's interest to have greater influence in
Congress.

The flaw in the argument, however, is in the

unstated major premise that it was in their interest to have
a stronger vote in Congress.

It was true as long as the

whites could control the votes at home.

If the black vote

posed a threat to white control of the state then influence
in Congress would quickly be sacrificed to maintain power at
home.

Hampton clearly indicated this position in 1867 when

he was willing to compromise with the blacks and give them
Congress if the whites could have the state.137

In the 1876

campaign he made it clear that the state was more important
than the national election and encouraged blacks to vote
Republican nationally if they felt the need, but to vote
Democratic in the state.138

Thus the major premise was true

only so long as the black vote represented no threat to
13Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
137Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James
Conner Papers.
138Charleston News and C o u r i e r . 31 October 1876.
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state control by the whites.
His second line of refutation was his personal pledge
that a Democratic administration would not tamper with the
rights of the blacks.

As proof he offered his personal

integrity and examples of his past relations with the
blacks.

Since his argument from ethos is discussed above,

it will not be repeated here, except to say that it was one
of his strongest arguments.
His third refutative argument was one he had used in
1867.

Essentially he was offering them a no lose situation:

"If you trust the white people of South Carolina once, and
then if you find any of your rights impaired, you are strong
enough in the state to turn them out of office.

We cannot

be elected without the aid of the colored people."139

He

amplified the argument by observing that the whites had
joined with the Republicans on three occasions to support
reform candidates, but without success.

They had tried one

approach to reform and it hadn't worked, now it was time to
try another, and it was without risk because they had the
majority.

The problem was that the Democrats had had a

chance and had done all they could to keep the blacks as
close to slavery as possible.

Patrick Henry had claimed

there was no way of judging the future but by the past and
unfortunately for the Democrats there was little in their
past actions that boded well for the black.
139Ibi d . , 20 September 1876.
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history proved there were numerous mechanisms by which the
will of a majority could be circumvented.
The argument that gave Hampton the greatest delight,
judging by the frequency of use and vividness of phrasing,
was his attack on the fitness of the two leading Republican
candidates, Robert Elliott and Daniel Chamberlain.

He

quoted the charges Elliott and Chamberlain had made against
each other in the bitterly contested Republican convention.
Chamberlain says Elliott is the most corrupt man in
South Carolina, and Elliott goes into the convention,
before Chamberlain has received the nomination, and
draws from his pocket a paper and reads a part of it,
and says:
"If I was [sic] to read all that I have in my
possession I would destroy Governor Chamberlain . . . I
could convict Governor Chamberlain of larceny and
consign him to the penitentiary."14 0
Hampton then carried his conclusion to the absurd by
pointing out that if Elliott and Chamberlain were elected
the first duty of Elliott would be to prosecute the governor
and put him in the penitentiary.

At this point in the

argument he suggested that if he could be certain Elliott
would faithfully fulfill his oath of office, he would
withdraw from the race just so he could see Chamberlain
placed in jail.141

Hampton's enthymeme was:

Major Premise:

A party with corrupt candidates cannot
reform government

Minor Premise:

The Republican party has corrupt
candidates

140Ibid., 31 October 1876.
141Ibid.
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Therefore:

The Republican party cannot reform the
government

While Elliott's and Chamberlain's charges against each other
made up the heart of his support for the minor premise and
was always used, on occasion he strengthened the support by
citing the comments of two other candidates about each
other: "Take the two next men on the Republican ticket.
Cardozo says Dunn is a thief.
and a liar.

Dunn says Cardozo is a thief

That is what they say about themselves.

likely they are both telling the truth."

Very

Hampton then

showed the inconsistency of Chamberlain's call for reform
two years earlier, when now "the very men whom he denounced
as the most corrupt men in South Carolina are on the same
ticket with him."142
The Republican party was certainly vulnerable on the
corruption issue, and Hampton capitalized on it.

The

statements by Elliott and Chamberlain were public knowledge.
Chamberlain fully realized the inconsistency of his presence
on the ticket with Elliott143 and it was entirely possible
that Elliott had some damaging documents relating to
Chamberlain's past.

In any case the argument was a telling

one, and put the Republicans in an embarrassing situation.
Even Chamberlain's law partner, Samuel Melton, could not
support the whole ticket.

In a letter to James Conner,

142Ibid.
143See pp. 114-15 above.
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Melton expressed his dilemma: "There is a certain sort of
propriety in my adhering to the ticket with which he
[Chamberlain] has associated himself, and which, aside from
political consideration, is unworthy of support, as a
whole."144

Melton expressed extreme displeasure at the

selection of Robert Elliott for attorney-general and
therefore his intention to vote for Conner.
One argument that was addressed exclusively to the
white members of his audience was that they needed to avoid
disturbances if they did not wish to lose the election.
argument was one of direct causality.

The

Disturbances, or any

civil unrest would give Chamberlain an excuse to call for
federal troops and possibly impose martial law; and either
would cost the Democrats the election.

It was unnecessary

for Hampton to establish the link between unrest and federal
troops.

Immediately after the Hamburg riot, Chamberlain had

consulted with President Grant over the possible need for
troops.

The action was well known by the whites, and as

discussed earlier was the breaking point between Chamberlain
and his Democratic supporters.

On October 17, after the

Ellenton riots, the president granted Chamberlain1s request
for additional federal troops.

Thus, when Hampton spoke at

Edgefield on the eighteenth and at Aiken on the twentieth,
his audience knew that more federal forces were on their way
144Samuel Melton to James Conner, 26 September, James
Conner Papers.
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to the state.

Additionally, the region had already experi

enced the presence of federal infantry during the Ellenten
riot in late September.
Hampton went beyond arguing that violence would bring
the troops to contending that the radicals were hoping for
and even encouraging outrages to justify federal soldiers:
They [Republicans] have but one hope, and that is they
may be able to goad this people into armed resistance.
That conspiracy has already been hatched. . . . They
hope now, by scattering troops throughout the state, to
bring about a collision. And give a pretext to bring
more troops to see thatthe board of canvassers will
count us out and make us lose the victory.145
At Aiken and at Marion he referred to a letter from
Gov. Adelbert Ames of Mississippi in which Ames told the
radical leaders
that it would be a good thing for their cause if twenty
or thirty negroes were killed, as it would furnish grist
for the outrage mill. . . . and that if they could raise
the cry of the bloody shirt before the North, the
success of the party in Louisiana was ensured.146
Another part of the radical strategy, according to Hampton,
was to send to their campaign meetings "only those engaged
in the national contest, so that if we should break up the
meetings or any riot should occur they can appeal to the
United States bayonets, and then they can put the state
under martial law."147
The conclusion was clear.

At all costs the whites had

145Charleston News and Courier. 21 October 1876.
146Ibid., 2, 23 October 1876.
147Ibid., 23 October 1876.

to avoid any provocation:

"It is of the utmost importance

that the canvass should be peaceable.
avoided."148

All bloodshed must be

He stressed the urgency of his conclusion by

reminding the old soldiers present of the necessity for
strict discipline and adherence to command in the military.
He then made the analogy to the campaign with himself and
the executive committee in command.

They had the best

information; therefore, it was imperative that their
instructions be obeyed, and their instructions were to keep
the peace.

Those at Aiken he entreated to not only avoid

collision with the federal troops but to receive them as
friends:

"These men who met us in war, when we laid down

our arms, and recognized the supremacy of the old flag and
the perpetuity of the Union, were no longer our enemies, but
are the best friends we have North.

Treat them kindly."149

At Edgefield he added a commendation for the way they had
already greeted the troops.150

It is significant that he

presented the argument in its most developed form at Aiken
and Edgefield.

Aiken County had already experienced the

Hamburg and Ellenton riots which were the prime cause for
Chamberlain's request for federal aid.

Edgefield County,

the home of Martin Gary and the Mississippi plan, was
adjacent to Aiken, and many of the men from Edgefield had
148Ibid., 2 October 1876.
149Ibid., 23 October 1876.
150Ibid., 21 October 1876.
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been involved at Hamburg and Ellenton.
Beyond the argument in his speeches, the controversy
over the purpose and need for federal troops was vigorously
pursued in the press, letters, addresses to the people of
the United States, and eventually in testimony before both
House and Senate committees investigating the election. The
Democrats produced testimony that generally throughout the
state peace prevailed, and there had been no interference
with the courts and the process of law enforcement, and
whatever problems there were could be handled by forces
within the state.

Chamberlain on the other hand flatly

denied any political motive in requesting troops and
produced testimony that the Democratic rifle clubs consisted
of thirteen thousand armed and trained white men in a
nonlegal paramilitary organization and that in Aiken and
Edgefield counties they had intimidated the law enforcement
authorities and were terrorizing and killing blacks.151
It is beyond the scope of this study, if not impos
sible, to unravel the accuracy of these competing claims.
Probability, however, would seem to rest with Chamberlain.
Gary, in his plan for the campaign, expressly endorsed
riding roughshod over the blacks and even killing if
necessary to ensure the election.

Since he advocated such

measures, and since such measures were claimed to have
151Reynolds, 381-90; Allen, 365-427; Recent Election
in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
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occurred, it is not difficult to believe that they in fact
did occur.

It is also not difficult to believe that

Chamberlain, based on his personal experiences at Edgefield
and Newberry, was ready to believe the reports of whites
acting in a lawless manner.

It is quite reasonable that

Chamberlain, afraid even to venture forth to make campaign
speeches, acted sincerely when he called for federal troops
and not as part of a political conspiracy to defraud the
Democrats.
Hampton and the Democrats did not want the soldiers
for as James Conner indicated, it upset the strategy of
impressing the blacks with their strength.

By arguing that

civil unrest and violence would work to the advantage of the
Republicans, Hampton sought to stifle the violent tendencies
of the Gary faction of the party and bring it more under the
authority of the executive committee.
In a campaign marked by violence and intimidation,
Hampton sought throughout the canvass to employ rational
appeals to reach both blacks and whites.

He used both

enthymemes and causal analysis, and supported key conten
tions with sufficient evidence to make them convincing.

His

attack on Elliott and Chamberlain was more entertaining and
reinforcing than probative since the data was readily
available, and most of the audience had already made up
their minds on the issue.

The appeal to certain whites for

discipline and control was necessary and, in spite of the
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wrongfully assigned motives, causally valid to the extent
that a direct collision with the federal troops would have
harmed any chance they had of winning.

There is no evidence

however that the argument had any significant impact upon
the behavior of whites in those counties.

His most exten

sive argumentation was in an effort to convince blacks that
their rights were secure with the Democrats.

He approached

them from the perspective of the three principal partici
pants in the scene, the whites, himself, and the blacks, and
tried to show them that their rights were secure with a
three fold lock.

The whites wouldn't tamper with their

rights because it would hurt their power in Congress; he
wouldn't tamper with them because he was a man of his word;
and the blacks had the votes to stop any tampering.

Thus,

there were three independent checks upon any tampering with
their rights.

He produced evidence to support premises in

all three enthymemes, but only in the argument from his
character could he point to past example.
Fitness of Response
On their face the election returns of 1876 showed
Hampton elected by a maj ority of 1,134.152

The returns,

however, of Edgefield and Laurens counties were thrown out
by the Republicans.

In Edgefield the total vote exceeded

the number of eligible voters by more than 2,000, and the
52South Carolina in 1 8 7 6 . 988.
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votes for Hampton went beyond the eligible white population
by approximately 3,500.153

With those two counties out

Chamberlain won the election by about 3,000 votes.154

Both

sides claimed victory, and for five months political chaos
reigned with two governors, two legislatures, and a statehouse guarded by federal troops.

Finally on April 11, 1877,

one day after federal troops were removed by President
Hayes, Chamberlain turned over the office of governor to
Wade Hampton, and the Democratic victory was complete.155
The exigence had been removed, but had victory been
achieved through rhetorical means or through violence,
coercion, fraud, and intimidation?
seems to indicate the latter.

The weight of evidence

A. B. Williams, who traveled

with Hampton as a reporter, concluded:
Nobody ever will know how the state would have gone with
a fair and free election. The Democrats cheated and
intimidated and bribed and bulldozed and repeated where
they could and the Republicans did likewise. It was war
and revolution, a battle for life, and force and cunning
were applied and the law was disregarded by both sides.
. . . In the upcountry Red Shirts rode about in troops
from poll to poll voting in each and hindering and
scattering negroes who were trying to do likewise.156
Even Hampton Jarrell, a strong apologist for Wade Hampton,
concedes there was no way to explain the vote in Edgefield:
153Ibid., 568.
154Simkins and Woody, 514.
155por detailed accounts of this period see Simkins and
Woody, 514-41; Reynolds, 393-462? and Allen, 428-87.
156Williams, 365.
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There was fraud, no doubt, in Edgefield, but probably
not to the extent alleged. Most later stories of fraud
and intimidation stem from Edgefield, the home of both
Gary and Tillman; but this county was the exception, not
the rule, as to the campaign in the state at large.157
However, one must add to Jarrell's restricted view of fraud
the testimony of James Conner, who was certainly not allied
with the Gary faction, that they tried to buy votes in
Charleston but failed.158

Even if Edgefield were atypical,

without its incredibly bloated majority for Hampton, he
would have lost.

Typical or not, the Edgefield vote was

critical to the outcome.
There is likewise no way to determine how many blacks
voted for Hampton.

Estimates ranged from a low of three

thousand by Chamberlain159 to a high of seventeen thousand
by Hampton.160

A. C. Haskell put the figure at about

fifteen thousand.161

Haskell based his estimate upon an

analysis of voting in the twenty-four counties where
separate black and white poll lists were kept.

By deducting

Chamberlain's vote from the total black votes cast he was
able to determine that at least 8,191 black votes had been
cast for Hampton.

By projecting the same ratio of black

157Jarrell, 98, 99.
158James Conner to his wife, 11 November 1876, James
Conner Papers.
159South Carolina in 1876. 40.
160Recent Election in South Carolina. 333.
161Ibid., 823.

votes for Hampton to the eight counties that had not
reported poll lists by race, he arrived at a minimum of
14,237 blacks who voted for Hampton.162

The determination

of the eight thousand minimum in the twenty-four counties
seems reasonably accurate.

If one uses the 8,191 to

determine the percentage of total votes cast in those
twenty-four counties that were black votes for Hampton it is
slightly over seven percent.

Applying the seven percent

figure to the total votes cast in the election would reveal
a black vote for Hampton of just over thirteen thousand.
The best estimate for the black vote for Hampton would seem
to be from twelve thousand to sixteen thousand.

James

Conner did not give any estimate of numbers but did indicate
the black vote for Hampton was less than what he had
expected:

"They fooled us to death.

Thousands who had

promised us to vote Hayes and Hampton voted the straight
Republican ticket."163

Ben Tillman, a devotee of Martin

Gary, claimed Hampton
blundered egregiously in urging the policy of per
suasion; and of convincing the negroes by argument to
vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen
thousand negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully
mistaken."164
On the other hand, one of the key elements of the Gary
162South Carolina in 1876. 568-71.
163James Conner to his wife, 11 November 1876, James
Conner Papers.
164Tillman,

27-28.
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strategy was to keep blacks away from the polls, but as the
returns indicate, this effort was an obvious failure since
blacks voted in record numbers:
We submit that if the charges generally made against us,
of intimidation, were true, the evidence of 105,366
colored votes having been cast is a denial stronger on
its face than any personal testimony can be. Admitting,
for the argument . . . that there may have been threats
made for the purpose of intimidation yet, if they were
made, they were entire failures, because the colored
vote is within 5,000 of a declared census. . . . It is
larger by thousands than any colored vote hitherto cast
in this State.165
Jarrell argues that the claims and boasts of intimidation
and fraud were exaggerated by certain elements of the
Democratic party in order to justify their approach toward
the blacks:
The matter [vote count] is significant because the
divergent policies of Hampton and Gary (and, later
Tillman) towards the negro were largely justified by
their contradictory claims as to how the election had
been won. . . . Gary was to insist that the election was
won only by intimidation and fraud and that any other
course with the negro was treason to Straightout Demo
cracy. 166
Out of all the claims and counter claims a few con
clusions regarding the results of the election seem pos
sible.

First, no one, not even the staunchist Democratic

apologists, can deny that cheating and intimidation occurred
in Edgefield.

Second, the evidence seems clear that Hampton

received at least in excess of eight thousand black votes
and probably in the range of twelve thousand to fifteen
165South Carolina in 1876. 72.
166Jarrell,

102.
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thousand.

Third, without the fraudulent votes of Edgefield

and the black votes cast for Hampton, there would have been
no Hampton victory.

Fourth, there is no way of determining

how many of the black votes cast for Hampton were the result
of bribery and intimidation and how many of free choice.
Thus the claim of victory was the product of both coercion
and persuasion.
The key concern for this study is not so much the
success or failure of the campaign as the appropriateness of
the approach Hampton took in trying to modify the exigence.
Martin Gary and his faction of the party saw the exigence as
nonrhetorical, one that could not be modified by the appli
cation of rhetoric.

They believed the blacks were incapable

of responding to rational persuasive appeals and therefore
fashioned a campaign of fraud and intimidation.

On the

other hand, every piece of evidence indicates that Hampton
did not concur in that view, but rather saw the exigence as
rhetorical and tried to modify it through persuasive
appeals.

Repeatedly Hampton asserted his commitment to

persuasion:
The canvass opened . . . in Anderson, and I there took
the ground . . . that we would endeavor to call out the
colored people to listen to us, to show them that their
interests were our interests, and to tell them that of
course, they had a right to vote as they pleased, but to
endeavor, as I used the expression at one time, to
appeal to them by argument, and to reach their heads
through their hearts. That was the ground upon which
the campaign was organized, and most of each speech of
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mine during the canvass was generally addressed to the
colored people.167
Hampton believed he was nominated because he could appeal to
the blacks: "The two reasons [for his nomination] were that
I would bring out all the white vote, and that I would bring
to my support a large number of colored people with whom my
relations had always been friendly."168
completely consistent with his claim.

His speeches were
From his acceptance

speech before the all white Democratic nominating convention
in Columbia to a practically all black Republican audience
in Beaufort, from Pickens in the up-state to Charleston in
the low-country he advocated and employed the use of
persuasion and denounced all use of violence and intimi
dation.

In the congressional hearings none of the testimony

linked Hampton to any occasion involving violence or
intimidation.

In the period immediately after the election

when five thousand Red Shirts descended upon Columbia, he
counseled peace and confidence in legal measures, and
dispersed the crowd.169

Gary and his supporters did not

perceive Hampton as supportive of their tactics.

A letter

to the editor in the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel accused
Hampton of ignoring the straightouts when he selected the
state executive committee and of adopting a "milk and cider,
167Recent Election in South Carolina. 305-6.
168South Carolina in 1876. 991.
169Williams,

418.
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peace and prosperity, conciliation of Radicals and flattery
of negroes policy, instead of the bold and aggressive policy
inaugurated by the straightout leaders.1,170

Furthermore,

according to Haskell, Gary was asked to modify his use of
violent language in his speeches:
It was always heard with great regret, and was directly
contrary to the spirit of our party and to our whole
campaign . . . His speeches were not approved in that
respect. It is a great peculiarity of the man that he
uses violent language very often, and he was asked to
modify it.171
Hampton knew of Gary's plan for the campaign, and while he
did approve a show of strength to impress the blacks, it
seems clear that he rejected the spirit of Gary's campaign
of violence, and instead sought a solution through rhetoric.
His appeals were well adapted to his audience and the
occasion, and many were the same ones he had used in 1865
and 1867:

the economic mutual interests of black and white

and the comparison of the fate of the blacks to that of the
Indian had been used in 1865; his character, patriotic love
of the state, and the numerical majority of the blacks were
all employed in 1867.

The appeals still had the same

problems they had encountered earlier.

With the exception

of his character, he had no present or past examples to
demonstrate the good faith of the Democrats toward the
blacks.

At times, as in the attack on Chamberlain for

170Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel. 10 January 1877.
171South Carolina in 1 8 7 6 . 833.

failing to appear and the conspiracy by the Republicans to
create outrages, he tended to adjust the facts to suit his
argument, but not to an extent that exceeded the propriety
of most political rhetoric.

He was able to speak to large

numbers of blacks and convinced a substantial number to vote
the Democratic ticket in the state.

On the whole, his, and

not Gary's, was the appropriate response to the situation.

CHAPTER VI

ADDRESSES AT BLACKVILLE AND GREENVILLE
AS RESPONSE TO THE BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION EXIGENCE
Exigence
Precisely at noon on April 11, 1877, the personal
secretaries of Daniel Chamberlain and Wade Hampton met at
the office of the governor of South Carolina.

A few words

were spoken, keys were passed from one representative to the
other, and for the first time in eight years the seal of the
state of South Carolina was again in Democratic hands.1

But

to insure control of the state, the Democrats also needed
the legislature.

By the end of April, the Democrats had

increased their majority in the House from six to forty, and
by the end of the special session in June they had obtained
a majority in the Senate.2

Consequently, when the regular

session of the legislature convened in the fall of 1877 the
Republican party had been thoroughly routed, and Democrats
were in complete control of state government.
Once the exigence of black domination had been over
come, at least temporarily, the issue turned to the means
for maintaining the dominant position.

During the campaign

Charleston News and Courier. 12 April 1877.
Cooper, Jr., 24-25.
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Hampton had pledged that race would not be an issue in his
administration, but that all men regardless of color would
be treated equally under the law.

The exigence that

Governor Hampton faced in 1877-78 was a challenge from
within the Democratic party to abandon his pledges and
defeat the Republicans at the next election by fraud.

His

speaking on the race issue during his term as governor was
to reassure the blacks of his policy, remind the whites of
the good faith of the blacks, and resist that element of the
party that was attacking his policy.
Shortly after his election, Hampton made it clear that
he intended to keep his pledges and pursue a moderate course
toward the blacks.

One of his first acts, according to his

testimony before the House investigating committee, "was to
publish a card advising that there should be no proscription
for political opinion in the State."

He did this to reduce

the potential for confrontation between blacks and whites,
prevent harm to the economy, and above all honor "the
pledges that I had given through the canvass that we would
endeavor to bring about a union of the races here, in peace
and harmony; and I thought it would be a most advisable step
to take to show that we were not disposed now to look back
after the election, but to go forward and redeem the pledges
we had made."3

In his inaugural address, a month later, he

reaffirmed his commitment and praised the blacks for their
3Recent Election in South C a r o l i n a . 331, 333.
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role in helping to elect him.

After enumerating the

specific pledges of the campaign he added:
To the faithful observance of these pledges we stand
committed; and I, as the representative of the Con
servative party, hold myself bound by every dictate of
honor and of good faith to use every effort to have
these pledges redeemed fully and honestly.
It is due
not only to ourselves but to the colored people of the
State, that wise, just, and liberal measures should
prevail in our legislation. We owe much of our late
success to those colored voters who were brave enough
to rise above the prejudices of race and honest enough
to throw off the shackles of party, in their deter
mination to save the State. To those who, misled by
their fears, their ignorance or by evil counsellors,
turned a deaf ear to our appeals, we should be not
vindictive but magnanimous. Let us show to all of them
that the true interests of both races can but be secured
by cultivating peace and promoting prosperity among all
classes of our fellow citizens.4
In April, when Hampton returned from Washington with
the news that federal troops would be withdrawn from the
state, he again announced that he would "know no race, no
party, no man, in the administration of the law."

He then

appealed to the blacks to trust his administration, and to
throw all of them out at the next election if they did not
fulfill their promises.5

In his first message to the

legislature he called upon them to improve the system of
free education so as to
place the means of education within the reach of all
classes in the State. . . . We are bound alike by every
consideration of true statesmanship and of good faith,
to keep up in the State such a system of free schools as
will place within the reach of every child— the poorest
as well as the richest, black as well as white— the
4Charleston News and Courier. 14 December 1876.
5Ibid., 7 April 1877.
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means of acquiring an honest and honorable education.6
Historians of the period generally agree that Hampton
was sincere in his pronouncements and made every effort to
fulfill both their spirit and letter.

George Tindall

documents at least eighty-six black Hampton appointees among
which were trial justices, jury commissioners, and at least
one commissioner on a county election board.7

Tindall cites

specific instances of Hampton's appointments of blacks as
well as testimonials from prominent black leaders of their
pleasure at his performance.8

Holt concurs with Tindall on

Hampton's appointments but faults them for being to minor
offices.

Cooper cites additional testimony from black and

white Republicans supporting Hampton's racial policies and
concludes, "most observers— contemporary and subsequent—
have found Hampton sincere in his concern for the Negro."9
Jarrell in his detailed study of Hampton's racial position
contends that
the dominant theme of the two years of his adminis
tration . . . is his struggle to end discord in the
state— between parties, between the two races, and
between the North and South— and to redeem his pledges
6Wade Hampton, Message No. 1 of His Excellency Wade
Hampton, Governor of South Carolina (Columbia: State of
South Carolina, Executive Department, 1877), 7.
7George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 18771900 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952),
22.
8Ibid., 23-26.
9Holt, 211; Cooper, Jr., 93.
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in a political atmosphere that made such redemption
extremely difficult, if not impossible.10
This difficulty in redeeming his pledges came in large
part in the form of Martin Gary of Edgefield and his coterie
of followers.

In Jarrell's words,

from the first, he [Gary] had seen the political problem
of the state as one, not of parties, but of races. He
had viewed with utmost scorn all preceding efforts at
conciliation or fusion, and he did not shrink from any
degree of violence necessary to eliminate the negro
majority from the political life of the state.11
An early objection to the racial policies of the governor
was Gary's opposition to an annual two mills property tax
for schools.

The primary problem for Gary was that whites

would be taxed to provide schools for blacks.

"Nine-tenths

of this tax would be paid by white people and three-fourths
of it would be spent in educating pickaninnies. . . . He was
unalterably opposed to taxing whites to supply the teachers
for blacks."12

Hampton1s views prevailed so that during his

administration funding for education increased from $189,000
to $316,000 with blacks receiving about $20,000 more than
the whites but the per capita amounts being essentially
equal.13
At the Edgefield County Democratic convention in June
and at an Edgefield political rally in August, Gary stressed
10Jarrell, 122.
i:LIbid., 57.
12Sheppard, 216.
13Tindall,

214.
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that the issue in South Carolina was race, not politics.14
Later in August, Gary was scheduled to review the militia
and deliver an address in Greenville.

The speech was

designed to be a strong straightout speech, but when Gary
saw blacks marching with whites, he was incensed and turned
the speech into one of his strongest attacks on Hampton5s
racial policies.15

Captain J. W. Gray, the white commander

of the militia, was so antagonized by the remarks that he
issued a response:
The true expression of the feelings of the State volun
teer troops— and I take it, of the Democracy of the
State— toward the colored race is to be found in an
invitation extended by myself as commander of the
Fourteenth Brigade, after consultation with other
officers, inviting the Mountain City Guards, a colored
company belonging to the National Guard, to parade and
be reviewed in line with my brigade. This is the first
instance where colored troops have ever marched in line
with the white citizen soldiery of South Carolina. The
event is a moral result of the "Hampton Democracy," and
who does not say "Hurrah for Hampton!"16
Gary responded the next day:
I do not suppose that anyone will dispute, or care to
share with General Gray the honor of having brought
about by his invitation "the first instance where
colored troops have marched in line with white citizen
soldiery of South Carolina." He claims that the event
is a natural result of "Hampton Democracy." I suppose
that we will next hear of "dining" or dancing with the
colored brothers and sisters as . . . the natural result
of "Hampton Democracy."17
14Charleston News and Courier. 4 June; 15 August 1878.
15Ibid., 22 August 1878; Sheppard, 263-64.
16Charleston News and Courier. 26 August 1878.
17Ibid., 29 August 1878.
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His reference to "dining" was more than a careless exagger
ation.

When Hampton and Superintendent of Education Hugh

Thompson visited the president of Claflin University, a
black school, they found themselves obliged to eat with two
black dinner guests.

Gary knew of the incident and wanted

to use it against Hampton, going so far as to include it in
an article attacking him for his pro-black sentiments.
Upon the advice of a trusted political advisor, however,
Gary did not publish the article.18

In a letter to Gary,

Ellis Graydon, a political colleague, observed that he had
been "blowing the nigger dining on Hampton, and it meets
with universal condemnation.1,19
In Edgefield County Gary led the successful movement
to prevent the participation of any blacks in the Democratic
primary.20

At the state convention Gary was instrumental in

adding to the platform a resolution to "repudiate all fusion
or coalition with the Republican Party."21

It was not

enough for Gary to have the state under the control of the
Democrats; he wanted the blacks eliminated from politics.
The proper pattern for achieving his objective was Edgefield
which not only had no blacks voting in the Democratic
18Cooper, Jr., 91.
19Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
20Charleston News and Courier. 4 June; 25 September
1878.
21Ibid., 2 August 1878; Sheppard, 258.
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primary but had no delegation attending the Republican
convention.22

This sentiment was expressly stated in the

Augusta Chronicle and Constitutionalist;
Republican and race majorities can be overcome every
where as they were overcome two years ago in Edgefield,
Abbeville, Aiken, and Barnwell. But the fight must be
made as it was made in those counties. The straightout
policy must be adopted, and a bold and aggressive
campaign inaugurated.
If this is done, the Republican
vote in the present Legislature can be wholly eliminated
from the next General Assembly.23
M. C. Butler thought it preposterous that anyone would even
consider fusion with the Republicans.

"I cannot think that

Hampton or any other sane man would advise a fusion with the
Radical party now that we have control of the state.

Did

they give us representation when they were in power?"24
Gary's position was so strongly contrary to Hampton1s
that the governor refused to speak from the same platform
with him.

Gary volunteered his services for the campaign to

the executive committee and specifically asked to be used in
the low-country; Gary, however, was assigned to speak only
at Aiken.

In an interview with a reporter from the Columbia

Register the chairman of the executive committee said, "It
was not deemed politic . . . to send him . . . to the
'eastern and southern counties.'"

Additionally, he

22Charleston News and Courier. 22 July 1878; Columbia
Daily Register. 8 August 1878.
23Augusta Chronicle and Constitutiona1ist in Columbia
Daily Register. 18 April 1878.
24M. C. Butler to Martin Gary, 3 April 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
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explained Hampton's refusal to speak on the same platform
with Gary: "Governor Hampton was dissatisfied with his
[Gary's] speech at Greenville, and also at his sneer of what
he termed the 'Hampton Democracy,' and that under the
circumstances, it would be unpleasant for him to speak at
the same time, with one who differed with him so widely upon
the issues of the day."25

Even Gary's friends thought he

was going too far in some of his statements, and urged him
to tone them down:
I think I would not come down too heavy on the race
issue. . . . I think the old Bald Eagle had better tone
down his speeches just a little— or rather I should say
omit some parts which too roughly proclaim the inferi
ority of the negro."26
For Hampton the exigence was clear.

His policies and

his pledges toward the blacks were under attack by the Gary
faction of the party.

At times the attack was frontal as in

Gary's opposition to the education tax, the Edgefield
resolution, and his remarks at Greenville, but Gary's
strategy included oblique assaults as well:
General Butler's speech at Center Spring, killed their
movement and the resolution of Buist [at the Democratic
Convention] made it impossible for them to go before the
people. We stopped them there, they now can't make
fusion speeches, and they stultify themselves if they
make straight out speeches.27
25Columbia Daily Register. 22 October 1878.
26J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
27Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
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In other correspondence with political confidant Hugh Farley
he outlined the plan of praising Hampton but attacking other
members of his administration.

"I made a speech on the 17th

in which I came out for Hampton for Governor, but at the
same time have given my reasons for differing with him.

I

have thrown the responsibility of his mistakes upon the
v

lawyers of his administration.1,28

The attack would also be

made under cover of correspondents:
The policy to be pursued is not to make a personal fight
against the present state ticket, except under cover of
correspondents. Henry said he would write you a letter
criticising them. In your editorial I would take the
broad ground of a fair and impartial division of the
offices amongst the Democracy of the State.29
Gary seemed convinced that if he could change Hampton1s
advisors he could significantly alter the direction of his
policies.

"If we do not surround Hampton with good advisors

we are gone.

The present state officers have not got spirit

enough to oppose Hampton when they know he is wrong.1,30
Thus the battle lines were clearly drawn.

Through public

opinion, convention maneuvering, and purging of his
advisors, Gary sought to diminish the influence of Hampton
and to alter his policy of moderation toward the blacks.
Audience
Though Hampton's audience in 1878 was composed of many
28Ibid., 20 April 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
29Ibid., 20 May 1878.
30I b i d . , 8 April 1878.
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of the same people he had addressed a year and a half
earlier, there was a totally different attitudinal fraL.^work.

The whites who had in their perception been fighting

for their existence had won and were in total control of the
machinery of state government.

On the other hand the blacks

had had a year to test the promises and experience life
under the "new" Democratic party.
Among the blacks there existed two predominant atti
tudes, which were not mutually exclusive:

(1) demorali

zation and (2) satisfaction with the policies of Hampton.
Holt concludes that blacks and radical leaders were demoral
ized by the defeat in 1876:

"The apathy, fear, and defeat

ism engendered by that campaign and President Hayes's
betrayal were still pervasive in the Republican Party."31
County organizations were without leadership, and in
Colleton County, William Driffle, a former Republican
representative and "one of the early organizers among
Republicans in Colleton, declared that the party had died in
1876 and he was there to help bury it."32

At the state

convention in August, the Republicans did not nominate a
ticket for state offices, but concentrated on county offices
and the legislature.33
Not only did the Republican state convention not put
31Holt, 213.
32Ibid., 215.
33Columbia Daily Register. 9 August 1878.

up any opposition to the state offices, but also it only
narrowly defeated a resolution endorsing Governor Hampton.34
This attempted endorsement was not atypical of the general
response of blacks and even white Republicans toward
Hampton.

In April of 1878, E. P. Clark, managing editor of

the Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, visited the
state and wrote a lengthy appraisal of conditions in South
Carolina after one year of the Hampton administration.

The

writer claimed to have spoken with white and black, Repub
lican and Democrat, up-country and low-country citizens in
his effort to discern attitudes.

He concluded:

"The

concurrent testimony of all these Republicans, white and
black, is the most sweeping commendation of Governor
Hampton's course and the most implicit confidence in the
man."

He then quoted Dr. Benjamin Boseman, the black

postmaster of Charleston "'as expressing absolute confidence
in Governor Hampton and entire satisfaction with his course.
We have no complaint whatever to make.
pledges.'"

He has kept all his

The postmaster of Columbia, also a black,

expressed similar sentiments.35

In an interview in the

Washington Post Republican ex-Governor R. K. Scott offered
his endorsement of the Hampton government and gave his
opinion that the blacks were "satisfied with their treatment
under Hampton.

I am quite sure they would rally to his

34Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 8 August 1878.
35Ibi d . , 19 April 1878.
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support and elect him over any man whom the Republicans
might nominate."36

In Barnwell County a mass meeting of

blacks at Great Cypress Township unanimously adopted
resolutions praising Hampton's administration and calling
upon other blacks throughout the state to do likewise.37
While there was no doubt some dissatisfaction among blacks
with the Hampton regime, the preponderance of evidence
clearly indicates a generally positive attitude toward the
governor.

Even J. J. Wright, a black justice of the state

Supreme Court whom the Democratic legislature had forced to
resign, came out in support of Hampton:
He has kept every pledge he has made, and on the seventh
of next November he will be reelected Governor almost
unanimously. He will get nine-tenths of the colored
vote. I speak advisedly on that point. There is not a
decent negro in the state will vote against him.38
In analyzing the attitudes of the white audience of
1877-1878, it must be remembered that Hampton and Gary
represented opposite poles of the political spectrum within
the Democratic party.

J. H. Hudson in his letter to Gary

suggesting that he tone down his racial language warned Gary
that his position was "a little in advance of the Straightouters, and far [emphasis his] in advance of the fusionist
36Washinaton Post in Columbia Daily Register. 9 May
1878.
37Columbia Daily Register. 7 September 1878.
3P h i l a d e l p h i a Times in Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 21
August 1878; and Tindall, 17, 18.
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and policy men.”39

In his testimony before the Senate

investigating committee, Hampton admitted that when he
advocated a qualified suffrage for the blacks in 1868 he was
in advance of the rest of the whites and that "it did not
meet with general concurrence throughout the state."40

The

question then is where along that continuum was Hampton1s
audience.
E. P. Clark in his evaluation of the political milieu
was keenly aware of the division within the Democratic
party, and sought to determine the sympathies of most of the
whites.

Clark indicated he had "investigated this point

with considerable care" by asking "a good number of people"
whether Democrats would support any other man in carrying
out the policies promoted by Hampton.

Some believed "not

one in ten," but a consensus felt it was something less than
a majority.

The writer concluded:

The policy which he has carried out the past year is not
the policy of the old Democratic party of South
Carolina; it is not the policy which those old leaders
meant to enforce when they got control of the State.
Popular enthusiasm for the man has finally suppressed
all open opposition to his course, but there is a large
element of the party which at least does not like
Hampton's liberal course.41
A good example of this dichotomy between loyalty to the man
and support for his policies came in Hampton's initial test
39J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
40South Carolina in 1876. 991.
41Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 19 April 1878.
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in the legislature.

One of the first jobs of the legis

lature after Chamberlain had departed was to fill the office
of chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court since
the former chief justice had died in early April.

Hampton1s

choice for the post was Associate Justice A. J. Willard, a
carpetbagger from New York who had decided for Hampton in
the 1876 election dispute.

A substantial portion of the

legislature supported Samuel McGowan, a native white from
Abbeville.

The political battle was fought on May 14 in a

Democratic party caucus that lasted from 8:00 p.m. until
3:00 a.m. at which time Willard finally received the last
vote needed to give him a majority.

Afterward, according to

Sheppard, those who voted for Willard claimed, "'Hampton did
it.

The Governor told us to do it.

We wanted to vote

right; but we couldn't help it when the governor said
otherwise. 11,42
At the Democratic convention in Fairfield County
general resolutions were offered supporting the governor and
his administration; before voting, though, Thomas W.
Woodward wanted to explain his vote.

He began by announcing

his shock and consternation at Hampton's support for
Willard, appointment of R. H. Gleaves, and support for the
seating of the Mackey House and Prince Martin in particular.
He concluded:
But, sir, despite all this, and more than can be

42Sheppard,

198-214.

189

alleged, I favor and love this man. I know, personally,
that he possesses those magnetic attributes of head and
heart which will endear him to this people, and which
will keep the honor of the old Palmetto State and the
welfare of its citizens uppermost in his mind. Having
said this much, which consistency required that I should
say, I shall vote for the resolutions, and shall stand
prepared to go forth at any moment in the new campaign,
as of old, in obedience to orders from headquarters.43
Martin R. Delany, a black trial justice in Charleston,
remarked upon losing his job, 181 lost as soon as they got
rid of him [Hampton] by sending him to the U.S. Senate, as
he was too liberal for the rank and file of the party
leaders.8,44

George Tindall concludes that Hampton8s

policies were "opposed by the majority of the whites and
upheld only by the immense prestige of Hampton.8,45
On the other hand, as Cooper points out, Gary was
never able to muster widespread support for his position.
He lost every legislative fight to Hampton.46

He wanted the

United States Senate seat that was available when the
Democrats took power, but because of Hampton8s influence it
went to M. C. Butler.

His speeches and private correspon

dence reveal four main objectives for the election in 1878:
(1) keep blacks out of the Democratic party and out of
office,

(2) convince the Democrats of the need to keep

Hampton in the governor8s office for the next two years,

(3)

43Columbia Daily Register. 5 April 1878.
44Martin R. Delany to William Coppinger in Tindall, 38.
45Tindall, 39.
46Cooper, Jr., 53-64.
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change the personnel surrounding the governor, and (4) get
himself elected to the United States Senate.
His first obj ective was made clear by his statements
and actions at the Edgefield convention.47

The barring of

blacks from any participation was the pattern to be adopted
in all the counties.

The press and the county organiza

tions, however, were generally not sympathetic.

The

Charleston News and Courier denounced the resolutions and
later excoriated Gary for his "intolerance” and "abuse of
the colored people."4s

The Columbia Register welcomed black

voters to the ranks of the Democracy and rejected extreme
men who were trying to drive them away.49

In the county

conventions resolutions were adopted encouraging black
participation in the party.50

In Sumter a committee was

formed to solicit black participation, and in Orangeburg it
was determined that a proportional division of offices
should be made with the blacks.51

Thus, outside of Edge

field, Gary's attempt to totally proscribe the black from
political participation failed.
For Gary to have a chance at the United States Senate
47Charleston News and Courier. 4 June 1878.
48Ibid., 4 June; 25 September 1878.
49Columbia Daily Register. 6 September 1878.
50Charleston News and Courier. 7, 10, 13 June; 12
August 1878.
51Ibid., 7 June; 12 August 1878.
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seat in 1878, he had to keep Hampton from getting it.

In a

letter to his close ally Hugh Farley he revealed his
strategy:

"I wish you to show that he is the only man that

can keep the blacks and whites harmonious for the next two
years."52

A series of letters to the Columbia Daily

Register signed Cato argued strongly the point urged by
Gary.53

Again, Gary was unsuccessful.

In his letters to Hugh Farley in April and May 1878,
Gary made clear the need to change the state ticket and
surround Hampton with better advisers.54

Yet at the state

convention the entire ticket was unanimously renominated.55
In his guest for the Senate, Gary received encouraging
news from friends throughout the state.

Ellis Graydon

wrote, "I am glad to see that your stock is rising con
siderably in this county.

They pick you against Hampton.

. . . You can beat any man in the state for the U. S. Senate
if left to the vote of Abbeville.1,56

But on December 10,

1878, Gary himself, along with 150 others, Democrats and
Republicans, cast his vote to send Hampton to the United
52Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
53Columbia Daily Register. 21, 23, 28, 30 November; 10
December 1878.
54Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 6, 20 April; 20 May 1878,
Martin Gary Papers.
55Charleston News and Courier. 2 August 1878.
56Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin
Gary Papers.
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States Senate.

Gary's name was not even placed in

nomination.57
The best conclusion on the attitudes of the whites is
offered by Cooper:

"Most white South Carolinians were not

so sincere as Hampton in their determination to accord the
negro equal treatment with the white; but, on the other
hand, most did not accept the harsh, bitter attitude of
Martin Gary."58

Hampton's audience, then, was clearly in

the center between the two extremes and open to persuasion.
Constraints
Since many of the same arguments from 1876 reappear in
1878 there is not great merit in repeating the analysis.
The best way to gauge his response to the 1878 exigence is
to look closely at two speeches that were delivered shortly
after there were direct challenges to his racial policy.

In

June, Edgefield County barred blacks from participating in
the Democratic primary and passed resolutions that the real
issue in the state was race and not party.59

Apparently

there was some sentiment in Barnwell County to follow
Edgefield's lead.60

Thus, at Blackville in Barnwell County

57For a detailed account of Gary's Senate attempt see
Cooper, Jr., 53-59; Sheppard, 268-78, gives a detailed but
biased view of events surrounding the senatorial elections.
58Cooper, Jr., 93-94.
59Charleston News and Courier. 4 June 1878.
60New York Herald in Columbia Daily R e g i s t e r . 11 July
1878.
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at a fourth of July reunion of Hart's Battery, Hampton
delivered a forceful denunciation of the Edgefield policy.
James Conner was the main speaker, and Hampton was not on
the program, but at the conclusion of Conner's address the
crowd called for Hampton and he took the opportunity.
Because of the nature of the occasion the speech was short,
but the substance was wholly devoted to the pressing
exigence.
The other speech that represents a direct response to
an immediate, frontal attack occurred in Greenville.

Here

as described earlier, Gary made a speech directly attacking
the governor1s policy toward the blacks.61

In a letter to

James Conner, Hampton indicated his intention to use his
forthcoming speech at Greenville as a direct reply to Gary.
He explained to Conner why he did not directly attack Gary
and the Edgefield resolutions in an earlier speech at
Edgefield, and then continued:
Gary had then given me no ostensible ground to attack
him, but he has done so since in his card replying to
Gray of Greenville. The people of this county have
asked me to go and do away with the harm he wrought by
his foolish speech, and I shall then pay my respects to
him. I do not intend to enter in a controversy with
him, but I shall denounce his allusion to the results of
Hampton democracy as a piece of impertinence.
I am
tired of his pretended support and his covert inso
lence. 62
61See p. 179 above.
62Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade
Hampton Papers.

194

The Greenville speech provides an excellent opportunity to
analyze his direct response to Gary.
Blackville Address
Motive Appeals
The predominant tone of the speech was moralistic.
The theme was boldly declared three fourths of the way
through when he asked rhetorically, "Is it not better to
fail in doing right than to succeed by doing wrong?"63

In a

clear two-valued orientation his policies were on the side
of right and those of Martin Gary, though he did not name
him, were aligned with evil.
On the side opposed to Hampton were "demagogues," "men
who subordinate everything to office, to wealth, to place
and to power."

They were "extreme men" and men who made

promises with no intention of keeping them.
promoters of fraud as the avenue of victory.

They were the
On this side

were those who did "wrong," served "mammon," and who would
have as their fruits of victory only a "worthless bauble."
Hampton's side, however, was the side of "duty,"
"honor," "right," and "God."

With him were men of character

who "would cut off their right arms before they would
violate their pledges," and "would die before they would
perjure themselves by placing men wrongfully in office."
63Columbia Daily Register. 7 July 1878. All further
references to the Blackville speech in this section are from
this source.
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The fruits of his policy would produce benefits to be
"enjoyed by our children and children's children for
generations to come."
He further appealed to their own self respect.

If

they countenanced fraud as he had heard some men advocating,
then "before many years pass over your heads you will not be
worth saving, and will not be worthy of the state you live
in."

If after going to the blacks and securing their help

for the victory of 1876, they said, "'Now we have no use for
you.

You shall not vote even at the primary election.' If

this be the policy of South Carolina, then am I sadly
mistaken in the people of South Carolina."

Thus, to engage

in fraud was degrading, and to break their promises indi
cated a lack of character.
While the perfect dichotomy between good and evil was
a bit overstated, his casting the issues in moral terms
seems perfectly appropriate.

To exclude blacks from any

voice in the Democratic party as had been done in Edgefield
was a complete abrogation of the commitments Hampton and
most of the party had made in 1876.

To willfully violate

explicit pledges made to the blacks and to practice fraud,
since with the control of the election machinery they were
in a position to do so, were clear moral issues, and Hampton
approached them as such.
Personal Appeals
The general high esteem in which Hampton was held by
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audiences throughout the state has already been established,
and will not be repeated here.

What is noteworthy is how he

employed that esteem in his argument at Blackville.
The key strategy of the argument was to impress upon
the audience that he and his policy toward the blacks were
one.

The participation of blacks in the political process

was not a peripheral matter that could be discussed,
bartered, or altered, but was an integral part of his own
commitment to certain values.

In other words, if they

wanted him they also had to accept his racial policies.
After describing the approach of appealing to the blacks and
then excluding them, he flatly declared, "I can carry out no
such policy."

He reviewed his canvass and the commitment he

had made to black and white from the mountains to the coast
and then put himself among those who "would cut off their
right arms before they would violate their pledges." He
warned them that "I can only assist you by standing upon
that platform of '76."

Finally, for the fourth time in the

short speech he stated his unavailability if they changed
the platform:
If you are to go back upon all pledges that I have made
to the people-— if you are to say that the colored men
that have sustained us are no longer to be citizens of
South Carolina . . . then, my friends, much as I would
do for you and for South Carolina, earnestly as I would
desire to spend or be spent in her service, willing as I
am to give even my life for my State, I should have to
decline. I would give my life for South Carolina, but I
cannot sacrifice my honor, not even for her.

197

In the challenge to his policies he saw his own character at
stake.
During the 1876 campaign the key element of ethos
which he had stressed had been trustworthiness.
this element that was threatened.

Now it was

Thus in one sense he was

appealing to them not to damage his ethos by destroying his
trustworthiness and was relying on their great respect for
his character to achieve his objective.
Logical Appeals
The speech was typically Hampton.

There was an

absence of evidence, little detail, and no closely reasoned
arguments.

In addition to his proclivity for such develop

ment, the moralistic tone encouraged the broad lines of
analysis.

Large portions of his arguments were already in

the heads of his listeners.

His basic premise was that it

was wrong for the Democratic party to proscribe the partici
pation of blacks.
manner:

He developed the argument in a two fold

(1) it was wrong in principle? and (2) it was wrong

pragmatically.
The argument from principle was simple and straight
forward.

Some whites believed that any means that elimi

nated the threat of black political domination was legiti
mate.

Here, Hampton flatly contradicted that idea.

He

tried to separate the action from its object and to force a
moral judgment on the intrinsic merits of the behavior.
pledge one's word and then deliberately break it and to

To
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engage in fraud were morally wrong and should be avoided
regardless of the goal.

The argument was conclusionary in

nature and assumed that the audience shared his values.
In addition to being wrong in principle, the behavior
would prove counter productive:
If you listen to those men, then I say you may as well
at once relinquish the fight, for South Carolina will
soon pass again under the rule and to the ruin from
which she has just emerged, and in the great Presi
dential contest of 1880 we shall not only lose our own
election but we, the people of South Carolina, will be
the cause of breaking down the national Democracy.
The argument was causal but the links were missing.

In no

way did he attempt to show how excluding blacks from the
Democratic party would put them back under radical rule and
cause the loss of the national election in 1880.

The link

in Hampton’s mind might have been the power of the blacks to
regroup and vote out the Democrats, much as he had advised
them to do if the Democrats did not treat them fairly.
He also applied the counter productive analysis to the
use of fraud.

First, it would not produce the desired

result because the chosen
the returning board now.
there as representing the
Carolina would die before
by placing men wrongfully

sons of South Carolina form
The men that you have placed
truth and honor of South
they would perjure themselves
in office.

Here at least he provided the causal link, but it was simply
an assertion that had to find its validity in the audience's
willingness to accept his generalization at face value, and
in their own knowledge of the character of the men to whom
he was referring.

His statement did not prove to be very
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accurate since Jarrell argues that probably more fraud
occurred in 1878 than in 1876, and Hampton, himself,
conceded afterwards that there had no doubt been a good deal
of fraud in the election.64

In addition to not producing

the desired result, fraud would also degrade them and make
them unworthy individuals.
His most extensive causal argument was the claim that
they could be successful in 1878 by appealing to the blacks
to join with them.

He supported the link by looking at what

had happened in Barnwell County in 1876:
You carried your election by an overwhelming maj ority
because you came before the people, white and black,
recognizing the right of every citizen and saying, "you
shall all be equal under the law." You went to the
colored people and told them that their rights would be
protected. . . . You appealed to them to come and help
you work out the redemption of the State. They came by
hundreds and did help you.
Through experience they had seen the one policy work in the
past and, therefore, should continue its use in the future.
But, what policy had actually been used in 1876 to secure a
majority for Hampton?

Since Barnwell was one of the three

counties whose returns were contested in 1876,65 there is at
least a basis for solid suspicion that Hampton was overly
idealistic in describing the approach they had used.

To the

extent the majority vote had been obtained by fraud and
intimidation his argument lost impact.
64Jarrell,

149; Charleston News and Courier, 20 January

1879.
65Simkins and Woody, 517.
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His final causal argument was direct and simple.

If

they altered the platform of 1876 to in any way proscribe
the black, then he would not be a candidate in 1878.

The

link as developed above was that his personal integrity was
involved, and it was more important than the state.

The

position was repeatedly stated, and there was no reason for
the audience to believe he was anything less than sincere.
Hampton correctly perceived the issue of racial pro
scription as having strong moral dimensions and correctly
took the high ground.

His appeals to his audience's moral

integrity and to his own character were the strongest of the
address, with those based upon his ethos having the greatest
potential for impact.

His pragmatic causal arguments were

not particularly convincing, since the critical link between
the act and its consequences was frequently unsupported or
open to other interpretations.
Greenville Address
In the introduction to his report on Hampton's Green
ville address, the correspondent for the Charleston News and
Courier remarked that the speech "was the most impressive I
have ever heard him deliver."66
one.

His assessment was a good

It was not the speech of a politician plying his

skills to get himself and his party reelected, but rather
66Charleston News and Courier. 20 September 1878. All
further references to the Greenville speech in this section
are from this source.
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that of a statesman seeking an enduring solution to a
profound and perplexing problem.

The speech was not so much

an attempt to persuade his audience as it was a setting
forth of his position on the right policy to pursue toward
the blacks.
Personal Appeals
There was little conscious attempt to build ethos, and
yet the entire speech revolved around the character of the
man.

He assumed, correctly, that he had their respect and

set out to show them the path that should be taken by the
man of character.
In the introductory portion he reflected on the
campaign of 1876 and used it as an opportunity to remind
them of his good judgment.

He described going to the

mountains after his nomination to ponder the plan for the
campaign, and then starting the canvass in the Piedmont and
moving to the coast:
It was no accident that arranged that part of my
programme. Communing alone with nature in those grand
solitudes I had considered what would be the plan of
operation, and I determined to go first to the men of
the mountain. . . . I knew that the fires of patriotism
kindled here would be reflected throughout the State,
and I was right.
While he complimented the men of the up-country for their
patriotic zeal, he also demonstrated the correctness of his
judgment.

While not vital to the speech's outcome, he was

going to be pronouncing a judgment on right and wrong
policies and it didn't hurt to plant at the beginning a
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reminder of his past good judgment.
In his conclusion he drew attention to the quality of
his judgment.

It was not for personal or party gain or for

any monetary advantage:
I am not now— God forbid that I should be— advocating a
policy simply for momentary triumph or personal
qualification. No, I have been looking far beyond that
present day— for it has seemed to me that I have been
able sometimes to catch transient glimpses of the future
through the veil that hides it from us— and I have
thought that in that far future, in the day when you and
I and all of us shall have been gathered to our God, I
could see a great and happy State and people.
His policies thus represented the judgment of a man of
vision and altruism.

He further strengthened his altruistic

motives when he said, "It would be the highest reward that
could come to me if in the hearts of those descendants of
ours yet unborn they could say that I worked for South
Carolina."
He developed his character attributes when he showed
himself as a man who would not move on a matter of prin
ciple.

He and the Democratic party had given pledges in

1876 and reaffirmed them at the 1878 convention, and he was
unalterably opposed to any deviation from them.

The state

ment almost had the ring of a Martin Luther's "Here I stand,
I can do no other."

Hampton wanted there to be

no misunderstanding of the position of your standardbearers in the fight. I intend that there shall be no
mi sunderstanding of mine, for I propose to stand where
the Democratic party placed me in 1876. . . . I cannot
deviate from that policy. I believed it was the true
one then, and I know that it is now.
Finally, he defended his character from the personal

attack of Martin Gary.

Gary had earlier referred to "the

Hampton Democracy" and its attitude toward blacks.
ton's response was twofold.

Hamp

He deprecated the linking of

his name to a form of democracy: "I have never assumed to
myself the honor of founding or attempting to found a school
of Democracy."

He was but a follower of Jefferson and other

founding fathers and "content to follow where they have led,
without indulging for a moment in the presumption of trying
to engraft one article of faith on the creed promulgated by
the fathers."

He also denounced any insinuation "that the

proud banner of our party has been lowered in my hands," and
labeled as "unfounded" and "impertinent" any attempt "to
reflect upon myself personally or officially."

In essence

Hampton put down the attack without ever answering the
specifics.

It was his character against the charges of

Gary, and there was no contest.

With the recent Claflin

University incident fresh in his mind, it was wise to
dismiss rather than dignify Gary's claims.
Motive Appeals
His motive appeals were similar to those at Black
ville, but not as well developed.
position with two basic values:

He undergirded his
(1) that which was morally

right and honorable; and (2) a deep patriotism that desired
what was best for South Carolina and her citizens for
generations to come.
His direct appeal to discard policies that were
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intrinsically wrong was short, succinct, and forceful:
In the name of our civilization and of all that has been
honorable in South Carolina, in the name of our State
and of our God, I protest against any resort to
violence, or wrong, or any adoption of the "shot-gun
policy!" We cannot do evil that good may come of it.
The last statement was very close to what he had said at
Blackville, "Is it not better to fail in doing right than to
succeed by doing wrong."

In both instances he rejected the

casuistry of the end justifying the means and appealed to
higher values.
His patriotic appeal was not a trite, maudlin attempt
to cover over bad policy by having the band play Dixie and
recalling the glory of the Confederacy.

In fact the remark

able aspect of the appeal was that it asked his audience to
look forward and not back, and to consider the long term
consequences of policies on the quality of their society.
"We must be united and move together," he urged, "for on
that depends now the very life of the State, not the mere
supremacy of one or another party for an hour.

Your

children for generations to come will be influenced by your
action."

He then described his vision of the future:

I have thought that in that far future . . . I could see
a great and happy State and people. Our children's
children . . . shall build up a new and great country.
They will lift up South Carolina and place her where God
intended her to stand— with a united, free and happy
people, walking on the great road to national prosperity
and peace. I have seen that future, and I have worked
for it; I have prayed for it.
His vision was the broad vision that went beyond party
ascendancy and state domination to national prosperity.

His

205

view encompassed harmony and reconciliation both within the
state and throughout the country.

From the perspective of

Richard Weaver's noble rhetorician, he was trying to lift
his audience to a better and higher vision of themselves.
Logical Appeals
The primary emphasis of the speech was the development
of four major arguments:

(1) he established the commitment

of the party to the platform and principles of 1876; (2) he
refuted Martin Gary's position; (3) he set forth a cons
tructive approach for dealing with the racial problem; and
(4) he warned his audience of dangers that threatened the
party.
Hampton supported his generalization that the South
Carolina Democratic party was committed to the principles of
the 1876 election by offering five examples of actions by
the 1878 convention.

The convention had endorsed the same

men for state office in 1878 as had run in 1876.

The only

exception was James Conner, who resigned in order to return
to his private practice.

To send forth the same ticket a

second time constituted, in Hampton's view, a clear mandate
for his policies.

The convention had adopted the same

platform from 1876, which he saw as broad, liberal, and
capable of being supported by both races.

Third, the

convention had "reiterated unanimously the principles which
gave life, and strength, and victory to that struggle."
Fourth, the convention had appealed to all citizens of the
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state for their support, which would include the blacks.
Finally, the convention "when it placed its candidates in
the field, told them to go forth and declare to the people
that the great party which had won success in the last
canvass intended faithfully, honestly and truly to keep all
those pledges of the past, and not forget in the future the
promises made when defeat was overshadowing us."
He further strengthened his argument of commitment by
looking at the national party.

"The Democratic Party of the

United States countenances no proscription on account of
birth, race, or color."

Furthermore, the national conven

tion had "declared its acceptance in perfect good faith of
the recent amendments to the Constitution of the United
States."

The state convention had not ignored or simply

acquiesced in the decision, but had "accepted, ratified and
endorsed in most emphatic terms the action of the national
party."

Because of the actions of both state and national

organizations, Hampton concluded, "we are thus doubly
pledged to carry out in good faith the policy to which the
great Democratic party of the country is unalterably and
solemnly committed."
Hampton offered no proof or documentation for the
actions of the convention, but relied on his audience's
knowledge for that support.

He also carefully indicated

that the commitment was not just to the principles of 1876
but to his interpretation of those principles.

It was a
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commitment to a broad, liberal policy of appealing to blacks
and practicing no proscription.

It was a strong argument

with very clear support from the record.
His refutation of Gary consisted of two parts, an
extensive response to Gary's "shot-gun policy" and a brief
retort to his remarks about a "Hampton Democracy."

In

refuting Gary's policy, Hampton employed three lines of
analysis:

(1) Gary's views were not consistent with the

Democratic Party; (2) Gary's policy did not produce success
in 1876; and (3) Gary's policy was not the Mississippi plan.
After extensively developing the position to which the party
was committed, he entered his "emphatic dissent to the views
expressed by Gen. Gary at the recent meeting here and in his
card in reply to Gen. Gray."

Those views, he contended,

were "inconsistent with the true policy of the Democratic
party."

He supported the charge of inconsistency by showing

that Gary's views did "not represent the opinion of your
standardbearer, nor of the Democratic party of South
Carolina, and that he was not authorized to speak for your
nominee."

Thus Hampton succeeded in divorcing Gary's views

from the Democratic party.

There was clear inconsistency

between the position of the party as developed by Hampton
and the position of Gary.

The only other link to the party

would have been if Gary had been speaking in some official
capacity, but Hampton denied this.

In fact, the evidence is

clear that the executive committee did not want Gary out
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speaking for the party.67

The argument could probably have

been strengthened by analyzing specific passages from Gary's
speech, but Hampton chose instead to refute the perceptions
from the address rather than the actual language itself.
Hampton next contended that it was not Gary's policy
which was successful in 1876, but his.
I believe that it was the conservative character of the
last campaign, as contradistinguished from what he calls
an "aggressive" one, that enabled us to carry the State.
I believe that the appeals made to the colored citizens
by men in whom they had confidence brought thousands to
our support.
He offered no election statistics to back his claim but
relied on argument from authority.

He claimed as evidence

for his contention
the fact that many more thousands will go with us in the
coming election. They realize that they have been
honestly dealt with. They recognize that all their
rights have been unimpaired, and they appreciate the
blessings of peace and increased prosperity which have
followed the inauguration of Democratic rule.
While as it turned out he was correct in that he received
widespread support from the blacks, one can't claim events
yet future as evidence.

Another fallacy was that satis

faction with the Democratic administration did not prove
which means got them into office.

Even if elected by fraud

they still could have carried out a policy that pleased the
black constituency.

To prove that he had been elected by

the help of the blacks he needed, preferably, statistical
data or at least authoritative testimony to bolster his
67See pp. 181-82 above.
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assertion.

His statement of the positive attitude of the

blacks that would cause them to vote Democratic in the next
election not only didn't relate to how he had been elected
in the past but was again an unsupported generalization.
There was ample data available to indicate the satisfaction
of many blacks with his policies, but he chose to ignore it,
choosing rather to rely upon his ethos.

While the logic was

flawed and the support weak, it is highly probable that the
only perturbation belongs to the critic and not his
audience.
The longest part of his refutation focused on the
Mississippi plan.

In what was substantially an argument of

definition, Hampton contended that it was slanderous to
refer to the Mississippi plan as a "shot-gun policy."

He

compared the Mississippi canvass to the one in South
Carolina:
In one sense their canvass was aggressive as ours was.
They met the plunderers of their State at every point to
denounce their corruption before the people. They
devoted themselves, as did our people, heart and mind to
the great work of saving their State, and they appealed
to all honest voters to aid them in their patriotic
undertaking.
He then provided the example of General Chalmers to support
this contention.

Chalmers had won election to the United

States House of Representatives in a district with a large
black majority by appealing to them.

Hampton had recently

seen an interview
in which the question was asked: What he [Chalmers]
would do if the Republicans sent speakers into his

210

district to oppose his election? He did not threaten to
Ku-Klux them or to intimidate them; he did not say that
he would resort to the "shot-gun policy," but he said
that he would give those visitors a cordial welcome;
that he would offer them every facility to meet his
constituents and that he would have them met everywhere
by colored Democratic speakers.
Hampton then concluded, "This is the best commentary on the
Mississippi Plan, and that plan I am willing to adopt."
The purpose of the argument was to further isolate
Gary and deprive his views of any legitimacy.

Earlier he

had isolated Gary from the Democratic party of South
Carolina, now he prevented him from claiming the same policy
as was used in a sister state.

Hampton had also tacitly

endorsed the Mississippi plan and it was important to
distinguish what he had endorsed from what Gary advocated.
The example of Chalmers was a good illustration of Hampton's
interpretation of the Mississippi plan, but was far from
proving that in fact it was the policy carried out in
Mississippi.

The letter from General Ferguson outlining the

Mississippi plan would strongly suggest otherwise.68

While

he could not prove that Gary's use of the term was illegiti
mate, except again by his own authority, he did succeed in
establishing the meaning he attached to the term.
He concluded this attack on Gary's misapplication of
the Mississippi plan with the causal argument that had the
policy of violence been followed, the election would have
been lost;

"Had we been so short-sighted as to have

68See p. 126 above.
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endeavored to carry the State at the last election by force
or violence, martial law would have been proclaimed, and we
should now be under the hateful rule of our oppressors."
Again, Hampton offered no proof other than his word, but he
could reasonably count on his audience's knowledge that
federal troops had been brought into the state as a direct
result of specific violence against blacks; thus, he
extended the analysis to conclude that had the violence been
widespread the entire state would have been placed under
martial law.

It was not an unreasonable extension of

argument.
Hampton's second line of refutation was against what
he considered personal attacks by Gary.

In his response to

Gray, Gary had said, "He [Gray] claims that the event [black
and white militia marching together] is a natural result of
'Hampton Democracy.'

I suppose that we will next hear of

'dining' or dancing with the colored brothers and sisters
as . . . the natural result of 'Hampton Democracy.'"69

As

discussed above, Hampton did not want to get into the
substance of the attack because of the Claflin incident.
His reply, which focused on the phrase "Hampton Democracy,"
totally missed the issue.

"Hampton Democracy" had not been

coined by Gary but by Gray in his defense of Hampton's
policies.

So the phrase entered the dispute in a positive,

not a derogatory, way and from a friend, not a foe.
69Charleston News and C o u r i e r . 29 August 1878.
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Hampton took umbrage at Gary's use of the term, and argued
that he was not the founder of a school of democracy.

Thus

Hampton1s attack on Gary for use of the phrase was unfounded
since Gary was merely repeating Gray; moreover, Hampton
ignored the substance of the argument which dealt with the
direction his policies were taking.
The constructive policy which Hampton developed for
dealing with the blacks constituted one of the most complete
statements on the subj ect in any of his speeches.

Before

making his proposals, he identified the problem and des
cribed some of its characteristics.
The problem was the "adjustment of the relation of two
distinct nations living on the same soil."
was not temporary.

It was one which

"It is not a question of a day nor of a

generation, but for all time to come, and we have to meet it
now."

His perspective was not a narrow one that looked

exclusively at immediate political gain, but a broad one
that considered the difficulties of two distinct groups of
people living and working together over a long period of
time.

It was the correct perspective for viewing the

problem.
The problem, he contended, was not created by the
white southerners but the northerners who brought the slaves
to the South, sold them, and then to mollify their con
science set them free at no cost to themselves.

But rather

than spend time vilifying the Yankees, he accepted the
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present condition as a burden placed upon the southerner by
an act of Providence:

"We cannot tell what great object

Providence had in view in allowing these things to be done
by which these people have been brought here and liberated
in our midst."

Providence, then, had also placed upon the

whites the responsibility of caring for the blacks:

"He has

brought them here, relieved them of their shackles and left
them here untutored in mind, with all the prejudices a
century of slavery has engrafted on them, and we are to be
their guardians and protectors."

The only flaw with this

relationship was that others had come between the native
white southerners and the blacks, and taught them that "we
[whites] are natural enemies, politically at least, of the
colored men," and "that if the Democratic party got into
power he would be put back into slavery."

In spite of that

teaching, in all matters except voting, the blacks still
felt a strong pull toward their old masters:

"Personally

they have had kindly feelings for their old masters.

Let

one of them but get into difficulties, and in nine cases out
of ten he will go to his old master for assistance, and not
to one of his Republican leaders."

There was, therefore, a

role or an obligation for the whites to fulfill toward the
blacks, and the natural ties from the past would enable him
to carry out that role in all areas except the political,
where the black had been deceived by northern adventurers.
Now, he argued, under his policies the claims of the
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Republicans were exposed as lies, and there was no reason
for the blacks not to trust the white Democrats:
They have been at last dispossessed of the great error
into which they were led by their designing leaders, and
have found that they are protected in all their rights,
and are as free now as they were in '76. . . . They see
now that they were misled and are now willing in many
instances to trust those whom they were taught to
distrust.
His support for the changed attitude was "that while
thousands voted the Democratic ticket at the last election,
thousands more will support it at the next one."
The ideal relationship ordained by Providence was a
benevolent paternalism of whites toward blacks.

This

proposition was strictly an assertion by Hampton, but one
that he was safe in making.

The tendency of blacks to seek

aid from former masters was also unsupported, but Hampton in
his 1876 campaign had frequently referred to his own experi
ences with former slaves to support that contention, and the
argument was not likely to be challenged by his audience.
The causal factor preventing the ideal relationship was the
political distrust of the blacks.

His administration had

eliminated the mistrust, thus they were now in a position
for the ideal relationship to be realized.
A new opportunity was before the Democrats, and
Hampton moved into the means by which this new relationship
could be permanently secured and maintained.
should:

The whites

(1) recognize the political equality of the races;

(2) protect them in the exercise of all their rights; (3)
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manifest a kind disposition toward them; (4) provide
facilities for their education; (5) encourage them to join
the Democratic party and if they did, allow them to vote in
the Democratic primaries; and (6) show them through justice,
generosity, and magnanimity that the whites were their best
friends.

At the same time, blacks would not be given any

preference because of race.

Each man would have to stand

upon his own merits, and positions would be filled by the
most qualified men without regard to race.

Most of these

duties were not developed and had to be accepted on the
authority of Hampton. The exception was education, which he
developed extensively.
He first established the importance of education for a
nation:

"The greatest statesman and philosopher of England

has said that education is the chief defence of a nation,
and no philosophical remark was ever made with greater
truth."

Realizing how sensitive this subject could prove

for his up-country audience, he carefully qualified what he
meant by education.

"I am not one of those who believe

[sic] that because a man can read and write he is neces
sarily a better man than his fellow."

As an example to

prove his point, he recalled that during the war the
northern men were better educated, but the southern men were
better soldiers.

Education, he concluded, was "not only

intellectual education, but education of the heart and
soul— to lift our people up and teach them that the only
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true knowledge is the knowledge of God."

He then turned to

ancient Greece to argue "that the best educated people the
world has ever seen could neither read nor write."

In

addition to the educated Athenians who could neither read
nor write were men of South Carolina in past generations.
They were well versed in governmental and political theory,
but they received it from "their great men who came fre
quently through the country and discussed before them the
great questions of the day."

Once he had qualified his

definition of education, he could then argue for both kinds:
I want not only that education, but the diffusion of a
general education— that the rudiments at least should be
placed in the reach of every man, and the colored people
allowed the opportunity of bettering their condition.
I
want them to be made good citizens, and I believe it can
best be done by giving to their children education.
Education would help them learn the "rights, duties and
responsibilities of citizenship."

The results would be

beneficial to both white and black because "they will be
happier, and will make us happier."
His initial argument for education was a broad
enthymeme that whatever was in the best interest of a
nation was good; education was vital to the interest of a
nation, therefore, education was good and by implication
should be pursued.

The minor premise was expressed as a

quotation from a respected British source.

The major

premise and the conclusion were both unexpressed.

His

second argument was a more narrowly developed causal
analysis.

Education for the blacks would give them a better
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understanding of their role as a citizen which would in turn
make for a better relationship between the races.

The

weakest link in the analysis was that a better informed
black citizenry would work co the benefit of the whites.
Idealistically he was probably correct, but one could also
argue that as education for the blacks increased so would
their desire for more influence in the government and that
definitely would not have made a lot of whites happy.
In his fourth major area of argumentation, Hampton
addressed the issue of dangers to the party.
two concerns:

He identified

(1) independents who acted apart from the

spirit and letter of the platform, and (2) an overconfidence
that tolerated political heresies.

Though Gary's name was

not mentioned in this section, both threats were indirect
attacks upon him.
The greatest threat endangering the party was "that of
an Independent movement."

He carefully defined an indepen

dent as one "who sets up his own individual judgment as a
rule of action, and refuses to act in full and perfect
accord with our platform, in spirit as well as in letter."
The crisis of the times, presumably the threat of blacks and
carpetbaggers regaining control of the government, demanded
unity above all else:
Our party must be kept fully organized, perfectly
compact, and thoroughly disciplined. Every member of it
must yield implicit obedience to its dictates, sacri
ficing, if need be, his private judgment to its
expressed policy, and subordinating all personal
ambition to the public welfare.
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Anyone who did not act in this manner should be considered
an "enemy," and a "radical," for "an open enemy is far less
dangerous than a pretended friend."
On the surface it was a general argument for Demo
cratic unity, which was supported by Democrats across the
state, including Gary.
the intended target.

Below the surface, however, Gary was
In the early part of the speech, he

had shown that Gary was acting in a manner that was totally
inconsistent with the "spirit" and "letter" of the party
platform.

It was common knowledge Gary was pursuing his

ambition for a seat in the United States Senate and apparent
as well that Gary was putting his personal judgments on the
race issue above the expression of the party.

An editorial

in the Charleston News and Courier attacked Gary for being
out of step with the Democratic platform.

"So long,

however, as he approves of and stands by the Fourth Article
of the Edgefield platform, he is not in accord with, and
stands in opposition to, the assembled Democracy of the
State."70

Finally, the "pretended friend" reference was

almost directly from Hampton's letter to James Conner in
which he disparaged Gary's "pretended support."71
The second danger was even more obviously aimed at
Gary.

The threat was an overconfidence that tolerated
70Ibid., 25 September 1878.

71Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade
Hampton Papers.
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deviation from the successful path of 1876:
The Democratic party thinks it is invincible, and it is
so when thoroughly disciplined and properly led, but if
we have divisions and dissensions, and if we allow
ourselves or any men to set up false gods or indoc
trinate us with political heresies and lead us from the
straight road which led to victory in '76 . . . that
party will be scattered as these leaves now shimmering
above us will soon be scattered by the blasts of
October.
The political heresies that would lead them astray were no
doubt the ones he had been attacking throughout the speech.
The audience had two choices:

they could either follow the

policies of Hampton which would lead to victory, or "politi
cal heresies" that created division and ultimately produced
disaster.

The choice was not a difficult one.

The argument

was nothing more than a restatement in general terms of the
more specific argument employed earlier that the "shot-gun
policy" would have led to martial law and carpetbag rule
whereas his policy of moderation had been successful.
Hampton's position and his analysis were clear and
reasonably well developed.

More so than in most of his

speeches, he provided support for his claims.

He provided

multiple documentation to support the commitment of the
Democratic party, which was foundational to everything else
he would argue.

With regard to Gary, he provided a three

fold analysis to prove Gary's inconsistency.

With his

constructive policy for blacks and analysis of dangers to
the party, his line of argument was clear but resting
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primarily upon his authority and the knowledge in the heads
of his audience.
Fitness of Response
Hampton's response to Martin Gary's challenge of his
moderate racial policies was direct, aggressive, bold, and
most appropriate.

He perceived the exigence correctly as a

rhetorical one in which the blacks had to be convinced that
the Democrats would keep their pledges and allow black
participation in party affairs, and whites persuaded that
the promises were commitments that needed to be met.

From

the spring of 1878 until the election in November he spoke
to both black and white audiences in all parts of the state.
Whether the occasion was a political meeting or a festive
one such as the Aiken Schutzenfest he consistently incor
porated into his speeches a call for kind, fair treatment of
the blacks as demonstrated by his administration.

The

blacks were not going to rule the state again, but they
should be fairly represented.
Many of the themes were old ones such as the destinies
of the two races being linked, and that which was in the
best interest of the whites, but there was some remarkable
new ground as well.

Though he had been speaking on the

subject since 1865 the utterances of this period marked his
highest level of appeal.

Repeatedly he framed the issue to

his white audience in moral terms.
violence was wrong.

The Gary policy of

Denying blacks who had voted with the
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Democrats a voice in the primaries was wrong.

Abandoning

promises made in good faith was wrong, and the moral
principle was more important than the pragmatic gain, for it
was better to fail doing right than to succeed doing wrong.
Along with this new moral appeal was also a new dimension of
statesmanship.

He had consistently argued from a perspec

tive of long term race relations, but during this period he
placed more stress upon establishing policies that would
solve the problems for generations to come.

There were

fewer negative statements regarding the blacks and more
emphasis upon education, political participation, and
economic improvement.
The appropriateness of Hampton's response, partic
ularly the policies enumerated in the Greenville speech, is
the subject of considerable difference of opinion among
historians.

Joel Williamson argues generally that Hampton

was not "more willing than any of his followers to give the
Negro political justice."

To the contrary, "Hampton

actually offered Negroes only the privilege of voting for
himself and his followers, and he was in perfect harmony
with those native whites who steadfastly refused to recog
nize the Negro's political equality by joining with him in
any political partnership.1,72

Thomas Holt, looking specifi

cally at the Greenville speech concludes:
Wade Hampton seemed more interested in creating the
72Williamson,

406.
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image [emphasis in original] of liberality than its
substance. . . . In essence, he described a policy based
on the illusion of color-blindness. He promised blacks
a fair procedure [emphasis in original] in the selection
of offices, not actual representation [emphasis in
original] of their constituents in government opera
tions.73
Holt then illustrates his point with the example of the
special election of the Charleston state delegation in 1877.
He cites the view of the Charleston News and Courier that
blacks should be given proportional representation on the
ticket, but when they received fewer than their proper
proportion
the editor dismissed this discrepancy as being of little
practical effect after all. "Upon the fair number of
colored candidates we do not lay so much stress because
every one of the seventeen members from Charleston will
represent the colored people." Thus while great care
should be taken to represent lawyers, doctors, and
Germans, anyone could be counted on to represent
blacks.74
In contrast to Holt and Williamson, George Tindall concludes
that "under a regime of white supremacy Wade Hampton saw
room for the talented and trained Negro and left open the
door of advancement for the whole race."

According to

Tindall, Hampton "gave not only lip service to the pledges
of 1876, but also active effort in carrying them out."
Tindall further points out that "during his administration
Hampton carried out the announced policy of naming the 'best
men' to office without regard to race by appointing a number
73Holt, 212.
74Ibid.
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of negroes to minor offices."

Tindall then proceeds to

document those appointments and the Hampton policy in
general.75

The question then is whether Hampton's response

was one of substance or appearance.
Williamson's statement seems so far off the mark that
it is difficult to understand how he reached his conclusion.
The whole Gary-Hampton controversy that has been documented
above clearly shows that Hampton was most certainly not "in
perfect harmony" with those who refused to recognize the
political equality of the blacks.

In Sumter he commended

the county Democrats for putting up Westberry, a black man,
for a seat in the state legislature.76

Throughout the

state, Hampton encouraged counties with large black popula
tions to divide the offices between them.77

Orangeburg

County Democrats asked the black members of the party to
select a proportionate number of their race to be on the
ticket.78

While the offices and the number of blacks

selected may not have been as great as Williamson desired,
it was Hampton's leadership that was preventing the pro
scription of blacks and providing in large measure support
for the offices they received.
Holt's criticism is unrealistic and slightly
75Tindall, 21-26.
76Columbia Daily Register. 24 September 1878.
77Tindall, 23-24.
78Charleston News and Courier. 12 August 1878.

inaccurate.

In his illustration of the Charleston special

election as representative of the Hampton policy, he misses
the point entirely.

He quotes the opinion of the editor of

the Charleston News and Courier.

In a list of grievances

against Hampton, Martin Gary revealed that the governor
opposed the unseating of the original Charleston dele
gation.79

Not only did he oppose the original action, but

also he sent a message by James Conner encouraging the
Charleston white Democrats to select a proportionate number
of blacks.80

Thus, by his opposition to the unseating and

his direct plea for proportional representation, he
certainly seems to be consistent with the principles
enunciated at Greenville.

It is also difficult to under

stand how Holt can fault Hampton for offering "a fair
procedure" rather than guaranteeing "actual representation."
It is not at all clear how Hampton could have guaranteed
actual representation to any group.

What does seem clear is

that within his socio-political milieu he exercised to the
degree possible both his authority to appoint blacks and the
force of his persuasion to encourage an expanded role for
the blacks.
Both Holt and Williamson appear to be judging Hampton
with a twentieth century standard rather than measuring his
79Message "To His Excellency Wade Hampton, Governor of
South Carolina," Martin Gary Papers.
80Charleston News and Courier. 20 June 1877.
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responses by the attitudes of his day.

They are obviously

bothered by the concepts of white supremacy and paternalism
which were unquestionably part of Hampton's vision of good
race relations.

It is Tindall who is able to look at

Hampton's actions and beliefs and evaluate them within their
context:
The liberal nature of the Hampton program, however,
should not be exaggerated, nor on the other hand, should
it be condemned in the light of contemporary programs
for Negro advancement. It was . . . basically a program
of white supremacy. But there was in the Hampton view
no necessary correlation between white supremacy and
black proscription. His program did not carry the
connotation that latterday white supremacists included
of the complete elimination of Negroes from public
life.
Tindall then concludes:

"Given the situation in which he

found himself and the dominant spirit of the times, with
both northern and southern white opinion accepting as
axiomatic the innate inferiority of the Negro race, the
Hampton program marks him as a generous and constructive
statesman with regard to race relations."81

Considered thus

within its context, his response was not image creation, but
a substantive, appropriate response to a challenging exigence.
81Tindall, 20-22.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
This investigation of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric
in South Carolina 1865-1878 was prompted by studies showing
him as a prominent reconciliation speaker in the North, a
major spokesman for the South, and a moderate on the race
issue.

Since no investigation of his speaking in South

Carolina existed, this study attempted to assess his
speaking in the state on the race issue.

The dates repre

sent the period of his active involvement in the contro
versy.

The major newspapers of the state were examined to

locate his speeches, which were then categorized by period
and subject.

Those that contained racial passages were

grouped for further study.

These speeches were then

critiqued employing the methodology of the rhetorical
situation.

This approach seemed most appropriate since it

allowed the critic to view Hampton's speeches as a response
to an urgent problem, which in fact they were, and to
analyze the appropriateness of his response.
The plotting of his speeches revealed four periods of
active speaking on the racial theme, with a different
emphasis in each period.

In 1865-66 he focused on the lost
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supply of laborers and the need through fairness and kind
treatment to induce the former slaves to return to the
fields, lest both white and black go down to economic ruin.
In 1867-68 he directed his attention to the suffrage issue
and sought to gain control of the black vote by offering a
qualified suffrage.

Personal matters took him out of active

involvement in the affairs of the state until the campaign
of 1876.

In his campaign for governor, he went to the

blacks seeking their assistance in redeeming the state from
thieves and carpetbaggers.

In the last period, 1877-78, he

fought attempts from within the Democratic party to break
his promises of 1876 and proscribe blacks from party
participation.
Conclusions
At the beginning of the study a number of questions
were posed.

It is now possible to look back over the

preceding chapters and posit answers to those questions.
(1)

To what extent were Hampton's speeches in South

Carolina from 1865 until 1879 concerned with the race issue?
Three general themes emerge in Wade Hampton's
speaking:
race.
two.

the Lost Cause, North-South reconciliation, and

The race question overwhelmingly dominates the other
The Lost Cause theme was frequently employed in

ceremonial addresses to various veterans' groups, both in
and out of the state.

Even on these occasions, however,

Hampton would at times inject the racial theme as he did in
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his 1866 Walhalla address and the 1878 speech at the
reception for the Washington Light Infantry.

The recon

ciliation theme was used more at engagements outside of the
state than within it.
Of his thirteen known speaking occasions within the
state during 1865-68, all but two were concerned to some
extent with the racial issue.

In all probability the actual

number is higher since the number of speeches reported for
the 1867-68 suffrage campaign does not seem to match the
level of his involvement.
From 1869 until 1876 there is no evidence of a single
speech delivered by him within the state on the racial
issue.

The only evidence of his addressing the issue at all

during this period is his 1869 speech at the Macon, Georgia
fair.

He was out of the state for most of the period

attending to personal and business matters.

His speeches

were ceremonial and centered around the Lost Cause theme.
Both the amount of his speaking and the proportion
devoted to the racial issue increased enormously beginning
with his 1876 gubernatorial campaign and lasting through his
election to the United States Senate at the end of 1878.
the 1876 campaign there were at least fifty-seven major
addresses plus his acceptance of the nomination and his
inaugural.

Thus,, during the five month period from August

through December there were at least fifty-nine major
addresses that focused on the racial

issue.

His pace

In

229

changed dramatically in 1877 with only three speeches
delivered in the state, but all three dealt with the racial
theme.

He returned to a more active schedule in the state

in 1878, delivering twenty-seven major addresses of which
twenty-five incorporated the racial element.

Not included

in this number are short impromptu speeches delivered en
route to campaign engagements.

The number is smaller than

it would have been had he not become ill and cancelled
several of his campaign addresses.
Over the span of thirteen and one-half years from
after the Civil War until his election to the United States
Senate in 1878, it is possible to document 102 speeches
delivered by Wade Hampton in South Carolina.

Of those

speeches ninety-eight dealt at least in part with the racial
issue.

Overwhelmingly, the dominant theme of his speaking

in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 was race.
(2)

What arguments and strategies did he employ to

deal with the racial situation?
There is no evidence of a clearly developed strategy
by Hampton for dealing with the racial problem prior to the
spring of 1867, yet his speeches during 1865 and 1866 were
all consistent with the later plan of action.

In letters to

John Mullaly and James Conner in the spring of 1867 he
clearly outlined his plan for dealing with the racial issue.
His obj ectives were the obvious one of preventing the blacks
from "overwhelming" the white minority and the less expected
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one of making a record for history.

The only expression of

the latter goal was in his letter to John Mullaly:
We are appealing to the enlightened sense and the
justice of mankind. We come forward and say we accept
the decision rendered against us. We acknowledge the
freedom of the negro and we are willing to have one law
for him and for us. We are making up our record for
posterity and we wish no blot or stain to be found
there.1
Though this letter provides the only reference to the motive
of a record for posterity in the approach to the blacks, his
later affiliation with the Southern Historical Society
suggests that he was concerned with how subsequent gener
ations would view his actions.

To James Conner he wrote in

1869:
There is another matter on foot in New Orleans which
promises immense good— the formation of a grand
Historical Society with branches all over the south. I
have promised to assist in this scheme. . . . We wish to
put on record in an enduring form, the truths regarding
our struggle for freedom, and thus preserve untarnished
our glorious position and our heroic deeds. If we let
the Yankees manufacture a history, as they do wooden
nut-megs, we shall have of the former about as good an
article as they gave us of the latter, and as much like
the genuine.2
A key ingredient in achieving his objectives was to
realistically assess the situation and adjust his plans
accordingly.

Prior to the war he had been a Union man

opposed to secession, but when South Carolina withdrew from
the Union he adjusted his stance and wholeheartedly
^■Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
2Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade
Hampton Papers.
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supported the southern cause.

After the war he repeatedly

counseled frank recognition of what had happened and the
need to accept new realities.

On the need to face the

realities of the racial issue he wrote to John Mullaly,
I advocate a warm protest from the South against all
this legislation of Congress, but protests can do us no
good. We must meet it as a fact, one we have to deal
with, and on the solution of which depends the very
existence of our country.3
To Conner, he wrote in 1869,
It is criminal to say that because we do not recognize
the present State Offices as constitutional, we refuse
to take any part in the administration. We cannot be
extricated from our deplorable condition by any help
from abroad, we must work out our own political sal
vation and work it out with such instruments as we find
at hand.4
A realistic approach to the new conditions called for
a strategy of controlling the black vote by saying "to the
negroes, we are your friends . . . we are willing to let the
educated and tax paying among them vote."5

To Mullaly, he

indicated it meant "making the negro a Southern man and if
you will a democrat, anything but a radical.1,6

The critical

element in the strategy was a kind, benevolent attitude
3Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
4Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade
Hampton Papers.
5Ibid., 24 March 1867.
6Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
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toward the blacks by the whites:
As it is of the last consequence to maintain the same
amicable relations which have heretofore existed between
the whites and the blacks, I cannot too strongly
reiterate my counsel, that all classes should cultivate
harmony and exercise forbearance. Let our people
remember that the negroes have as a general rule,
behaved admirably, and that they are in no manner
responsible for the present conditions of affairs.
Should they, in the future, be mislead by wicked or
designing men, let us consider how ignorant they
necessarily are, and let us only the more, try to
convince them that we are their best friends. Deal with
them with perfect justice, and thus show that you wish
to promote their advancement and enlightenment.7
This realistic, pragmatic strategy even meant con
cessions to and compromises with the blacks.

The qualified

suffrage was an effort to divide the blacks along class
lines and draw to themselves the educated, propertied class
of blacks whose interest in sound government and economic
responsibility would most likely be parallel to their own.
It even meant giving some offices to the blacks:
Like you, I am only solicitous about our state govern
ment, and if we can protect that from destruction, I am
willing to send negroes to Congress. They will be
better than any one who can take the oath and I should
rather trust them than renegades or Yankees.8
A few weeks later he was even more direct, "We had better
endeavor to compromise with the negroes, allowing them to go
to Congress

if they will let us have the State."9

7Wade Hampton to D. W. Ray, Wm. H. Talley, et al., 27
August 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.
8Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
9Ibid., 9 April 1867.

His strategy, then, came from a realistic, pragmatic
assessment of conditions.
black vote.

It was an attempt to direct the

An exercise of kindness and good will would

reaffirm former ties of loyalty and friendship between
masters and slaves and thus draw to them many of their
previous slaves.

The qualified suffrage and compromise on

offices would split the blacks along class lines disfran
chising the majority of blacks while drawing to them the
upper strata of blacks.

Of course, after 1868 the qualified

suffrage aspect of the strategy had to be abandoned, but the
rest remained intact.

Finally, they were to appeal to the

blacks in terms of mutual self interests and southern heri
tage.

In essence the strategy was almost exactly what

Horace Greeley had suggested would have been the appropriate
policy for the South to have pursued immediately after the
war.
Aristotle said that the appeal from a man's character
is probably stronger than either emotional or logical
appeals.

An analysis of Hampton's speeches revealed the

prominent role of ethos in his arguments.

Aristotle placed

the emphasis upon ethos developed within the speech rather
than that which preceded the speaker to the occasion.

In

Hampton's case, however, he drew heavily upon antecedent
ethos as well as that developed in the speech.

With his

white audiences his reputation as successful planter and
military hero was well established.

Primarily because of
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the war, the admiration for the man was not divided by class
or sectional lines.

He was as popular in the up-country as

in the low and with the merchants and small dirt farmers as
with the aristocracy.

Thus, there was little need to

develop ethos among the whites.

The only time he developed

the ethos argument in speaking to whites was in 1878 when he
linked his policies and his character and argued that to
talk of going back on the pledges of 1876 was a direct
threat to his integrity.
To his black audiences he developed at length the
elements of trustworthiness, sincerity, and good will.

In

Richland Fork he was a man of truth and good will, who had
the best interests of the blacks at heart.

In the freed-

men's address over one-third of the speech was spent
establishing his trustworthiness, and a similar portion was
used to build sincerity by showing the consistency of his
approach since the war.

The same was true in the 1876

campaign when in almost every speech he argued the good
relationship that had existed in the past between himself
and his former slaves.

Repeatedly he gave illustrations and

examples of the respect and trust exhibited toward him by
blacks.

In 1878 he pointed to the fulfilling of his pledges

as past evidence of his trustworthiness.
Hampton accurately recognized the pivotal role his
character played in any appeal to blacks and correctly
stressed those appeals.

In order to achieve any degree of
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success he had to convince them that he and the other whites
could be trusted with their political future.

In 1867

Hampton could point to past examples of his good relations
with blacks as justification for trusting him; however, the
record of the white power structure since the war indicated
they were not a safe repository for black rights.

While the

blacks might trust Hampton, he was in no position to make
guarantees or speak in any official capacity.

In 1876 the

same appeals had greater impact since as candidate for
governor, he spoke for the party and with the power to carry
»

out his pledges.
Hampton's motive appeals were both positive and nega
tive, and demonstrated some progression in his approach
during the period.

Self interest, particularly in terms of

economic survival, was one of his most consistent appeals.
In 1865 he told the whites it was in their self interest to
treat the blacks kindly and fairly because it was the best
way to keep laborers for their farms.

To the blacks he

contended in 1865, 1867, and 1876 that their economic
interest was intrinsically bound up with that of the whites.
Instead of showing, however, the economic benefits that were
possible if the whites thrived, the application was
primarily negative, stressing how far down in the rubble
heap the blacks would be if they let the whites go under.
In 1865 and 1867 he strengthened the fear dimension by
adding reminders of what had happened to the Indians.

He
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was correct in his assessment that the self interest of both
blacks and whites required a working together but the
emphasis was misdirected.

When one has been on the lowest

possible rung of the economic ladder, the threat of collapse
is not terribly intimidating; a more compelling appeal would
have been to hold out possible gains for them through mutual
cooperation.
A second major appeal involved two dimensions:
patriotism and identification.

To the whites the appeal was

to work and sacrifice for the good of South Carolina.

For

the blacks, however, before he could appeal to them for the
good of the state, he had to get them to see themselves as
Carolinians and southerners, thus the two pronged approach.
In 1867 and 1876 he tried to transcend the racial and class
differences and have the blacks view themselves as one with
the whites in their heritage; he could then appeal to them
as patriots.

While the appeal was ideally suited to his

white audience, it was painfully obvious to the blacks that
they were not and had not been one with the native sons.
The South Carolina of the blacks was a totally different
state from the one celebrated by the whites.
The progression in his thinking is seen in his
speaking in 1878, and particularly in the Greenville
address.

The appeal was not to immediate self interest or

economic survival but to a true patriotism that looked
toward the long term solution of a profound sociological
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problem.

The emphasis was positive in providing education

and opportunity for the blacks.

Finally, he placed his

appeal on a new level, that of morality.

Certain actions

and approaches to the racial problem were wrong and his
appeal was to do what was right.
In his argumentation Hampton utilized both construc
tive and refutative approaches, and employed enthymemes,
causal analysis, and generalizations.

His arguments tended

to be broad and sweeping in nature and frequently lacked
adequate support.

Rarely in any of the speeches did he

engage in counter argumentation; it was almost as if his
were the only conclusions possible.

One conceivable

explanation for his reliance upon his authority rather than
evidence and his failure to engage in counter argumentation
may rest with his background.

As a wealthy planter, who

managed several plantations, and a high ranking confederate
officer, he was more accustomed to having his statements
accepted at face value than having to support them with
detailed analysis and evidence.
In 1865 he argued that the best way to keep crops in
production and achieve a happy, contented, and laborious
peasantry was through kind treatment.
his authority.

The only proof was

In 1867 he contended that the interests of

the blacks were bound up with those of the native whites and
that the native whites were the best ones to have political
control of the state.

While he used valid lines of
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argument, his evidence did not adequately support his
premises or his conclusions.

In 1876 his emphasis shifted

from constructive to refutative arguments.

He had to refute

the belief that the whites, once they got in power, would
take away the rights of the blacks.

The case here was one

of the best constructed in all of his speeches.

The

analysis showing the threefold guarantee of rights by the
whites, himself, and the blacks was brilliant, but at the
same time the argument was flawed because the truth of two
of his propositions was certainly susceptible to doubt, even
though he supported them with evidence.

His two construc

tive arguments consisted of an enthymeme indicting the
integrity of the radical office seekers and a causal
argument dissuading the whites from violent tactics.
The Greenville speech in 1878 was probably his best
use of argumentation; it was certainly his most extensive
and well developed attempt at analysis.

Two of his best

constructive arguments dealt with the commitment of the
party to the platform of 1876 and the need to provide
education for the blacks.

The former was a generalization

which was well supported with examples, and the latter was
an enthymeme with premises supported by historical example
and authority.

He advanced a detailed refutation of Gary's

position but it did not match his other arguments.

The

analysis was valid, but his support was not adequate to
prove his contentions.

239

Overall, Hampton's analysis was generally valid, and
his arguments pertinent to the question.

His great weakness

was a tendency to rely too heavily upon his audience to
provide proof for his propositions or to trust his
authority.

Here one must realize that in some cases he was

trying to establish a point for which all of the existing
evidence was contrary to his thesis.

In trying to prove in

1867 and 1876 that the whites would preserve and protect
black rights, the only direct evidence was the refusal of
the whites to grant a qualified suffrage in 1865 and the
passage of the harsh, restrictive Black Codes.

Thus,

Hampton was faced with the challenge of advancing an
argument with all of the evidence against him.

It must also

be remembered that while many of his arguments were not
sufficient to meet the rigorous demands of the critic,
Hampton's authority and the premises drawn from his
audience's own experience were sufficient to secure the
point.
(3)

Did his position and strategies remain consistent

throughout the period?
One of the rather surprising findings of this study is
the consistency of Hampton's position.

Only a little more

than six months after the war, Hampton addressed an audience
of blacks and whites at Richland Fork and made his initial
statement on the approach to be adopted in the new racial
climate.

From that day until his departure for the Senate
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in 1879 his position did not change.

His private corres

pondence with political confidants elaborated upon and
clarified his position but was internally consistent
throughout the period and consonant with his public utter
ances .

The same policies were advocated before white

audiences that were argued before black ones.
in the up-country was no different in the low.

His position
In short,

Hampton may be faulted for many things, but not for being
inconsistent in his racial views.

Apparently early on, he

had a view of the new social, economic, and political
relations in the post-war society and the means to achieve
that goal.

While the society about him underwent revolu

tionary change, his vision and the means for achieving it
remained essentially unaltered.
(4)

To what extent did Hampton practice and encourage

rhetorical means for solving the race problem as opposed to
more coercive ones?
There is no direct evidence that Hampton ever prac
ticed or encouraged anything but rhetorical means for
solving the racial problem, and considerable evidence to
establish his active opposition to violence, intimidation,
coercion, and fraud as means of dealing with the blacks. The
only reason to raise the question is because of some of the
tactics employed in the 1876 campaign.

Outside of this

campaign there isn't even a shadow of tolerance for anything
but persuasive means.

There is no question but that

coercive methods were practiced in the campaign.

Impor

tantly, however, no one actually accused Hampton of being
present where any violence or intimidation occurred.

The

Senate investigating committee concluded that Hampton was
totally removed from all of the violent aspects of the
campaign.10

Apparently there were two roads for the

campaign, the high road of persuasion taken by Hampton, and
the low road of violence and intimidation traveled by Martin
Gary.

The question is whether Hampton knew of the violence

and gave tacit approval by ignoring it.

There is no direct

evidence on the question, so the answer is based strictly on
inference.

Considering the contacts he had and his promi

nence in the campaign it seems almost impossible that he
would not have known about the violence and intimidation
that were taking place.

Secondly, those who pursued the

policy of violence perceived Hampton's approach as inimical
to their own, and in 1878 he directly challenged Gary and
his policies.

The best conclusion seems to be that Hampton

knew, at least in part, of some of the acts of violence and
intimidation, and that he did not approve of the activities,
but lacked the political clout to stop it.

Not until his

position was secure in 1878 could he move directly against
the intemperate forces of Gary, and even then he was still
unable to totally control the actions of his party.

Hampton

repeatedly avowed a commitment to persuasion as the means
10South Carolina in 1 8 7 6 . 138.
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for gaining black support, and his actions appear to affirm
the sincerity of his commitment.
(5)

To what extent did Hampton’s speeches offer a

constructive solution to the problem of race relations in
South Carolina?
In the conclusion of his Greenville address, Wade
Hampton spoke eloquently of his vision for the state.
I have been looking far beyond the present day— for it
has seemed to me that I have been able sometimes to
catch transient glimpses of the future through the veil
that hides it from us— and I have thought that in that
far future, in the day when you and I and all of us
shall have been gathered to our God, I could see a great
and happy State and people. Our children's children—
wise by the errors we have committed, chastened by
sorrows we vicariously have borne for them, instructed
by the experiences we have gained— shall build up a new
and great country. They will lift up South Carolina and
place her where God intended her to stand— with a
united, free and happy people, walking on the great road
to National prosperity and peace. I have seen that
future, and I have worked for it; I have prayed for
it.11
Hampton had a vision of an ideal social order for a
prosperous South Carolina, and toward this vision he worked
and prayed.

Before evaluating the vision one must first

determine the character of his society.
The first tenet upon which Hampton's society was
constructed was white supremacy.

In an 1888 article he

clearly and forthrightly stated and defended his position:
The question has been asked in some quarters, "What
would be the effect upon the South, morally, socially,
and commercially of the political supremacy of the
negro?" Every one in the South who had the misfortune
^ Charleston News and C o u r i e r . 20 September 1878.
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to experience that baleful supremacy while it existed
would answer, without hesitation, that it would involve
total and absolute ruin to the South, and infinite and
irreparable loss to the whole country. But a large
class at the North, mainly honest and conscientious men,
but knowing nothing of the condition of affairs at the
South, and profoundly ignorant of the characteristics of
the negro, think that he should, of right, rule,
wherever his race is in the majority. To this class I
shall address myself, and I shall endeavor to prove, by
facts cited from the recent history of South Carolina,
while under negro rule, how erroneous are their
opinions, and how sound are those of the southern people
who have had direful experiences of negro supremacy.12
At the conclusion of the article he quoted Abraham Lincoln
to show that the Great Emancipator held similar views on the
equality of the races, yet Lincoln "was equally emphatic in
expressing the utmost kindness for the negro.

No one can

doubt that he was a sincere friend of the colored race.1,13
Repeatedly in his speeches in 1878 he reminded blacks that
while their rights would be protected and they could
participate in government, never again would they control
the state.
The second tenet was that the primary role for the
black was as a laborer on large farms and plantations.

At

Richland Fork he had argued that kind treatment of the
blacks would bring about "a happy contented and laborious
peasantry."

The blacks, however, were to be given the

opportunity to acquire education and better prepare them
selves for the responsibilities of citizenship.
12Hampton, "Negro Supremacy," 2.
13Ibid., 14.

Those that
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were qualified by education and experience would have an
equal opportunity to compete with whites for positions in
government.

Ideally he would have had only the educated and

property holders voting, but that was taken out of his
hands.

Blacks should be encouraged to join the Democratic

party and all black members should have full voting rights
in party matters and primaries.
His vision has received a variety of labels from
historians.

Holt and Cooper see it, at least partially, as

an expression of noblesse oblige.14

Williamson describes it

as "paternal politics as they had given him paternal
slavery."15

Tindall characterizes it as noblesse oblige,

paternalism and white supremacy.16

They are all correct; it

was all of those, but because those terms carry a strong
negative connotation in late twentieth century society one
cannot deprecate out of hand the application of those
concepts in the latter portion of the nineteenth century.
One must consider the context and the alternatives.
Hampton's program was a significant improvement over the
Black Codes of 1865 and the later violence and proscription
of Gary and Tillman.

It also represented a realistic

assessment of what could be done.

The program had to be

within the latitude of acceptance of the whites or it would
14Holt, 212; Cooper, Jr., 19.
15Williamson, 406.
16Tindall, 21.
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have gone nowhere.

As it: was, Hampton was operating on the

very fringe of acceptability as he sought to expand the area
of acceptance.

As discussed earlier he was significantly

ahead of other whites in 1867 when he called for a qualified
suffrage, and though his program was being implemented from
1876 to 1878 it was not without a struggle.

His program was

positive and constructive in that it offered the best
attainable balance between a totally unacceptable black
supremacy-on the one hand and proscription on the other and
sought to establish persuasion, accommodation, respect, and
equality of rights as means for solving for generations to
come the complex problem of "two distinct nations living on
the same soil."
(6)

What was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial

rhetoric?
From 1865 through 1868 Hampton's rhetorical efforts
were apparent failures with no favorable results.

In 1865

the farmers preferred the Black Codes as a means of keeping
their labor over Hampton's proposal for kind treatment and
just compensation.

In 1867-68 blacks rejected his plea to

trust the native whites and qualify their suffrage.

It was

not all failure, however, since he established a wide
reputation as a racial moderate.

The New York Times. New

York Herald. Harper1s Weekly, and the New York Daily Tribune
all commended his moderate views and his persuasive efforts
toward the blacks.

The Richmond Times indicated pleasant
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surprise at Hampton's speech to the freedmen:
Light upon the intricate problems of "how to deal with
the freedman" [emphasis in original] has broken in upon
us from a most unexpected quarter. Wade Hampton of
South Carolina . . . is destined to become as
distinguished as a sagacious, practical statesman, as he
was a hero.17
By the time of the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he was
clearly identified as a moderate on the racial issue, and
one of the strengths in his appeal to the blacks was that he
could point to a consistent position that went back ten
years.
While Hampton's figure of seventeen thousand blacks
voting with him in 1876 may be somewhat exaggerated, and
while the precise number cannot be documented, blacks across
the state in substantial numbers did listen to him, and
several thousands of them voted for him.

Hampton, uniquely,

possessed the personal appeal that allowed him to bridge the
gulf between the races.

He was able to both rally and

restrain the whites and persuade the blacks.

Without his

judicious application of rhetoric to the situation, it is
highly doubtful that the whites would have carried the 1876
election.
In 1878 his rhetorical efforts were directed at
reaffirming and redeeming the pledges made two years
earlier.

In many counties with large black populations the

problem was how to deal with the new influx of blacks and
17Richmond Times in Columbia Daily P h o e n i x . 26 March
1867.
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particularly their role in the candidate selection process.
One cannot establish a direct causal link between Hampton's
persuasive efforts and actual policies adopted in the
counties, but significantly, the counties, with few excep
tions, and the state convention adopted Hampton's position.
One certainly cannot discount the multiple factors
that were at work during the period influencing racial
attitudes and decisions, but clearly the rhetoric of Wade
Hampton played a major part in helping define and shape the
new black-white relationships in the post-war period.
In 1865 the world turned over for southerners.

Not

only had they lost the war, but with emancipation of the
slaves their whole social order had been thrown into chaos.
The attempt to restore order and define the proper relation
ship between the races presented a problem of such com
plexity and controversy that over a hundred years later it
is still one of society's most pressing issues.

The study

of Wade Hampton provides insight into the efforts of one
man, in one state, during one brief period to cope with the
problem.

He perceived the issues in terms of economic and

political exigencies which could be modified through the
application of rhetoric.

His efforts demonstrate for the

rhetorical critic the power and significance of a rhetor's
personal character and the comparative roles of rhetoric and
coercion as they were applied to the same objective.

The

substance of his solution to the exigence was not such as

would be appropriate in our day, but was in his, and at
least provided a direction which if followed in succeeding
generations might have removed the exigence from ours.
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